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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM DEFINED 
Preliminary Comments 
To no small degree this dissertation is a thought 
experiment. It consists of a somewhat self-imposed 
theoretical puzzle regarding a specific problem in the 
philosophy of art. Having an interest in and preference for 
nominalism as an ontological perspective along with an 
interest in and some occasional experience with musical 
composition and performance, I have wondered whether the two 
interests could be combined into a coherent position: a 
nominalistic theory of musical compositions. Therefore, it 
should be made quite clear from the beginning that I am not 
searching for a conclusion, I already have one in mind; nor 
do I have pretensions of settling the question, What is 
the ontological status of musical works of art?. My 
purposes are, I believe, more modest. I am simply 
addressing the challenge of constructing an ontology of 
musical works that might be satisfying to those with a 
nominalistic bent or outlook. The question this dissertation 
seeks to resolve is this: if someone were inclined to 
believe that musical works are individuals, and that as 
individuals, they are, furthermore, better understood as 
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concrete particulars, what shape might a theory take in 
order to account for such presuppositions? 
The hypothetical character of this thesis should not 
be taken as implying any lack of seriousness of motive on my 
part, nor should it be thought to imply that I do not think 
what follows is a viable theory. But it is important that 
readers recognize the actual goals of this essay. The 
starting point is a nominalistic perspective. I do not hope 
to convert non-nominalists to such a position; however, a 
greater measure of sympathy for the view would be desirable. 
It might be said then, that the minimal goal for this 
dissertation is providing a plausible ontology of music that 
is reasonably consistent with both nominalism and actual 
musical practice. The maximal goal for these efforts is 
developing a better theory than the alternatives, that is, 
determining what might be a "correct" description of musical 
compositions. 
Thus, this dissertation seeks to be an investigation 
into the possibility and character of a nominalistic 
ontology of musical works. More specifically, this is a 
proposal for a theory of musical compositions that construes 
them as concrete particulars. A nominalistic ontology is, 
in simplest terms, a theory that countenances the existence 
of individuals only; or alternatively, it denies the 
existence of any sort of non-individual abstract entities or 
universals other than general words.1 Therefore, th~ 
3 
proposed theory that follows will characterize musical 
compositions as individuals. But in addition and in keeping 
with the proposed notion of concrete particular and 
consistent with their status as artworks, compositions will 
also be regarded as physical or sensory artifacts, i.e., 
publically observable objects made by some person or 
persons. 
In saying that concrete particulars of the sort I 
shall be discussing are physical objects, I am indicating 
that such an entity exists objectively in space and time. 
In saying that these concrete particulars are sensory (or 
phenomenal) objects, I am indicating that they are 
perceivable with the senses by perceivers. Thus, 
compositions, as concrete particulars, are entities existing 
independently and objectively of those who perceive them. 
Compositions qua compositions are therefore not imaginary .,,,., 
nor conceptual entities. Dreams or hallucinations, for 
example, are phenomenal without being physical, (except as 
chemical or electrical brain phenomena, I suppose); whereas 
atoms are physical without being phenomenal, (under "normal" 
sensory conditions). 
Another point regarding the claim that concrete 
particulars are physical and phenomenal has to do with the 
recognition that entities of the sort I am concerned with 
are describable in at least two basic ways. A physical 
description of something is an account of its extension in 
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space and related qualities. A phenomenal description of 
the same thing would amount to a report of someone's sensory 
experiences of the thing. For example, a musical 
performance described physically would be in terms of sound 
waves of certain frequencies; while a phenomenal account 
would be in terms of adjectives like "loud", "sonorous", and 
"high pitched". Therefore, compositions, since they are 
concrete particulars which are physical and phenomenal 
objects, can be described in either of these two ways. 
A nominalistic ontology has little difficulty in 
accomodating the notion of concrete particular. Whether or 
not so-called "abstract particulars" are acceptable to 
nominalism is not so clear, and so this shall be left an 
open question, (although I shall touch on it later, 
especially in Chapter V). The present objective includes 
the development of a theory of compositions construed as 
concrete particulars. Under the view presented here, to say 
that something is concrete is to assert that it is 
non-abstract and "combined with, or embodied in matter, 
actual practice, or a particular example"2; it is spatially 
and temporally identifiable and is fundamentally describable 
as physical and/or sensory. To say that something is a 
particular is to assert further that it is non-universal and 
not general, it is a specific individual entity 
distinguishable and separable from other individuals. It is 
a singular entity that, unlike what is general or universal, 
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cannot exist as some sort of common nature or feature of 
something other than itself. A concrete particular has no 
existence prior to or independent of its spatial and 
temporal location. Thus, a nominalistic ontology of musical 
artworks, as developed in this dissertation, will construe 
them as a unique, physical and/or sensory individuals, and 
will avoid any description of them in terms of abstract or 
conceptual ontological categories. 
Although some might insist that all artworks are 
essentially conceptual or abstract rather than physical or 
sensory, (for reasons to be discussed later in this 
chapter), others are likely to acknowledge that at least 
some of the arts are comprised of works of art that are each 
concrete particulars. A paradigmatic example would be 
painting. Paintings are usually regarded as unique 
individuals consisting of pigments on an actual physical 
surface, (e.g., canvas, wood, paper, plaster, etc.). They 
are each one-of-a-kind spatial and visible objects, whose 
basic aesthetic properties are visual. Other arts such as 
sculpture and architecture are likewise often taken to be 
comprised of artworks which are the physical artifacts we 
perceive as before us; i.e., statues and buildings. 
In music, (as well as with others of the arts, e.g., 
dance, film, literature, drama, printmaking), the situation 
appears to be quite different. What sort of thing or object 
is a musical work of art? Paintings, sculptures, and 
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buildings are physical objects, pieces of matter, but 
musical compositions and performances are not so clearly 
material in this way. Musical sounds are thoroughly 
transient, and the works made of these transitory items lack 
the relative permanence that the other sorts of artworks 
mentioned above possess. We cannot point at musical works 
in the way we can point at paintings, sculptures, and 
buildings. Whereas daVinci's "Mona Lisa" exists in one 
place at a time, and Giacometti's "Standing Youth" and Frank 
Lloyd Wright's "Heller House" are likewise spatially and 
temporally identifiable; can we refer to Beethoven's "D 
Minor Symphony" in this manner? 
First of all, Beethoven's symphony, taken as his work 
of art, his composition, is usually distinguished from any 
particular performance of it. A performance quite clearly 
consists of sensory experiences, and is spatially and 
temporally identifiable. But in what sense is Beethoven's 
work itself identifiable and sensible? Does it even make 
sense to ask such a question about such a thing as a musical 
composition? It is generally recognized that this symphony 
can be performed an indefinite number of times in an 
indefinite number of places. Does this imply that there are 
an indefinite number of "D Minor Symphonies"?; is any given 
performance actually Beethoven's work of art anyway, or do 
we never hear Beethoven's genuine work of art?; and what 
about the score, is there any sense in which this paper 
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filled with notations is the work of art? These and a host 
of other difficulties associated with music will be examined 
later in this dissertation. 
These sorts of considerations have led some 
philosophers to conclude that the genuine musical work of 
art, the composition, is fundamentally some kind of abstract 
entity. One direction taken has been to regard the 
ontological status of the work as essentially conceptual, 
mental, or imaginary. Any physical or sensory manifestation 
of music, i.e., performances, (actual sound sequences), or 
scores, (notated symbols on paper), is merely a means of 
conveying the essential work to audiences. The "true" work 
is the object of mental aesthetic contemplation: either the 
artist's or the spectator's internal experience; or it is 
the intelligible form or design of the work. Another 
direction taken has been to construe the work as some sort 
of universal; that is, as something capable of multiple 
instantiations. From this perspective the work is evident 
in any number of individual performances, scores, 
recordings, etc., but none of these particular objects is 
the actual work itself. Musical compositions may then be 
comparable to other universals like "Redness", "Chair", or 
"Justice". Under this view, compositions, as with 
universals generally, are not only non-physical and 
non-corporeal, but they do not require physical embodiment 
in order to exist. A version of each of these two 
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directions will be addressed at length in Chapter IV of this 
dissertation. 
It is my intention here to argue against such 
conceptions of musical works, and for, rather, a conception 
which construes them nominalistically as concrete 
particulars. The musical work will be described as an 
individual sensory object, (perceivable as sights, sounds, 
etc., depending on the medium in which it exists), and as a 
particular physical artifact made by some person or persons. 
This artifact is the sort of thing that can be copied or 
imitated in a variety of ways and in diverse media. Such 
copying of a physical artifact will be distinguished from 
such non-nominalistic descriptions as 'instantiating' or 
'being an example of' as the fundamental relationship 
between composition and performance. 
Therefore, under my proposal, a particular performance 
of Beethoven's "D Minor Symphony", for example, is not, 
strictly speaking, Beethoven's artwork, nor is it properly 
regarded as an instance or occurrence of his composition. 
Rather, such a performance is understood to be a new, yet v 
only partly original, artifact derived from Beethoven's 
original work. A performance of the "D Minor Symphony" uses 
a copy of Beethoven's manuscript score as a set of 
instructions, a description, or a guide towards making some 
musical sound occurrence. The performance "earns" the title 
"D Minor Symphony" on the basis of an historical conriection 
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with Beethoven's original musical composition. Chapter III 
will attempt to spell out these issues. 
An assumption of this dissertation related to the 
larger theory will be the claim that not all works of art 
are admired in and of themselves or for their intrinsic 
sensory qualities. The significance of this subsidiary 
thesis may be seen in relation to the aesthetic value of 
manuscript scores as artworks. Paintings and sculptures are 
often taken to be aesthetically interesting and valuable for 
their immediate sensory characteristics: color, shape, 
texture, etc. But they may be valued also for their 
references, meanings, and representations beyond these 
directly experienced qualities.3 That a painting represents 
the Crucifixion or incorporates various symbols, for 
example, is usually taken to be somehow aesthetically 
relevant, if not essential, to an adequate appreciation of 
such pieces. In admitting this, someone may yet justifiably 
claim that the physical painting remains as the actual 
artwork. 
Similarly, musical performances are quite clearly 
aesthetically important, in large measure, because of their 
directly experienced audial qualities. Whether musical 
sounds and their arrangements can be or are meaningful 
beyond this sensory level is a matter of great controversy. 
But let us set that issue aside for the moment and note that 
musical works in manuscript form, (i.e., notational ~ymbols 
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on paper), are most often aesthetically admirable for what 
they can do or be used for rather than for their intrinsic 
sensory properties. Very rarely, if ever, is a manuscript 
contemplated for the dots and lines that comprise its visual 
qualities, (in fact, to do so would probably amount to 
treating the manuscript like a painting or a print rather 
than as a musical score). Some people can "read" manuscript 
scores and imagine music consistent with the notation. This 
situation does not undermine the point here. A case of 
imagining music "in one's head" based upon a composer's 
manuscript should not be confused with a case of admiring 
the sensory qualities of the manuscript. The former is a 
case of using the score for something else, namely, 
imagining music. The essential point here is that the 
notational symbols derive their aesthetic value primarily 
from their ability to refer to or represent actual musical 
sound occurrences which are aesthetically valuable for 
themselves. 
Compositions are the products of certain acts of 
composing. One of the chief tasks of the dissertation will 
be to describe how the making of compositional artifacts 
bears upon the ontological issues at stake. Composing is, 
most simply, the selecting and arranging of what I shall 
call "musical elements". Musical elements will be presented 
as existing in two basic forms: sounds or symbols for 
sounds. These symbols may be notational or linguistic; that 
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is, they are either written inscriptions or verbal 
expressions. Those musical elements that are musical 
sounds, (as well as sound correlates such as silences and 
accents), are generally associated with certain conventional 
names and these names can be written in symbols, (i.e., 
dots, lines, etc. on a staff), letters, (e.g., B, G#, etc.), 
or words, (e.g. "Key of C", "crescendou, "F Major chord", 
etc.). These names may be spoken as well as written. 
Later, they will be described as functioning in a manner 
comparable to other general words, and consistent with a 
nominalistic interpretation. 
The artifact that is the result of certain acts of 
composing, namely the musical composition, is that object 
constructed from whatever musical elements that are chosen 
by the composer. Thus, the artifactual object of musical 
art-making is most often either a rather short-lived, 
transient sound sequence or a written manuscript having a 
considerably longer life-expectency.4 In either case, the 
artwork is this concrete individual. 
Obviously, not all musical occurrences are 
compositions. Compositions are original works of art, while 
performances and scores as such are usually, in some way or 
other, copies or derivations of compositions. Spelling out 
this fundamental and crucial distinction between composition 
and performance provides another important task for this 
dissertation. In addition, the relationships betweeri 
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composition, score, and performance, as well as 
understanding the place of improvisation in these 
considerations will have to be addressed. I shall argue 
that all performances are themselves musical works; but 
while some performances are compositional works of art, most 
are not. I shall also argue that it is usually the case 
that improvisations should be regarded as genuine musical 
compositions. 
Composing is not just any occasion of selecting and 
arranging musical elements--some selecting and arranging is 
not composing. Transcribing into notation a heard 
performance involves, strictly speaking, selecting and 
arranging notational musical elements, but this is not 
composing. Performing a piece of music from a score is an 
occasion for selecting and arranging musical elements, 
(i.e., making decisions about which sounds to make on or 
with a musical instrument or voice), but again this is not 
composing. A genuine compositional work is the product of 
some person's (a composer) intention to make original 
selections and arrangements. That is to say, there must be 
a belief on the part of the composer that the work under 
construction is, to some extent, original. The degree of 
intentional originality required is probably not clearly 
specifiable, but I shall look into this question at the 
appropriate point in my presentation. A rough-and-ready 
characterization of musical compositions, to be spelled out 
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in Chapter III, will thus be that they are intended 
originals consisting of selected and arranged musical 
elements. 
Before I explain in further detail this nominalistic 
theory of musical compositions, I shall attempt to 
accomplish two preliminary tasks: (1) provide a sense of 
context by setting the specific issues of this dissertation 
within the broader context of ontology and the arts; and (2) 
examine nominalism as an ontological perspective. The first 
of these will be the focus of what remains of this chapter; 
the latter task will be presented in Chapter II. 
Work of Art: Evaluative and 
Classifactory Senses 
Among George Dickie's many valuable contributions to 
the philosophy of art is his clarification of two senses of 
the phrase "work of art". He distinguishes what he calls a 
classificatory sense from an evaluative sense.5 This 
distinction is helpful and important not only because it 
clarifies a significant ambiguity in the use of this phrase, 
but also because it effectively identifies a fundamental 
division between areas of inquiry in the philosophy of art. 
I shall discuss this division shortly; first, let us briefly 
consider Dickie's distinction. 
The difference between the evaluative and 
classificatory senses of "work of art" is fairly 
straightforward. The evaluative sense of "work of ar·t" 
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refers to uses of the phrase concerning judgments of 
aesthetic value. To say of a thing that it is a work of art 
in an evaluative sense is to say that it is aesthetically 
valuable. The evaluative sense is, to a certain extent, 
honorific or complimentary. It is not uncommon for someone 
to say of some painting, for example, "Now that is a work of 
art." The purpose of the statement is to acknowledge the 
noteworthy aesthetic value of the painting. In calling the 
painting a "work of art" the speaker is not merely 
identifying what sort of thing is hanging on the wall; 
rather, she is making, for the most part, a value judgement 
to the effect that the painting is somehow "good" from an 
aesthetic point of view. "Work of art", used in this way, 
is thus evaluative since it expresses an evaluation, and a 
positive one at that, of the object to which it refers. 
The classificatory sense of the phrase "work of art", 
on the other hand, refers to uses that do not make such 
evaluative attributions. This sense is essentially 
descriptive; it identifies what something is; it classifies 
the thing as an art object rather than something that is not 
an art object. Under this use of the phrase, if someone 
says of the painting, "Now that is a work of art.", the 
speaker's purpose might be only to single out the piece as 
an example of an artwork or to inform someone that the thing 
before them is an artwork and not something else. No 
evaluative assertion is intended. 
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Dickie points out that classificatory and evaluative 
senses may be operative in a single statement. If someone 
says, "This Rembrandt is a work of art," "the expression 
'this Rembrandt' would convey the information that its 
referent is a work of art in the classificatory sense, and 
'is a work of art' could then only reasonably be understood 
in the evaluative sense."6 
A partial justification for this distinction between 
descriptive and normative senses of work of art is evident 
in our readiness to talk about "good art" as opposed to "bad 
art". If "work of art" had only an evaluative sense of the 
sort described, then the phrase "a good work of art" would 
be redundant and the phrase "bad work of art" would appear 
to be self-contradictory. A junior high school art show may 
have no items of aesthetic merit, yet this does not conspir• 
against its status as an art show. We might say then that 
it is an art show in the sense that it exhibits works of/art 
in the classificatory sense. 
Clarifying this distinction between senses of wor~ of 
art is important on a number of counts. Disagreements 
following on the exclamation, "You call that a work of 
art!", may be more profitably pursued if care is given to 
noting whicn sense of "work of art" is being used. The 
statement might be a value judgement expressing disapproval 
of the purported work's positive aesthetic value. Thus, the 
exclamation is just another way of saying, for exampl~, 
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"That painting is ugly." In this way, an effective response 
to the speaker's charge should address criteria of aesthetic 
value. 
Alternatively, if the speaker's intention consisted in 
taking "work of art" in a classificatory sense, any 
subsequent debate would best consider the nature or 
definition of art. For example, the speaker may be 
attending a photography exhibit and actually believe that 
the photograph before her is quite beautiful, but she does 
not believe, (for whatever reason), that photography is a 
legitimate artform. An appropriate interpretation of the 
exclamation would then be something to the effect that, 
"Photographs cannot be works of art." The point of her 
utterance is not to make a value judgement as such, but to 
deny the photograph's classification as an artwork. 
Interestingly enough, probably the most common use of 
the above exclamation includes both senses of work of art. 
Controversial works of art are often indicted by the 
exclamation, "You call that a work of art!" for both 
lacking in aesthetic value and for not being the sort of 
thing that can be an artwork. For example, Duchamp's 
"readymades" such as "Fountain", (a manufactured urinal), 
have been criticized by some people for being aesthetically 
unappealing and also for not being the appropriate sorts of 
objects or subject matter for legitimate works of art. 
This dissertation will make use of the phrase "~ork of 
17 
art", (as well as "artwork" and "work"), in the 
classificatory sense exclusively. Whether or not an given 
musical composition or performance is aesthetically good is 
not my concern here. 
I said that Dickie's distinction of senses identifies 
a fundamental division of problems within the philosophy of 
art. The point I would like to make is this: just as there 
are these two distinct senses of "work of art", there are 
two distinct contexts for aesthetic inquiry which parallel 
these senses. An evaluative approach to works of art 
inspires questions such as "what is good art?", or "what 
features of artworks make them aesthetically valuable?", or 
"what is the nature of aesthetic value judgements?" In 
other words, quite clearly the philosophy of art consists 
partly of an inquiry into evaluative considerations of art, 
questions of aesthetic value. But the philosophy of art is 
also concerned with what might be called "classificatory" 
issues, or questions involving the nature of artworks 
independent of evaluative considerations. 
Classificatory uses of the phrase "work of art" serve 
primarily, as we have already noted, to distinguish artworks 
from non-artworks. Following on this understanding such 
questions as "what is art?", or "how are artworks different 
from thing$ that are not artworks?", or "is there a 
definition of art?" arise. 
In connection with these fundamental questions· 
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associated with the classificatory sense of "work of art" an 
additional set of questions emerge. These may be referred 
to as "ontological" questions. Once we have decided which 
things we wish to regard as genuine works of art we may be 
interested in questions such as, what or where is the 
artwork?, what sort of thing is an artwork?, in what sense 
do artworks exist?; are artworks necessarily embodied public 
objects?, is the actual artwork that which we experience 
with our senses or is it something essentially mental, 
something imagined? A complex web of problems and issues 
revolve around such ontological considerations, as we shall 
see. 
Ontological questions involve the classificatory sense 
of work of art because they are not directly concerned with 
evaluative claims about the artworks they examine. They are 
concerned with the nature of works of art whether they are 
"good" works or "bad" works, whether aesthetically valuable 
or valueless, and anything in between. Thus, in an 
ontological context, references to works of art may or may 
not imply anything with respect to the work's value. 
Ontological investigations may proceed regardless of the 
work's evaluative qualities. 
This is not to say that classificatory contexts, 
including ontological considerations, are irrelevant to 
evaluative contexts. What I wish to make clear is that in 
the ontological investigations that follow, the focus will 
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be on works of art in a classificatory sense. I am not 
concerned here with questions r·egarding which artworks or 
artforms are aesthetically superior, nor do I intend to 
discuss criteria for aesthetic evaluation or interpretation. 
As interesting as these issues are, I shall attempt to keep 
them separate from the present analysis. 
It should also be made clear that the ontological 
considerations I shall be concerned with are not 
classi·f icatory in the sense that they aim towards a 
definition of art or determining what distinguishes artworks 
from non-artworks as such, although it may draw from or 
contribute to such considerations. What I wish to emphasize 
is that ontological questions are classificatory since they 
are essentially descriptive, rather than evaluative or 
interpretive. We may proceed ontologically from the 
position that there is an already established fund of 
artworks, a large group of things accepted as works of art. 
These may or may not have been determined on the basis of 
some sort of explicit classificatory theory which lays out 
the critical necessary and sufficient conditions for 
arthood. The ontological project I propose to undertake, in 
effect, begins after such definitions and determinations 
have been made and however they have been made. The 
proposed theory should be able to accommodate all musical 
works, regardless of whether their status as works is widely 
accepted or highly controversial. This project proceeds 
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under the assumption that there are musical works of art, 
and then attempts to clarify and articulate a description of 
their ontological status regardless of the controversies 
surrounding them. 
Ontology and the Arts 
That works of art exist is not controversial. The 
controversies begin once we attempt to describe how or in 
what sense works of art exist. Are works of art physical 
objects or are they some kind of abstract entities? Are 
they particulars or something more akin to universals? 
Where is the art object to be located: the artist's 
experience, the physical stimulus, or the spectator's 
experience?7 Can a distinction be made between the "art 
object", (the physical, phenomenal, or public thing we 
observe), and the "aesthetic object", (that which we admire 
or to which we attribute aesthetic value, and is thus, the 
"real" work of art)? What is the relationship between works 
of art and copies, reproductions, performances, etc. of 
them? In what sense can works of art be created or 
destroyed? The questions and problems are many. 
The question of the ontological status of works of art 
in general may not be amenable to a single answer anyway. 
Painting, sculpture, architecture, literature, music, dance, 
drama, photography, and film all appear as quite diverse 
modes of artistic expression. They differ so significantly 
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from one another that a single ontology applying to all 
artworks may be inappropriate if not impossible. On first 
reflection, we may be inclined to distinguish the arts 
ontologically simply in terms of their different physical 
media. Paintings are made of paint; sculptures are made of 
clay, metal, wood, and other solid materials; literature 
consists of words spoken or written; music of sounds; 
photography and film are visual images produced by certain 
chemical reactions to light. From these distinctions of 
media an ontologist might conclude that the ontological 
status of a given work of art is a function of its medium of 
presentation, i.e., the physical or sensory object of a 
viewer's or listener's or reader's attention. The pigment 
on canvas is the work of art in painting; the sounds heard 
in the concert hall make up the symphonic work of art; the 
words printed on the page are, taken together, the literary 
artwork; and so on. 
What lends some initial plausibility to this 
physicalist/phenomenalist interpretations is the generally 
acknowledged expectation that artworks be publicly 
accessible. In other words, it is usually thought that it is 
not enough for artists merely to have aesthetic ideas, they 
must make something that people can experience. Therefore, 
a number of philosophers of art have regarded artifactuality 
as a necessary condition for status as an artwork. We often 
think of artists as people who create things, (sculptures, 
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poems, films, songs, etc.), for aesthetic appreciation. Few 
if any artworks require the presence of the artist in order 
to be experienced; rather, the artwork is an object distinct 
and separate from the artist herself. It does not require a 
great logical leap to identify the object experienced as the 
artist's work of art. This is just another way of 
recognizing that artworks usually, if not always, exist in 
some medium or other. The physicalist thesis amounts then 
to the claim that the work of art is identical with its 
medium, or ~hat the work of art is the artist's physical 
artifact. 
Consider the way in which we identify a work of art in 
terms of title and artist. We say, for example, "This 
painting is called 'Composition with Two Lines' and it was 
painted by Mondrian." It is easy enough to regard the work 
of art as the painting which is a particular physical object 
located in space and time, composed of paint applied in a 
certain way to a flat, rectangular piece of canvas, as 
something that can be pointed to and experienced with the 
senses, and the product of some individual person's 
intentional efforts occurring at a definite place during a 
specific time. This is shown, to some extent, in the way we 
can and do sometimes talk about artworks: "The 'Two Lines' 
fell off the wall today."; or "The 'Two Lines' was stolen, 
but has since been recovered."; or "Mondrian's painting has 
been destroyed by fire." Each of these statements i~ 
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literally meaningful; and the title of the work seems to be 
identified with the physical artifact. Such talk would be 
very peculiar, if not impossible, if the 'Two Lines' were 
not a physical object. Physical objects, but not ideas, can 
fall off walls. Physical objects can be stolen and then 
recovered, but not ideas. And it's not clear how anything 
other than a physical object can be destroyed by fire. 
Now such a conception is not without its problems and 
detractors, (I shall return to these later); but let us 
assume for the moment that this ontological description of 
paintings is adequate. Can a physicalistic ontology extend 
to other sorts of artworks? Consider woodcut prints, an 
artform not terribly distant from painting in terms of its 
artifactual product, (often a two-dimensional image on a 
flat surface), although the process of making the artifact 
is significantly different. The artist carves out areas of 
a block of wood, applies ink to the carved surface, and then 
presses the block to paper, or similar material, leaving the 
desired impression. Typically, the artist makes a run of 
these impressions ranging from a single print to an 
indefinite number of them. What is the work of art in this 
case? Seldom, if ever, is the wood block put on display or 
admired for it aesthetic qualities, this is because it is 
usually not considered to be the work of art as such. What 
is commonly taken to be the work is a print made from the 
block. If someone or some museum possesses an impression or 
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two of Ourer's "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse", each 
of these is spoken of as a work of art, each is displayed 
under the title and referred to as "The Four Horsemen of the 
1 II Apoca ypse . It would seem then that there are many works 
of art with the same title, but we can no longer speak of 
~ work of art as an individually identifiable object in 
these circumstances. If a print of the "Four Horsemen" is 
destroyed by fire, Durer's work with this title is not 
considered lost. If the wood block from which the 
impressions were made is destroyed or lost the work itself 
is not considered lost or destroyed. 
The situation in the case of literature appears even 
more problematic. John Updike wrote Rabbit, Run in 1960, 
presumably with some writing implement, (pencil, pen, 
typewriter, or whatever), on paper; this artifact is 
referred to as his manuscript. (An author could even 
dictate his work into some recording device, or type it into 
a word processor; this would further intensify the problems 
to be discussed below.) This manuscript was prepared and 
typeset by a publisher and thousands of copies of the novel 
were printed and distributed. Now what is Updike's work of 
art? Not only are we again confronted with a problem of 
identity and diversity as with woodcuts, (is each copy of 
the book equally a work of art?; are they each to be 
identified as a work of art?; is the original manuscript the 
only genuine artwork?, if so, what is the status of an 
25 
individual copy of the novel?; do we have access to the work 
of art without the manuscript?); but an additional and 
somewhat different ontological problem gains prominence. 
The physicalistic/phenomenalistic interpretation does not 
seem quite so amenable to literary artworks as it did to 
painting or even woodcut prints. This is so because, in 
literature, it is not so much the visible inscriptions on 
the page that we take as the object of our aesthetic 
interests or attention, but instead what some might call the 
meanings of the words, or even more abstractly, the story 
that is told with the words. In other words, the medium of 
literature does not seem to be a physical or sensory one. 
What further complicates the matter is the possibility of 
translations of the novel into other languages, languages 
the author probably does not even know. What permits us to 
refer to each copy of the book and each translation as 
Rabbit, Run? 
Thus, two sorts of ontological issues can be seen 
emerging with respect to works of art: 1) identifying or 
locating the actual works of art, i.e., where they exist; 
and 2) determining what artworks are made of, i.e., how they 
exist. If paintings are taken as relatively unproblematic 
in this regard, a physicalist's response to the two 
ontological questions might go something like this: 1) 
Mondrian's work of art known as "Two Lines" is an individual 
object painted in 1931 and is presently hanging on a wall at 
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the stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam; and 2) "Two Lines" 
consists of patches of pigmented oil paints arranged on the 
surface of an approximately 40° square piece of canvas. Can 
a comparable response be given to questions concerning 
literary works such as Updike's Rabbit, Run? If it is 
possible, it is certainly more complicated and difficult. 
How would we answer questions like, where is John Updike's 
literary work Rabbit, Run?, and what is it made of? The 
most likely response would be that such questions are 
somewhat nonsensical since a novel is not the kind of thing 
that can be identified in this way; its ontological status 
is significantly different from that of a painting, 
sculpture, or a building. Not only does literature seem to 
be comprised of artworks that are not individual objects, 
but the aesthetically relevant characteristics of these 
works do not appear to be sensory or physical. 
The so-called performance arts, drama, dance, and 
music, for example, provide further complications for the 
ontologist. In these arts a credible distinction can be made 
between a work and a performance ot it. The object the 
artist makes, a script, score, or set of choreographic 
instructions, is not usually thought to be the actual 
artwork. These artforms are sometimes described as 
consisting of two-stage artworks: the instructions and the 
performance. Scripts and scores are somewhat incomplete as 
artworks; they require some performer or performers to act 
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or sound them out. But the performances themselves are not 
the complete artwork either. The character of their 
phenomenal features largely depend upon the script or score 
produced by the artist. What then is the work of art in ~ 
these cases if not the script or score nor any particular 
performances of them? We speak of performances as "a v 
performance of the artwork 'Hamlet'"; and we speak of 
scores as "a score of the artwork 'D Minor Symphony'". 
The implication seems to be that neither performances nor 
their instructions are the actual works of art. Attempting 
to describe artworks within the so-called performi.ng arts in 
terms of individual physical objects does not seem 
plausible. 
Each of the various artforms has its own attendant 
ontological problems. I have touched on a few, and it 
should be quite obvious that there are many more. Various 
theoretical proposals have been offered to provide either a 
general, unified theory accounting for all artworks in all 
artforms, or specific theories aimed at satisfying the 
ontological requirements peculiar to particular artforms. 
An approach to a general theory that is an alternative 
to a physicalist theory might begin by making a distinction 
between the work of art and its artifactual embodiment. The 
"aesthetic objectM is considered the true work of art, 
whereas the artifact, the physical/sensory object is merely 
a means of presenting, conveying, or communicating the 
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essentially non-physical artwork to a spectator or audience. 
This view, in effect, denies that artworks are physical 
objects and so attempts to avoid whatever ontological 
difficulties arise from this interpretation. For example, 
if the work of art is not a physical object, then the 
problem of identifying its spatial and temporal location is 
removed. Artforms are distinguishable from each other 
partly in terms of the different kinds of aesthetic ideas 
they seek to convey, and partly in terms of the different 
media they use to embody the work itself. But any given 
embodiment or form of embodiment is not to be confused with 
the actual work of art. Neither the manuscript nor any 
printed copy of Rabbit, Run is the literary work; each of 
these items is important for experiencing the work, but they 
only serve to reveal the work, to put it in a publically 
accessible form, not to be the work. The work itself stands 
somewhat independently of these physical manifestations, and 
so is not lost or destroyed if the manuscript or any printed 
copy is lost or destroyed. The relationship is thus not 
symmetrical. Under this view, the work can exist without 
physical embodiment, but the physically manifested artifact 
cannot exist without a previously existing work of art. 
Aspects and variations of this kind of approach will be 
critically examined in Chapter IV. 
Another important proposed solution to the ontological 
difficulties associated with the arts is an application of 
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the type/token distinction to this context.9 Under this 
view, works of art are essentially types of which any number 
of individual tokens may exist. This is what permits 
copies, reproductions, performances, prints, etc. to each be 
called examples of a specific work of art. In talking about v 
a print of Durer's "The Four Horsemen• as having a tear in 
the left corner or being printed on deteriorating paper, we 
are referring to a token of the work, an individual copy. 
But if we say that "The Four Horsemenn is dynamic or 
comprised of exceptional detail revealing great skill on the 
part of the artist, we are talking about the type, i.e., the 
work itself. 
Musical compositions, as types, may have not only v 
numerous individual tokens, but these may also exist in a 
wide range of media: sound performances, notational scores, 
recordings, verbal descriptions, etc. The view I propose 
will not adopt either the language or the categories of 
types and tokens to characterize the ontological status of 
compositions and there performances, scores, etc. First of 
all, since my intention is to construct an account of 
compositions which is admittedly physicalistic, and since 
the notion of a type precludes construing it as a physical 
object, the concept of type must be ruled out as a viable 
category within the theory. Secondly, type is the sort of 
abstract notion which I am seeking to avoid. More on these 
points later. 
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Music and Nominalism 
The problems and perplexities resulting from 
ontological examinations of works of art are clearly many 
and widely diverse. This diversity is largely a result of 
the great variety of art media and artistic practices. Much 
has been written abou~ this, and I have only touched on a 
few examples. My purpose in what has preceded has been 
primarily to give some sense of perspective to the specific 
intentions of this dissertation: an ontological analysis of 
musical works of art, especially compositions. In what 
follows, I do not propose a unified theory applicable to all 
the arts; instead, I intend to focus on music, or more 
precisely, musical artworks. 
Music, it seems, is fundamentally a matter of sounds. 
To listen to music is to listen to certain sounds. To play 
music is make certain sounds. Sounds are, physically 
speaking, waves of moving air; sensorially speaking, they 
are audial experiences had by beings capable of hearing. 
Sounds also have the character of events. They are 
transient, they happen, they can be measured for duration in 
time, but presumably not for extension in space, (at least 
not in the ways we typically do so). Although they occur in 
specific places, they are not enduring spatial objects, 
(except as moving particles of air); they are quite 
short-lived. Since music is made of sounds, the ontological 
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characteristics of music might seem to be reducible to the 
ontological characteristics of sounds and events. If this 
were the case, music could be treated merely as a species of 
sound. 
If the art of music consisted of nothing other than 
making and listening to musical sounds, then the ontology of 
musical works might be fairly straightforward. Musical 
works would be certain sound-sequence-events occurring at a 
specifiable time and place. Their ontological status would 
be comparable to other sorts of sound-sequence-events; we 
would only need to determine criteria for distinguishing 
musical from non-musical sequential sound occurrences. But 
musical practice is not quite that simple. Music, as a form 
of artistic activity, is not only the making and hearing of 
musical sounds. 
For example, we often speak of someone 'writing' music 
or 'reading' music. Such reading and writing does not 
directly involve sounds. These uses of the term 'music' 
reflect practices in music which permit associating musical 
sounds with symbolic notation. Notating music seems 
desirable because it allows for the possibility of repeating 
certain musical sound-sequence-events or communicating 
musical ideas to others. Since musical sounds are transient, 
the only way to 're-experience' aesthetically satisfying 
musical sound-events is to make similar sounds. Before the 
development of sound recording and reproducing devices, 
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symbolic notation provided an effective way, beyond the use 
of memory alone, of communicating and 're-making' certain 
desired musical sound-events. 
Notation also allows for music to be created without 
actually making sounds. Since persons can imagine sounds, 
and since these sounds can be associated with symbols, 
creators of music can write out musical 'scripts' or scores 
instructing other persons how to make musical sound-events. 
Complex music, (multiple musicians, diverse instruments, 
longer sequences, etc.), may be facilitated through the use 
of this standardized notation. Music does not have to 
remain solely a matter of improvization, (making it up on 
the spot as it is being played), or of remembering 
previously occurring musical events. 
Reading and writing music thus amounts simply to 
making use of the symbolic notation of music. But what are 
the statuses of these notational arrangements in the 
ontological scheme of things? We say of the musical artwork 
'D Minor Symphony' that it has been written by Beethoven. 
If he had had nothing to do with any particular sounding of 
this work, we would not cease to refer to it as his artwork. 
Therefore, it appears that, given the way we talk about 
music, making musical works of art is not dependent upon the 
maker of the work making musical sounds. Furthermore, what 
we call musical artworks need not consist of sounds. And 
so, the ontology of music cannot be reduced solely to the 
33 
ontology of sounds. 
Nor can music be reduced solely to its symbolic 
notation. A great deal of music is never notated; often 
musical sounds and works are made without the use of 
notation; and 'reading' musical notation alone is not 
generally regarded as the preferred way of aesthetically 
appreciating music. Actual sound-events remain as the 
central elements in music and music making, but not the only 
ones. 
Sound recording and reproduction technology permit 
repeated sound-events that are quite similar to previously 
occurring sound sequences. Music produced in this way 
consists of sounds occurring in an identifiable time and 
place; but these sound-sequence-events are a few steps 
removed from the playing of musical instruments, (including 
voices). Musical instruments are similar to electronic 
playback equipment in that both can produce musical sounds 
under certain circumstances, and both can be used to produce 
sound-events very similar to others that have occurred 
before. The former requires a competant musician to 
properly play the appropriate musical instrument, whereas 
the latter requires a copy of a recording, (magnetized 
plastic tape, grooved vinyl disc, etched light-reflecting 
disc, etc.), made from some original sound-event caused by a 
musical instrument. Although the two methods of producing 
facsimiles of a previous sound-event may result in very 
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similar audial experiences, the processes are obviously 
quite different. I shall explore some of the ontological 
relevancies of these differences in subsequent chapters 
Recording media and techniques also provide another 
approach to making musical works of art. Multi-track tape 
equipment allows composers to construct musical works by 
manipulating and combining sounds with far greater control 
than otherwise possible. For example, a composer may play, 
by himself, each and every musical instrument required for 
the sounding of a musical work. These individual soundings 
may then be played back together forming the complete work. 
A composer can thereby construct a multi-instrumental work 
without dependence upon other musicians. In this way, not 
only is a composer able to provide a sounding of the work, 
but the compositional work is composed through the use of 
actual sounds rather than notational symbols. Thus, 
composers may compose musical works of varying degrees of 
complexity without the use of notation, and they may do so 
by the direct use of sounds. This phenomena of 'writing' 
music with sounds will also be explored for its ontological 
significance. 
The practice of virtually every art involves an artist 
who makes an artwork. In music, composers are the artists 
who make artworks referred to as compositions. But music 
also accomodates another sort of artist, the performer who 
makes performances. Often the activities of composers, 
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(e.g., writing on paper), and performers, (e.g., playing a 
musical instrument), are quite different; and usually the 
artworks produced by these activities are also quite 
different, (notational scores and musical sounds 
respectively). But sometimes, as we shall see, the composer 
and performer of a work may be the same person; and 
sometimes compositions may be performances, (e.g., 
improvisation). 
Another important feature of most art making is the 
identification of an artist's artwork by and with a title. 
The artist is associated with the artwork as its 
creator/maker, and the title, in effect, sets off the work 
from other works. That is, a work of art is distinguished 
from others partly in terms of who made it and partly in 
terms of its 'name' or title. A central problem facing this 
dissertation is the determination of the ontological 
character of titled musical artworks, (as well as so-called 
"Untitled• works). An important dimension of this 
determination is an analysis of this practice of naming or 
titling musical artworks. This effort must inevitably 
address the process of making musical compositions, the 
process by which a particular musical work is associated 
with a particular composer, and the process by which it is 
set off from other compositions through naming. 
As has been noted earlier, musical compositions are 
closely associated with performances of them. An 
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interesting feature of performances, from an ontological 
point of view, is the way in which they are given the same 
name or title as the composition. This is largely a matter 
of a dependency relationship that typically holds between 
performances and compositions. The ways in which 
performances are usually dependent upon compositions will be 
examined in some detail in Chapter III 
Not only do performances of compositions share names 
with the original compositions themselves, but written 
scores and sound recordings do as well. In addition, if 
someone merely imagines the sound of a composition "in 
his/her head", this too is referred to by the same name. We 
say such things as, 
"Beethoven composed the 'D Minor Symphony' during the 
early nineteenth century." 
"I listened to the 'D Minor Symphony' last night at 
Orchestra Hall." 
"The teacher played the 'D Minor Symphony' on the school's 
new sound system." 
"We studied the 'D Minor Symphony' from an old German 
textbook." 
What permits each of the referents (a composition, a 
performance, a recording, and a score respectively) to 
warrant the title 'D Minor Symphony'? Are we speaking 
accurately when we call each of these items 'D Minor 
Symphony'? 
Performances, scores, and recordings are fairly 
uncontroversially considered to be individuals. What is 
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controversial is the ~tatus of the composition. My claim is 
that they too are individuals; but others hold that 
compositional works are the sorts of things that can have 
multiple instantiations, or that they are somehow abstract 
in a way that precludes identifying them as in any way 
individual. Composers create or make compositions, but just 
what sort of thing do they make such that they appear to be 
capable of having performances, capable of being written out 
in symbolic notation, and capable of existing or being 
present in diverse recorded media? The nominalist, as 
someone committed to accepting only individuals as genuine 
existents, must show just how it is that compositional works 
are themselves individuals, and how the association of 
performances, scores, and recordings with a compositional 
work is fundamentally understandable in terms of language 
and individuality, rather than some essential relationship 
based on universality or in terms of abstract entities. 
Before proceeding with the proposed nominalistic 
theory of musical compositions, I shall briefly discuss 
nominalism as a general ontological perspective. 
CHAPTER II 
NOMINALISM AND ONTOLOGY 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall explain in general terms what 
nominalism is and how this conception will provide the 
background for my theory of musical compositions as concrete 
particulars. I shall not attempt to defend nominalism as a 
comprehensive ontology, nor shall I provide a systematic 
survey of the historical development of nominalistic 
positions. Instead, my purpose will be to characterize a 
nominalistic perspective that will be applied later to a 
specific group of entities, namely musical compositions and 
performances. 
Naturally this effort will involve some defense of 
nominalism as a point of view, as an approach to 
philosophical problems, but the adequacy of nominalism as a 
complete and all-encompassing ontological theory cannot be 
addressed within the scope of this paper. The reason for 
this is that the present essay has as its primary obiective 
an examination of the phenomena of musical compositions and 
performances in ontological terms. An analysis of 
nominalism provides some of the background for this 
examination, but is not itself the central subiect of this 
38 
39 
dissertation. Therefore, I shall leave the fuller defense 
of nominalism to others or for another time. 
I do believe though that an important part of the 
larger philosophical project concerned with spelling out a 
complete and adequate nominalism is the development of 
plausible nominalistic characterizations of certain 
problematic entities. In light of this, the chief objective 
of this dissertation is an explication of how a nominalist 
might understand the ontological makeup of a certain part of 
the world; i.e., musical compositions. This is thus one 
proposal for a conception of musical artworks as 
individuals. Seeing each and every part of the world as 
individual is a nominalist's fundamental ontological 
commitment, and so, I shall attempt to present musical 
compositions in a way that is consistent with this 
commitment. 
I am particularly interested in exploring at this time 
some of the ontological problems associated with music and 
to determine what a nominalistic theory of compositions 
might be like. As stated in the Introduction. I do not aim 
at converting non-nominalists to such a perspective; but I 
do hope to contribute a reasonable theory to the ranAe of 
possible ontologies of music and to provide one that would 
be satisfying to the nominalistically-minded. 
Nominalism is not a single, unified doctrine. Rather 
it represents a range of positions that cluster around some 
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basic ontological commitments or preferences. Some versions 
of nominalism are highly complex, formal, and technical in 
their formulation and application. But generally speaking, 
put one way, nominalism is an ontological perspective 
asserting that anything that can be said to exist is an 
individual. Put another way, a nominalist may prefer to 
emphasize a negative version of this thesis by rejecting the 
notion of any actually existing universals, abstract 
entities, classes, kinds, or any other non-individual. 
Alternatively, nominalism might be expressed as the view 
that all uses of universal, general, or abstract terms are 
devoid of reference. That is, although such words may serve 
a function in a language, they do not name or identify or 
refer to any existing thing. My own nominalistic approach 
regards all of these alternative conceptions acceptable and 
sufficiently compatible with one another as far as the 
present thesis is concerned. 
In order to flesh out these broader characterizations 
in greater detail, I shall develop my presentation of 
nominalism by examining the following general descriptions 
of nominalistic systems and approaches. A nominalist might 
explicitly ascribe to all of these claims or to some varying 
combination of them. In any event. nominalism might be 
construed as, (1) a form of skepticism about what there is. 
often emerging from empirical tendencies; (2) a 
philosophical temperament expressing a preference for· some 
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notion of ontological individuality; (3) a negative theory 
denying the existence of universals and/or abstract 
entities; (4) a positive theory affirming that all existents 
are individuals; and/or (5) a limiting theory describing the 
far extent to which particularity can be emphasized in an 
ontological system. Uy own view is that taken together 
these comprise the key features of an overall nominalistic 
outlook. In the first part of this chapter I shall explain 
what I mean by each of these variations on nominalistic 
themes. Later I shall describe how ontological problems 
arise in aesthetic contexts and how nominalism is relevant 
to them. 
Nominalism as Skepticism 
First, nominalism can be understood as a form of 
skepticism; that is, it may consist of a skeptical attitude 
towards existence claims regarding any purported 
non-individual entity. In general, skepticism is the view 
that either all knowledge claims or at least those of 
specified sorts are impossible, unreliable, or dubious. 
Skeptics differ from one another in terms of the scope and 
objects of their skeptical attitudes. but all tend to 
sharply limit what counts as genuine knowledge. 
Nominalism is skeptical about ontological claims 
regarding universals, abstract entities, kinds. classes. or 
any other non-individual. Can there be knowledge of 
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existing universals? Can any abstract entity be known to 
exist? Is there sufficient evidence that the terms 
•universal" or "abstract entity" refer to any knowable 
thing? A nominalist would tend to answer no to these 
questions. Minimally, the nominalist as skeptic is an 
agnostic with respect to the conclusiveness of arguments for 
the existence of universals. Although most versions of 
nominalism, as will be seen later, go beyond this skepticism 
to conclude that such entities simply do not exist, cannot 
be believed to exist, or cannot be meaningfully referred to 
as existing, a cautious nominalist might wish simply to 
suspend judgement and remain skeptical about certain types 
of existence claims. The point is that, at the very least, 
nominalism consists in a doubtful attitude toward the 
existence of universals. 
Empiricism and nominalism seem to be somewhat 
comfortable concomitants in this regard. Empiricism can 
provide either an epistemological foundation for or a 
motivation towards a nominalistic perspective: that is. a 
nominalist may adopt empiricist arguments to defend his 
ontology or an empiricist may develop a nominalist ontology 
as an outgrowth of her empiricist commitments. Since most 
versions of empiricism are generally critical of claims 
involving non-experiential evidence or conclusions. and 
since universals and abstract entities are usually taken to 
be non-experiential and non-corporeal sorts of things~ 
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••Piricism may share with nominalism an uneasiness about 
such entities. 
Quite clearly, empiricism is a wide ranging 
epistemological perspective, with many versions and 
variations. Some forms may straightforwardly imply a 
nominalistic outlook; others, in a decidedly opposite 
fashion, may actually be used to provide a basis for 
accepting universals and abstract entities as genuine 
existents. But, to the extent that a nominalism might be in 
search of an epistemology, it may adopt some sort of 
empiricist point of view. More importantly for the present 
discussion, empirical commitments may serve as the 
motivation for a nominalistic skepticism. 
Universals and abstract entities are usually 
understood, by those who affirm their reality, as 
essentially non-sensory and non-corporeal. Thus, an 
epistemology that discourages accepting claims that are not 
justifiable in terms of sensation and experience would tend 
to be skeptical about claims affirming the existence of 
universals and abstract entities. This is not to say that 
some empiricist might not infer the existence of such 
entities from an experiential basis: rather, an emoiricism 
may provide the justification for a skeotical attitude 
towards universals and abstract entities, or it may be the 
reason why someone is a nominalist in the first place. A 
nominalist can appeal to an empiricism that is skeptical 
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about ontological assertions regarding such purported 
entities. Thus, for nominalists, existential claims 
concerning real universals or common natures are not 
considered to be legitimate candidates for knowledge claims, 
or are at the very least open to serious reservations. 
In this way, nominalism can be recognized as 
reflecting the ontological implications of the sort of 
empiricism which will not accept inferential knowledge of 
universals and abstract entities. It is a view as to what 
entities can be affirmed by the epistemological theory and 
what alleged entities cannot. The limited claim that 
whatever cannot be positively confirmed on acceptable 
empirical grounds is unreliably believed is a large portion 
of the skeptical dimension of a nominalist position. 
I am not arguing that empiricism implies nominalism, 
although some forms might; nor that all empiricists have 
advocated nominalism, clearly this has not been the case. 
Instead I am suggesting that nominalism can be easily 
accommodated with an empiricist epistemology that endorses a 
skeptical attitude towards the sorts of entities about which 
nominalists are uneasy. Further, it is probably the case 
that many nominalists have maintained some version of 
empiricist epistemology. For example, William of Ockham, 
recognized as one of the earliest nominalists, believed that 
"the evidential base of all knowledge is direct experience 
of individual things and particular events.•1 He argued 
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that we have no experience of any non-individual, and so we 
have no evidential basis for belief in anything other than 
individuals. Although Ockham's nominalism is more fully 
argued from a logical analysis of terms, his empiricism does 
initiate and support a certain degree of epistemological 
skepticism regarding the existence of universals; Ockham's 
epistemology and ontology seem consistent in this regard. 
To the extent that empiricism generates 
uncertainties or epistemological problems for accepting 
abstract entities as genuine existents, it gives rise to the 
sort of skepticism that may underlie or motivate the 
development of a nominalistic perspective. Nominalism 
usually does not tend to remain merely a skeptical position. 
As we will see later, nominalism is often a positive, 
substantive theory that attempts to provide an adequate 
account of existence in terms of individuals alone. 
Skepticism and an accompanying negative theory critical of 
abstract entities provides most of the impetus for the 
development of such a positive ontology. Before I address 
the positive and negative characterizations of nominalistic 
theories, I shall briefly discuss another perspective that 
frequently accompanies or encourages a nominalistic outlook 
or commitment. 
Nominalism as a Philosphical Temperament 
As some writers have pointed out, nominalism may be, 
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a rt what amounts to a "philosophical temperament". By in P ' 
philosophical temperament I mean something much like what 
William James described in his essay "The Present Dilemma in 
Philosophy".2 There he argues that lying behind much 
philosophical reasoning is "no conventionally recognized 
reason"3; rather there is a "bias" that "loads the evidence 
for [the philosopher] one way or the other".4 Much of a 
philosopher's efforts, under this view, aim at developing 
reasons and theories that support or conform to a given 
temperament. A philosophical temperament is a bias, a 
disposition, an intuition, a preference. It is a 
fundamental sense of what makes for an adequate 
philosophical theory, and functions, to some extent, as the 
starting point for much philosophizing. As such, the 
philosopher "trusts his temperament" and tends to regard 
those with opposite temperaments to be misguided or "out of 
key with the world's character."5 
James appears a bit ambivalent about these 
temperaments. On the one hand, they clearly do not 
rationally justify a given philosophical approach or system; 
on the other hand, he seems to think they are inevitable and 
that we ought to acknowledge them and accept whatever 
valuable insights they might provide. He does not try to 
explain the source of these preferences, only their presence 
and apparent influence. 
Although James does not discuss nominalism 
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specifically, note what W. V. Quine and Nelson Goodman, 
prominent twentieth-century nominalists, have to say about 
their own nominalistic tendencies. "Why do we refuse to 
admit ... abstract objects ... ? Fundamentally this refusal is 
based on a philosophical intuition that cannot be 
justified by appeal to anything more ultimate."6 In a 
similar vein Goodman claims "a philosopher's conscience 
gives him little choice in the matter."7 Elsewhere Quine 
observes that some philosophers simply nhave a taste for 
desert landscapesu,s alluding to the nominalist's emphasis 
on and preference for ontological economy. 
Whether or not such philosophical temperaments can or 
should be avoided in sound philosophizing are interesting 
and debatable questions, but not of concern here. I wish 
simply to recognize the role they may play in motivating 
certain philosophical efforts, and to describe how a 
philosopher's desire to defend a nominalisitic view of the 
world and its constituents may originate in a philosophical 
temperament. Nominalism is, to some extent, a way of seeing 
the world. Reasons can and should be provided for such a 
perspective; but what may often motivate the pursuit of such 
reasons is an intuition, a general sense, that the world is 
a "world of individuals".9 
Nominalisms both affirm and deny something. They 
affirm that anything that can be said to exist is an 
individual. What is meant by this claim will be discussed 
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later. At this point I shall attend to what nominalistic 
views deny. 
Nominalism as a Rejection of 
Abstract Entities 
Historically, nominalisms originated as theories 
rejecting the existence of universals, or the need for them 
in an adequate theory of knowledge or description of 
reality. In the medieval controversies over such matters, 
the pole opposite the realists', those who affirmed the 
notion of real universals, was the position represented by 
nominalists such as Ockham. The concept of a universal to 
which these nominalists reacted extends back at least to 
Plato and Aristotle. 
For Plato universals represented true reality. 
Universals, (also referred to as Forms or Ideas), were 
essentially non-corporeal, non-particular, and non-sensible. 
They existed independent of and prior to human thought and 
to the particular things that were said to "participate" in 
them. Thus, universals provided the necessary basis for 
knowledge, language, and reality. 
Aristotle also believed that universals were real. 
i.e., actually existing, however, he did not think they 
existed independently of the particulars they informed. 
Whereas, for Plato ideas existed outside of particular 
things, for Aristotle universals existed within individual 
substances. Aristotle defined a universal as "that whose 
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nature is such that it may belong to many".10 A universal 
was something that was common to many individuals, it was 
something that could be predicated of various subjects. An 
individual, on the other hand, was something that could not 
be so predicated. 
A host of problems concerning these conceptions of 
universals were addressed during the medieval period. At 
this time, three main positions with respect to universals 
developed, of which nominalism was one. In order to clarify 
the distinctions between these positions, let us consider 
the following two questions that were of concern to the 
medievals. The first question was, "to what extent are 
universals mind-dependent entities"? The second question 
radically challenged the whole tradition of Plato and 
Aristotle: "are universals real entities at all"? The 
three views that emerged from differing responses to these 
questions are well known as realism, conceptualism, and 
nominalism. 
These perspectives on the problem of universals are 
not thoroughly discrete doctrines. Variations within each 
and difficulties in characterizing boundary regions between 
the views make distinguishing them clearly one from the 
other somewhat controversial. It is not my purpose to 
settle any historical disputes over these matters; but it is 
helpful nonetheless to demarcate generally the theoretical 
territory concerning universals apparent at this time. since 
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similar distinctions have persisted down to the present. I 
shall distinguish the three ontlogical positions in terms of 
the two questions mentioned above. 
Realism is the name for any view in this context that 
regards universals as entities existing independently of the 
mind. The common or general features of reality are 
discovered not constructed. Whether universals exist only 
within particulars or ultimately lie outside them is a 
question that distinguishes types of realism, not realism as 
such. According to realists then, general words name 
actually existing non-individual entities understood as 
universals, kinds, sp~cies, etc. Thus, realism answers the 
second question, "are universals real?", by affirming the 
existence of real universals; and answers the first 
question, "to what extent are universals mind-dependent?•, 
by claiming that they exist independent of any minds. 
Conceptualism alternatively answers the question 
concerning the extent of mind-dependency on the part of 
universals by claiming that generality is essentially a 
product of mental abstraction. That is, universals are 
wholly mind-dependent. They are thus essentially mental 
entities, concepts constructed by and existing only in human 
thought. Some sort of objective basis in things is 
typically acknowledged, but how this is to be understood 
without returning to realism is the chief difficulty for 
this position, and is treated variously by different 
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conceptualist thinkers. For conceptualists, although 
universals are completely mind-dependent, nevertheless, it 
can be properly said of universals that they exist. 
Nominalism denies the existence of universals 
altogether. Only individuals exist. Universals are nothing 
other than general words or "syncategorematic" terms. As 
general words, universals do not refer to anything other 
than the particulars to which they are applied. Ockham 
regarded universal terms as mere signs; " ... every universal 
is one singular thing. Therefore nothing is universal 
except by signification, by being a sign of several 
things."11 As syncategorematic terms, universals do not 
refer at all. Such terms serve certain logical functions 
within language, but do not themselves signify anything. 
They are meaningless except insofar as they are associated 
with or linked to categorematic terms, i.e., terms that do 
refer to or signify something. Thus, for nominalists, 
universals are not existents, rather they are linguistic 
devices devised in human thought. 
We should note three principal reasons why Ockham, and 
other medieval nominalists, reiected real universals. First 
of all, they are not evident to the mind in direct 
experience. What is apprehended through experience by the 
mind is always individual, and universals, (as conceived by 
realists), are not individuals, therefore, experience cannot 
give us knowledge of universals. 
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Secondly, universals are not needed to explain how 
individual things come to have the characteristics they 
have, nor are they needed in order to have knowledge of 
individuals and their descriptive features. According to 
nominalists, language and reality can be adequately 
accounted for with reference only to individuals, 
(individual objects or individuals signs). Such an ontology 
is preferable, according to Ockham, because it is simpler. 
Here is an important application of Ockham's famous "Razor" 
to his own philosophical efforts. Universals are 
problematic partly because, it is argued, they unnecessarily 
multiply the number of entities required to adequately 
describe reality. For the nominalist, there is a certain 
number of individual green leaves, for example. A realist's 
universe has the same number of green leaves, but has in 
addition a universal 'Leaf' and another universal 'Green'; 
increasing the size of the universe by two. But that is not 
the end of it. Additional constituents of the realist's 
universe include the universal 'Color' and 'Plant Part', and 
'Living Thing', and 'Physical Object'. and so on. and so on. 
This sort of ever multiplying universe is unbearably complex 
and unwieldy to Ockham and other similarly minded 
nominalists. 
Thirdly, realism apparently leads to various 
self-contradictions. For example, a universal is either one 
thing or many things. If it is one thing than it is an 
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individual and cannot be common to many things. If it is 
many things than each thing is an individual and these 
cannot be common either.12 
Subsequent to the medieval period, nominalism or 
nominalistic tendencies appeared regularly, often as a 
rejection of universals or abstract entities. Hobbes argued 
that although certain names may be "common names", (i.e. 
they may apply to more than one individual), these do not 
name any kind of entity other than the particulars to which 
they are applied. Thus, the only universals are words. 
"What Hobbes really meant was that universals only come into 
being with classifying, and that classifying is a verbal 
technique."13 The objects of the world are all individual 
and unique. General words simply allow us "to speak of many 
of them at one and the same time."14 
The British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 
whether they were, strictly speaking, nominalists or 
conceptualists, rejected any notion of universals as 
independent or outside of the mind. Their reasons for this 
rejection were largely born of their empiricism. Locke held 
"that general and universal, belong not to real existence of 
things; but are the inventions and creatures of the 
understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only 
signs, whether words or ideas."15 
Berkeley rejected abstract ideas as well as 
universals. He said, " ..• I deny that I can abstract from 
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one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which 
it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can 
frame a general notion, by abstracting from 
particulars .... "16 He later adds, " ... it seems that a word 
becomes general by being made a sign, not of an abstact 
idea, but of several particular ideas .... "17 
For Hume, all ideas originate in impressions. 
Impressions are particular and immediate sensations. Ideas 
are copies or images of impressions. Therefore, as all 
impressions are particular and definite, so all ideas must 
be particular too. Hume accounts for what are called 
abstract general ideas by claiming that they are actually 
particular images that "may become general in their 
representation".18 
Our various impressions of particualar dogs, for 
example, recalled as ideas, appear as resembling each other 
to some degree or other. We refer to each of these 
resembling ideas by using the same name, "dog" in this case. 
When we consider the word "dog" we cannot think of every dog 
or every idea we have of a dog; each of these is distinct 
and individual. Rather, it is a habit of the mind to bring 
to mind some or any individual idea of a particular dog when 
the general word is used. The general word thus names only 
individuals; and generality or universality is only a result 
of a certain habit of the human mind and of language. 
The rejection of universals has been motivated by or 
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defended for various reasons. As Rolf Eberle has pointed 
t "According to their temper, nominalists have tended to OU 1 
rule out unwanted categories of entities on grounds that 
positing their existence is contradictory, non-sensical, 
devoid of explanatory power, lacking in simplicity, 
unverifiable, or just plain suspicious."19 As this has been 
the case historically, so it has been in this century. 
Positivists rejected universals as meaningless 
notions, since they are empirically unverifiable. 
Philosophers of the latter half of this century have 
continued the tradition. 0. F. Pears has argued that the 
claim "universals exist" is not only an unverifiable 
statement of fact, but also that realism is dependent on 
circular reasoning in affirming the existence of 
universals.20 Quine and Goodman, in "Steps Toward a 
Constructive Nominalism" rejected all abstract entities.21 
Later, Goodman revised his view , (as did Quine, but in a 
different direction), to argue that "Nominalism ... consists 
specifically in the refusal to recognize classes."22 
Contemporary nominalists have also refused to accept, 
or have been uneasy about, entities such as concepts, 
meanings, propositions, and an infinity of objects.23 Their 
alternative ontologies countenence only individuals. To the 
extent that these other alleged entities, (universals, 
abstract entities, kinds, classes, meanings, concepts, 
etc.), are not construed as individuals, they are not 
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acceptable constituents of an adequate description of 
reality. 
My purpose in presenting this very brief review of 
some historically significant nominalists is twofold: 
first, to show how nominalism has been a perennial 
perpective; and second, to indicate some of the general 
reasons why some philosophers have rejected universals and 
other purported non-individuals. In summary, nominalisms 
have rejected any notion of real universals or abstract 
entities for the following basic reasons: 
(1) only individuals can be experienced, therefore the 
existence of universals cannot be verified, (this typically 
presupposes some version of empiricist epistemology); 
(2) universals are not needed in order to adequately 
account for knowledge or existence, (it is argued that other 
descriptions are possible); 
(3) theories of universals needlessly multiply 
entities, (such theories are at odds with various criteria 
of simplicity or parsimony advocated by some philosophers as 
marks of theoretical adequacy). 
(4) theories of universals are purported to contain or 
lead to contradictions, circularity, or infinite regresses 
of undesirable sorts. 
Nominalism does not end with its rejection of 
universals, abstract entities, or the like. A principal 
program for nominalism is to account for what is in terms of 
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individuals alone. A nominalistic analysis of reality 
determines not only that universals or abstract entities are 
suspect or non-existent, but that whatever can be said to 
exist is always an individual. It may be said of a 
nominalistic theory: to be is to be an individual, (or a 
particular--I shall use the terms interchangeably in the 
present context). 
Nominalism Affirms the Existence of 
Individuals Only. 
The main challenge for the nominalist is to construct 
an adequate ontology following on the conclusions that 
universals do not exist and that what does exist is always 
an individual. Nominalism must account for a crucial element 
of our experience of the world, namely, the apparent 
recurrence of qualities.24 
The items of experience appear distinct and individual 
largely because of their separation in time and space. In 
addition, they are described as having features, (color, 
shape, size, etc.), that further distinguish them one from 
the other. But it is readily apparent, in spite of the 
obvious uniqueness that holds between the constituents of 
our experience, that we also recognize recurrences of many 
of the features we observe. 
Our language reflects these observed recurrences. 
General words provide us with terms that permit us to speak 
of various individuals grouped together according to 
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recognized recurrences. The challenge for the nominalist is 
to describe this linguistic practice and the experiences 
that give rise to it with reference to individuals only. 
The apparently recurrent "green" we speak of with 
respect to the various leaves on a tree suggests different 
interpretations. Do we call each leaf "green" because they 
each have some thing in common? Or is this practice a 
result of a recogition of some fundamental resemblance 
between the experience of green in one leaf with that of 
another? Or is the "recurrence" ultimately reducible to the 
general applicability of the word "green? 
Each of these questions reflects a different view on 
the matter. The realist regards recurrences and the general 
words that name them as referring to something both 
objective and universal. Objective in the sense of being to 
some extent extra-mental; that is, the recurrences are part 
of the way the world is, they are not mere mental 
abstractions or creations of human thought. They are 
universal in the sense of being non-particular and having 
the capacity to be common to many things. Recurrences are 
recurrences of qualities that may be 0 present in distinct 
individual things at the same time."25 They are, in effect, 
repetitions of essentially the same qualities. The realist 
approaches the issue of recurrence from the side of the 
objects which reveal recurrences. In this way recurrence is 
considered a phenomenon of objects. 
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At the other end of the spectrum is the nominalist who 
approaches the issue of recurrence from the side of 
language. Recurrence is a phenomenon of language not of 
things. That is, the instances of a recurrent quality "are 
related only by the fact that they are the objects of the 
applicability of one and the same general word."26 The 
principal task for the nominalist in this context is to 
account for the applicability of general words. 
One approach might be to leave this general 
applicability of certain words unexplained, attributing 
general use to nothing more fundamental than convention. 
Such an explanation implies that groupings under general 
terms are wholly arbitrary or, at most, merely practical. 
Calling the leaves on the tree "green" and "leaf" is nothing 
more than a convenient and customary way of referring to 
more than one thing at a time. This approach is not very 
satisfying since it denies that there is any sense of 
recurrence in our experience, and our experience certainly 
seems to involve some sort of recurrence. It also seems 
implausible because it fails to account for our ability to 
use general words in consistent ways when we encounter new 
objects. Our experience of what appear as recurrent 
properties and our use of language in consistent and 
predictable ways implies that what is going on is not 
entirely arbitrary. 
A more promising strategy for accounting for apparent 
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recurrence is to show how all uses of general words can be 
translated into discourse in such a way that reference to 
universals or abstract entities is neither implied nor 
needed. Two versions of this approach are worth examining. 
Quine and Goodman have argued that all statements 
using general words can be translated into equivalent 
statements in which these general words occur as predicates. 
It is maintained that these predicates are genuinely 
meaningful but are not names. That is, they do not refer, 
as such, and thus do not commit us to the existence of any 
entities. As Quine has pointed out "being a name of 
something is a much more special feature than being 
meaningful."27 Something meaningful and true can be said of 
a leaf when we say of it that it is green without also 
claiming that "green• names some entity. In this way, names 
that purport to name attributes, universals, recurrences, 
etc., can be regarded as predicates and converted into 
descriptions. "Whatever we say with the help of names can 
be said in a language which shuns names altogether."28 
Quine has argued that the ontological committment of a 
theory is measured by the logic of our discourse. That is, 
we must accept as entities in our ontology only those items 
the terms of which function as values of a variable in a 
quantif icational translation of our language: "a theory is 
committed to those and only those entities to which the 
bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring 
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in order that the affirmations made in the theory are 
true."29 
"The leaf is green" is translated as "Something is a 
leaf and is green", (3x)(Lx . Gx). Such a statement commits 
the speaker only to those entities that must be substituted 
for the variable 'x' in order that the proposition above be 
regarded as true. Such a statement commits the speaker only 
to individuals in this case because anything that is a green 
leaf is an individual. No committment is made, no 
acknowledgment given to the existence of either "leafness" 
or "greenness" insofar as these are taken to refer to 
abstract entities. The terms "green" and nleaf" are 
regarded as syncategorematic terms; that is, terms which 
serve a logical function in a language, are meaningful only 
in a context that includes categorematic terms, (terms that 
refer to objects), but do not name anything. 
Now consider the statement "Green is a color". This 
appears to commit the speaker to abstract entities since 
this statement makes no reference to any individual but only 
to general qualities "green" and "color". The nominalist 
addresses this seeming problem through a use of the 
universal quantifier. "Green is a color 0 is translated as 
"Anything that is green is colored", or (x)(GX-31> Cx). Again 
such a statement commits the speaker only to individuals 
since every instance of 'x' can be substituted with a 
reference to an individual object. In other words, saying 
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•Green is a color" really amounts to saying that anything 
that can be called green can also be called colored. There 
are only green things and colored things. "Green" and 
•color" do not refer to or name anything. 
Not all statements are so easily dealt with by this 
strategy. For example, mathematics consists of various 
statements that are not nearly so amenable to the sort of 
translations that resist entailing committment to 
universals. A statement such as "There is a prime number 
greater than one million", (3x)(Px • x<1,000,000), says that 
"there is something which is prime and exceeds a 
million; and any such entity is a number, hence a 
universal."30 
The project of characterizing mathematical statements 
in purely nominalistic language is quite complicated and is 
an ongoing one. It is beyond the purposes of this paper to 
analyze these developments, but it worth acknowledging some 
of the ways in which nominalism has been only partially 
successful in providing the means for translating different 
areas of discourse. But it should be quite obvious that 
having not solved every problem is not the demise of a 
theory. Three things can happen as a result of the 
nominalist's efforts: (1) success in nominalizing a realm 
of discourse; (2) a setting aside of the problem area until 
more promising methods or strategies are discovered or 
developed; or 3) renouncing certain ways of speaking as 
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ontologically unacceptable. 
For example, Quine apparently recognized the 
significance of option (3) mentioned above when he remarked 
that, "bound variables for classes or relations or numbers, 
if they occur in existential quantifiers or in universal 
quantifiers within subordinate clauses, must be renounced by 
the nominalist in all contexts in which he cannot explain 
them away by paraphrase."31 
Another important contribution to nominalistic theory 
is Goodman's rejection of class-membership in favor of a 
part/whole relationship as a description of general terms. 
In an attempt to avoid appealing to universals as a way of 
accounting for recurrences, some have proposed instead 
making use of classes. "Red" is thus understood as a name 
referring to dthe class of red things". To be called red is 
to be recognized as a member of this class. But for some 
nominalists, classes are no less problematic than are 
universals. Interestingly enough, Goodman has actually 
defined nominalism as that view which "consists specifically 
in the refusal to recognize classes."32 Whereas in earlier 
formulations Goodman, along with Quine, defined nominalism 
in terms of a rejection of abstract entities, later he 
preferred •to characterize nominalism as renouncing all 
nonindividuals"33; and indicating further that classes are 
not genuine individuals. Goodman develops his distinctive 
position on this point by claiming that "while the 
64 
nominalist may construe anything as an individual, he 
refuses to construe anything as a class".34 And further 
that, "whatever can be construed as a class can indeed be 
construed as an individual, and yet a class cannot be 
construed as an individual."35 To satisfy these 
conclusions, Goodman has argued that what can be described 
in terms of classes can be better described in terms of 
discontinuous wholes. For Goodman, an individual "need not 
have personal integration".36 
For example, instead of speaking of "the class of red 
things", Goodman would have us recognize each red thing as 
merely a part of the discontinous and scattered whole 
individual "red". As most any nominalist would have it, 
"red" does not name any existing universal nor any abstract 
entity such as a class. But for Goodman "red" need not be 
disregarded as a name, but can be understood rather as the 
name of an individual comprised of many heterogenous and 
widely separated parts. This indicates something of the 
meaning of his assertion that whatever can be construed as a 
class can be construed as an individual. The so-called 
"class of red things" is fundamentally made up of individual 
red things by means of the relation of membership. The 
notion of class depends upon this proposed relation between 
class members. Goodman replaces the relation of membership 
with a part/whole relation and thus eliminates any reference 
to classes. 
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Goodman acknowledges that such a conception of 
individuals may stretch the imagination, but he is not 
willing to concede that it requires any more imagination 
than that required to accept the "platonist's" thesis 
regarding classes and universals. 
Goodman's rejection of classes follows from what he 
takes to be a fundamental nominalistic assertion: no 
distinction of entities without distinction of content. 
That is, no "two different entities can be made up of the 
same entities".37 The countenancing of classes allows for 
the generation and multiplication of entities; in this case, 
classes of classes. 
The platonist, (Goodman's name for anyone who accepts 
classes or any other nonindividual as an entity in his/her 
system), and the nominalist may actually agree as to the 
atoms, (basic individuals), that go to make up their 
respective systems. The nominalist recognizes as entities 
all individual atoms and any sums of atoms forming 
additional wholes, (construed as individuals). As long as 
each sum-whole is composed of different combinations of the 
atoms, each is accepted as a legitimate entity in the 
nominalist's ontology. These are all and the only entities 
the nominalist's system can "generateu. 
The platonist, on the other hand, recognizes these 
same individuals, except the platonist construes the sums as 
classes. So far so good for both nominalist and platonist; 
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that is, the sizes of their respective universes are 
essentially the same, and neither party has any significant 
objection to the other's conception of the universe. But 
the nominalist objects to what the platonist's system is now 
capable of generating; namely, additional entities comprised 
of the same basic atoms. The platonist countenances the 
generation, by means of the membership relation, of 
additional classes out of the initial classes formed of the 
system's atoms: classes of classes. And what is more, 
these classes of classes may generate classes of classes of 
classes, and, at least theoretically, so on ad 
infinitum. 
Such a populous universe not only offends the 
nominalist's minimalistic temperament, but, more 
importantly, it results in a virtual infinity of 
non-individuals which are, in terms of content, essentially 
indistinguishable from one another. As we have seen, from a 
nominalist's point of view such as Goodman's, there can be 
no distinction of entities made up of the same atoms; this 
is redundant and unparsimonious. To permit classes of 
classes is to permit entities made up of the same atoms. 
Therefore, the nominalist should not accept classes as 
constituents of her ontological system. 
I should like to describe one final approach to 
translating language which refers to recurrences. Such an 
approach attempts to rephrase all statements containing 
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general words in terms of "names of particular objects, 
forms of the verb 'to resemble', and the phrase 'as closely 
as'".38 In other words, this position recognizes 
resemblence or similarity as fundamental to our experience 
of objects. But in doing so, the nominalist making use of 
such an approach does not acknowledge that "resemblences• 
exist, nor does resembling refer to, or name, any thing. 
•To resemble" may be, thus, regarded as syncategorematic. 
Under this view, a statement such as "'a' is blue" 
might be translated as "'a' resembles 'b', 'c', and 'd' at 
least as closely as 'b', 'c', and 'd' resemble each other," 
where 'b', 'c', and 'd' are the exemplars of the meaning of 
the word "blue".39 Thus, general words are understood as 
convenient ways of referring to conventional or practical 
groupings of objects. But note that resemblance under this 
approach is a matter of comparison to a group of standard 
objects or particular exemplars, not in terms of 
"resemblance in some respect". To speak of "some respect" 
has been taken to imply or suggest a realistic 
interpretation of resemblances, and so is preferably avoided 
in nominalistic accounts. An opponent of the nominalist's 
appeal to resemblances might charge that resemblance is a 
derivative relation requiring some reference to a universal. 
The argument might go something like this: 
whenever we say that A, B, and C resemble each other in a 
certain respect, we shall be asked "In what respect?" 
And how can we answer, except by saying "in respect of 
being instances of the universal 9" or "in respect of 
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being characterized by the characteristic ea? 40 
The nominalist must avoid either of these alternative 
expressions. This is probably one of the greatest 
difficulties for nominalism: how to account for what appear 
as observed resemblances without falling into the realistic 
or platonistic language of drespects". 
One attempt at solving this difficulty is to interpret 
resemblance, as has already been mentioned, in terms of a 
comparison to standard objects or exemplars, (which are 
themselves individuals), rather than in terms of some 
universal. It is important to recognize that, for the 
nominalist, if resemblance is to be admitted into the system 
at all, it must be construed either as a syncategorematic 
term or as an individual, not some abstract relation, which 
requires some resemblance-universal in order to explain the 
phenomenon.41 For instance, the particular green of one 
leaf is said to resemble the particular green of another at 
a particular time, under particular circumstances, (light, 
perspective, distance, etc.), by a particular observer, and 
so on. The experience of resemblance between the two leaves 
is an individual experience that has nothing "in common• 
with any other individual experience described in terms of 
resemblance. 
But a greater problem arises from within the context 
of this noticed resemblance. As noted above, it seems that 
we recognize how things resemble one another only in terms 
"respect": of some 
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green leaf A resembles green leaf B in 
respect to their color. The green color of leaf A is not 
claimed to resemble the oval shape of leaf B. How can a 
nominalist account for this aspect of such observed 
resemblences? 
One response is that our language reflects certain 
habits of classification. That is, the individual objects 
and experiences that make up the world we experience appear 
to us with certain discernable individual features, and we 
observe what appear to us as more or less similar 
appearances of these individual features. But language 
makes an important contribution to these observed 
similarities. Our language adopts predicates that serve to 
identify useful groupings of what appear to us as similar 
features. Similarity or resemblence are themselves features 
of our experience of things, but our language conditions us, 
to some extent, to look for certain similarities. Thus, 
"respects• are actually items of experience for which we 
have predicate terms. The two green leaves do look more or 
less alike, but we need not say that this is due to some 
common respect. Rather, green leaf A and green leaf B are 
experienced in ways describable as "similar• to some extent, 
and our language gives us predicate terms 'green' and 'leaf' 
that have proven useful in grouping and classifying such 
items of experience. 
What allows us to link specific predicate terms with 
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specific individuals is the similarity we attribute to the 
new individuals and other individuals that we take to be 
exemplars of the relevant predicate terms. We have now 
returned to the earlier notion of translating general words 
as predictates indicating comparisons to groups of standard 
objects or individual exemplars. 
Summarizing, some nominalists propose to translate or 
interpret the language of recurrences not in terms of 
universals or general characteristics, but instead in terms 
of the resemblences and similarities. But similarity is a 
significantly relative concept. Our experience of 
similarity is greatly affected by the predicate terms we 
have at our disposal, our interests and purposes for 
acknowledging or attributing similarities, our individual 
sensory apparatuses, etc. Such a nominalistic approach 
consists in arguing that similarity, (resemblence, 
recurrence, or whatever), has less to do with the way things 
are than with how we choose to describe our experiences with 
language.42 
Nominalism as a Limiting Theory 
One final conception of nominalism I should like to 
consider briefly is the capacity for a nominalistic approach 
to serve the theoretical function of delimiting the range of 
possible ontologies. By this I mean that nominalism is 
quite clearly an extreme position. It represents the far 
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extent to which an ontological theory might go in 
restricting existence to individuality. 
In any attempt to develop a theory accounting for some 
phenomona, one useful way to proceed is to determine the 
range of plausible theories that might do the job. From 
there, weaker theories may be eliminated and further 
investigation may proceed on to more promising ones. In 
ontological matters, one of the principal questions of 
concern is, to what extent is what exists individual or not? 
Nominalism is the theory that takes the extreme position 
that anything that can truly be said to exist must be an 
individual. Each thing that exists is a particular, there 
are no non-individuals, universals, abstract entities, 
kinds, etc., except as linguistic devices. Some of the 
reasons why some theorists have held out in favor of such an 
ontological theoretical perspective have been examined in 
what has preceded. My purpose at present is to point out 
the general theoretical value of and interest in developing 
a coherent limiting theory, a theoretical perspective lying 
on the far reaches of viable possibility and plausibility. 
Even if one chooses in the end to reject the perspective, I 
believe that the exercise is worthwhile nonetheless, if only 
to contribute to a process of elimination. 
Nominalism helps to •1ay out the territory• and 
establish a sense of perspective with respect to certain 
ontological problems. Any investigation into the 
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ontological make-up of some part or the whole of the world 
must take account of the various key alternatives. As was 
discussed in the Introduction, diverse strategies and 
approaches have been applied to the ontological status of 
artworks. A complete appraisal of the matter must include 
an assessment of a nominalistic perspective, as well as 
others. (Consistent with this belief, I shall examine three 
other theories that I take to be "limiting theories" in 
Chapter IV.) 
For those already inclined towards nominalistic 
thinking, development of a nominalism with respect to the 
subject at hand will be the first order of business. But 
for those less attracted to nominalism, or even hostile 
towards it, I would suggest that consideration of this 
perspective might be compared to looking at the back side of 
a statue. Although the "best" view may actually be a 
frontal one, such a conclusion is better justified and more 
confidently maintained only after examining such seemingly 
strange perspectives as the back or even underside of the 
statue. In analogous fashion, nominalism may appear as an 
"undersideM ontological perspective to some, but I think it 
profitable to take a look anyway. 
Summary 
My intention in providing this chapter is to give some 
further sense of context to the subsequent presentati9n of 
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aesthetic issues. The first chapter stated the ontological 
problems associated with the arts generally and music 
specifically. I have now drawn the focus upon a decidedly 
nominalistic outlook. What I take nominalism as such to be 
and to entail has been the purpose of the preceding 
sections. In what follows a nominalistic theoretical 
approach will be applied to an ontological problem area in 
music. So far I have tried to explain how nominalism arises 
partly from a skeptical response to claims regarding the 
existence of universals and abstract entitiies, and partly 
from what I have called a philosophical temperament, which 
consists of a general sense or philosophical intuition that 
whatever exists is an individual. 
From a description of these initial tendencies or 
preferences I moved on to a brief survey of some basic 
theoretical reasons against belief in universals, and then 
to a characterization of some rudimentary means of 
construing existence and experience in terms of individuals 
alone. Finally, I described what I take to be part of the 
value of nominalistic theorizing: to search out and explore 
the limits of plausibility in constructing a particularist 
ontology in an area of interest that is somewhat unsettled. 
This chapter has not been an attempt to defend 
nominalism per se, rather it sets the stage for what I will 
regard as a genuine defense of a nominalistic proposal. I 
hope now to provide in what follows a reasonable and 
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defensible nominalistic ontology of musical compositions. 
CHAPTER III 
MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AS CONCRETE PARTICULARS 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall develop in specific terms my 
proposal for a nominalistic ontology of musical 
compositions. As described earlier, in Chapter I, this will 
require a careful consideration and application of 
nominalistic presuppositions and standards to performances, 
scores, and recordings as well. So, although the focus is 
upon compositions, much will be said about the various other 
products of musical activity, and thus, about music as a 
whole. 
A commitment to nominalism is, in large part, a 
commitment to descriptions of what there is in terms of 
individuals alone. Therefore, the sense in which the 
proposed theory is nominalistic is that it maintains the 
view that musical compositions, (and any other musical 
artwork, for that matter), are individuals and not any sort 
of purported non-individual such as a universal or other 
abstract entity. In addition to the claim that compositions 
are individuals, I am also claiming that compositions are 
concrete, that is, they are temporally and spatially unique 
individuals, and as such I thus maintain that they are 
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physical objects. Therefore, the approach developed here 
not only specifies an ontology of musical works which is 
particularistic, but one that is also physicalistic. In 
saying this, I am not claiming that a nominalistic ontology 
must be physicalistic, instead I am claiming that this 
nominalistic theory of musical works is to be understood in 
terms of particular physical objects. 
The principal reason for holding this view is that I 
take it that all artworks are physical objects. A physical 
object is something that is spatial and temporal, it can be 
identified with some position in space and it can be 
described as beginning to exist at one time, existing for 
some duration of time, and ceasing to exist at some other 
time. Under this view, events will be treated as physical 
in the sense that they occur in some locatable place and at 
some identifiable time. 
Physical objects can also be described as phenomenal 
objects; that is, such objects can be described in terms of 
the way in which perceivers perceive them. For example, a 
chair can be described as a physical object in spatial and 
temporal terms such as "the chair is three feet tall and was 
sitting in my room yesterday." The chair can also be 
described a phenomenal object in this manner, "the chair 
appears brown and feels comfortable." 
The bearing this has on art objects is that they too 
can be described physically and phenomenally. "The 
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performance of Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony' last night 
filled the concert hall with intense sounds." "Last night" 
gives the event its temporal location, "concert hallN gives 
it its spatial location, and "intense sounds" can be 
interpreted as describing the event as consisting physically 
of air particles moving at a certain frequency. The 
performance can also be described phenomenally in such terms 
as "The 'Ninth Symphony' was often loud, yet at times 
sounded quite soft." This latter statement describes how 
the event was perceived by some listener. 
It is my position, then, that all artworks are 
publically accessible artifacts, that is, they are unique 
physical objects that are made by some person or persons, 
usually referred to as artists, and that these artifacts are 
perceivable, i.e., phenomenally describable entities capable 
of having spectators. Quite simply, I am arguing that 
without a perceivable artifact, artworks cannot be said to 
exist. Without going too far into the matter here, let me 
call on the plausible intuition that I cannot be said to 
have made an artwork if I "have nothing to show for it•; 
what could my artwork be if it is not presentable for the 
inspection by others. I made this point earlier in Chapter 
I, and I shall have more to say about it later. I shall not 
argue for the larger thesis regarding the physical status of 
all artworks, but I shall argue the case for physical 
musical artworks in what follows. 
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It could be said then, that the theory under 
construction, which regards musical artworks as concrete 
particulars, is actually formulated on the basis of two 
ontological commitments: a nominalism that countenances 
only individual entities and a physicalism with respect to 
artworks that regards all genuine artworks, in this case, 
musical artworks, as physical entities. 
The plan for this chapter is as follows. First, the 
basic terminology which makes use of the words work, 
artwork, composition, and performance must be defined and 
clarified, along with other related terms such as score, 
manuscript, interpretation, improvisation, and recording. 
The next main objective of the chapter will be to 
explain the notion of "musical elements". Musical elements 
are, most simply, the materials out of which musical 
artworks are made. In other words, they are the things 
which are combined or grouped together to make compositions, 
performances, scores, etc. More specifically, with respect 
to compositions, musical elements are the simpler particular 
items that composers select and arrange and combine together 
in order to compose their musical works, which are thus 
understood as compound particular wholes. Some musical 
elements will turn out to be sounds while others are not. 
Following this, I shall begin to develop a 
characterization of the ontological status of musical 
compositions by first describing the process of composing a 
79 
musical work. As I shall explain it, composing a work 
consists of some person (or persons) intentionally selecting 
and arranging musical elements for the purpose of making 
what that person (or persons) believes to be an original 
musical composition. It will be pointed out that not all 
composing is composing a work, just as, for example, not all 
writing is writing a book. "Composing• is, generally 
speaking, an activity of selecting and arranging musical 
elements in what is believed to be an original way. 
"Composing a work" includes the intention to create an 
original musical work. The details of this process will 
comprise a crucial portion of the specific nominalistic 
theory under consideration. This description of how a 
composition is made will of course be coordinated with a 
description of the product of this activity: the 
composition. The composition, under this view, will thus be 
the physical (and phenomenal) artifact resulting from some 
person's intentional effort to make what is believed by that 
person to be a (somewhat) original combination of musical 
elements into a musical work. Since each of these musical 
elements is itself an individual entity, the composition is 
itself a com~lex whole comprised of some specifiable number 
of simpler parts. This whole is itself a temporally and 
spatially unique (physical and phenomenal) individual. 
Once the process of composition-making is described, 
the relationship between the product of this process,· i.e. , 
80 
the composition, and other musical objects, (performances, 
scores, etc.), will be delineated in some detail. This 
relationship will be explained in terms of what I will call 
•copying" and "derivingu. These notions will be understood 
primarily in terms of an intention on the part of some 
person or persons to make a musical object explicitly 
associated with some already existing composition. The 
"connectiona between composition and performance, for 
example, thus will be defined in terms of temporal 
precedence on the part of the former entity and of beliefs 
about the extent of originality with respect to each, and 
not in terms of any essential similarity or common 
qualities. It is believed that such a characterization of 
these connections or relationships will avoid such 
anti-nominalistic language of universals such as 
"instantiation of", hparticipation in", or the language of 
classes such as amember of". 
Further development of some of these features of the 
theory will be presented by way of comparisons with some 
other, variably different alternative theories of 
compositions in Chapter IV. By providing such comparisons 
it is hoped that the present theory will be better 
understood as situated within a range of proposed approaches 
to musical ontology. 
Some Terminology and Distinctions 
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For the sake of clarity and consistency, I shall 
describe my use of certain key terms. In doing so, my chief 
concern is to explain them in a manner consistent with the 
overall nominalistic theory of music I intend to construct, 
and yet in a manner not particularly foreign to conventional 
usage. Thus, not only will I define some terminology, but 
in so doing I hope to present some of the basic conceptual 
framework required for the central thesis. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I intend to use 
the words 11 artwork" 11 musical artwork• 11 compositional work 11 
"composition" and "musical composition" as interchangeable 
or synonymous terms. These will refer to the products, 
(artifactual objects), of a composer's act of composing a 
work. These terms are to be applied to those musical 
entities regarded as having the requisite degree of 
originality to qualify as genuine compositions. What is 
meant by "requisite degree of originality" will be discussed 
in the relevant sections of this chapter. Under this view, 
originality will be regarded as a function of belief on the 
part of the composer and not a matter of inherent novelty 
with respect to the composition. 
"Work", "work of art", and "musical work", on the 
other hand, will be used as the more general terms for most 
any kind of musical object.1 Musical works thus include 
compositions, as well as any other non-compositional musical 
objects that should be accounted for in a theory of music. 
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In other words, some or all of performances, recordings, 
scores, improvisations, etc., may be and have been regarded 
as musical works of art. In music, compositions are but one 
sort of musical work--not all musical works are understood 
to be compositions. For example, it is not uncommon to 
consider musical performances to be musical works of art of 
a sort. Put another way, the claim could be expanded by 
saying compositions are not the only musical objects that 
are art objects. Thus, it follows, given the present 
terminology, that while all musical compositions are musical 
works, not all musical works are musical compositions. 
Perhaps the most important distinction within the 
practice of music is the one between composition and 
performance. As I shall describe them, they are not 
mutually exclusive terms. Although most of the time what is 
a composition is not a performance and what is a performance 
is not a composition, we shall find that sometimes a single 
musical work may be referred to properly as both a 
composition and a performance. 
"Performance• will be the name used to denote certain 
individual musical works which are comprised largely, if not 
entirely of sounds. More specifically, performances are 
events consisting of actual musical sounds occurring in a 
particular sequence during some specifiable period of time. 
As such, a performance will often be referred to here as a 
sound-sequence-event. But not all occasions of musical 
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sounds are performances. Performances are those musical 
sound-sequence-events that are either compositions 
themselves or derived, (or copied) from a composition. A 
perform~nce is thus always either identified with a 
composition, (i.e., it is a composition) or it is 
associated with a composition, (i.e., derived or copied 
from an already existing composition). Most performances 
turn out to be of the latter sort. The former consist 
largely of improvisations, (which I shall argue are best 
understood as compositions); although I would also hold that 
there are some compositions which are performances but are 
not improvisations. 
This point can be made as follows: since 
compositional works are defined in terms of intended 
originality, and since improvisations are produced by 
musical performers who believe they are selecting and 
arranging musical sounds in a somewhat original way, it 
seems sensible to consider improvisors to be composers, and 
what they make to be compositions; (I shall return to this 
point below). Thus, improvisation is typically described as 
music that is created (composed) at the same time as it is 
performed; a kind of spontaneous or extemporaneous 
composition. But some composing gets done in a more 
piecemeal, deliberative fashion. A composer may compose a 
musical work by playing a musical instrument and by 
combining and recombining actual musical sounds made with 
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the instrument. Unlike improvising this composing activity 
need not occur all at one time, nor need it always result in 
a completed work at that time. It may involve working out 
parts of the work, remembering what was played, and 
eventually fitting the various parts together into a 
completed whole. I will suggest that it is the first 
playing of this whole sound-sequence that constitutes the 
composition.2 Such a sound-sequence is a performance and a 
composition, but it is not an improvisation. (Further 
details concerning this sort of composing will be 
forthcoming.) 
Examples of musical sound-sequence-events which are 
not performances would be recordings of performances, 
(recordings of performances are not generally regarded to be 
themselves performances)3; and mere practicings4, (e.g., a 
musician playing scales or warm-up exercises). The former 
are generally ruled out for not consisting of sounds made 
directly by the performer or performers, and the latter are 
ruled out for not being associated with a composition. 
Performances are defined then in terms of the 
following necessary conditions: 
A performance 
(1) consists of a musical sound-sequence-event; 
(2) is made by some person or persons with the 
intention of producing a performance; 
(3) is associated with a composition, i.e., a 
performance is either a composition or it. is 
derived from a composition. 
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The first condition states that all performances 
consist of actually occurring musical sounds. The second 
condition refers to the artifactual status of any musical 
work of art. And the third condition distinguishes 
performances from other musical sound-sequence-events, i.e., 
those not associated with any compositional work. 
"Score" will refer to a musical work which consists of 
musical inscriptions or notational symbols. "Manuscript" 
refers to a score which is a composition; it is the result 
of some composer's original selection and arrangement of 
musical symbols; it is the composer's autograph score. But 
most scores are not manuscripts, rather they are copies (or 
most often, copies of copies), of manuscripts. Still others 
are "transcriptions•. Transcriptions are scores derived 
from performances. A transciption is made by someone who 
listens to a sounding of a work of music and represents what 
is heard in terms of musical notatational symbols. 
Transcribing is analogous to taking dictation. As such, a 
transcription may be derived from an improvisation or it may 
be derived from a performance of a composition or it may be 
derived from a recording of some musical work. 
Although most scores are copies or derivations of 
compositions and are not manuscripts, (i.e., compositions), 
as it happens, most compositions are scores, (i.e., 
manuscripts). The most controversial claim of this 
dissertation is probably the claim presently under 
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consideration: that a score can be and often is a 
composition, or conversly, some compositions are scores. 
Since most composers write scores, their artworks, I shall 
argue, are their manuscripts. I shall argue that it is this 
written score that is the particular artifact that many 
composers produce through their compositional efforts, and 
so, these manuscript scores are to be properly regarded as 
their artworks. 
Musical "recordings• must be accommodated in any 
account of music, but they create puzzling difficulties. 
These difficulties arise partly because of a certain 
ambiguity associated with term "recording•. In one sense, 
recordings are physical objects, (usually magnetically 
charged plastic tapes, grooved vinyl discs, or etched 
plastic discs), made through the use of specialized 
sound-recording and -playback equipment. In another sense, 
"recording 0 is used to refer to the sounds produced by 
playing the recording in the appropriate machine. 
Recordings are the products of what is typically a 
mechanical process consisting of converting sound-events 
into some other, less transient physical medium. But this 
is not always the case. Interestingly, recordings can be 
made without producing any sounds at all. Sounds are waves 
of moving air that are perceivable by hearers; but some 
electronic musical instruments can generate electronic 
impulses which are not sounds, yet these electronic signals 
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can be recorded and subsequently "played back" as audible 
sounds. Thus, a whole recorded piece of music could be 
produced without making any sounds whatsoever, yet this 
recording can later be used to produce actual musical 
sounds. 
Sometimes "recording" applies to the physical object 
which is capable of being used to playback musical sounds. 
But "recording" also is used to refer to the musical sounds 
that are played back. When I say I have a recording of 
Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony" I can do so either by pointing 
at my tape cassette, for instance, or by directing attention 
to the sounds coming out of my stereo. If I say that I am 
"listening to a recordingM the object of my listening is not 
the piece of tape, but the sounds produced by running the 
tape through the proper sound-reproducing device. 
These recorded artifacts are used to make musical 
sound-events without the immediate or direct use of musical 
instruments or voices. The sounds resulting from the use of 
recordings in conjunction with the appropriate mechanical 
sound equipment are actually copies of previously occurring 
sound events. This is one way in which recordings differ 
from performances. In a performance, the performers. (the 
person or persons making the performance). directly cause 
the musical sounds to occur by playing their instruments, 
(or singing). The sounds resulting from the playing of a 
recording are not directly caused by a performer, rather 
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theY are replicas of previously occurring sounds. To be 
sure, the sounds of the recording are individual sounds 
occurring at the time of playback and some of their 
character is due to conditions present at this time, and 
thus hRve an identity distinguishable from the sounds which 
occurrad at the time of recording. But the proximal cause 
of the sounds at the time of playback is the machine and the 
tape or disc inside of it and not any performer's 
contemporaneous efforts. To some extent, a sound recording 
of a performance is comparable to a film of an event: they 
both are entities causally connected to prior events in such 
a way that they can produce sounds and sights, respectively, 
of significant similarity to those prior events. But such a 
recording does not consist of the same sounds as those 
that caused it; the sounds of the original event no longer 
do or can exist. The recording consists of new and distinct 
sounds distally caused by earlier sounds, and thus are 
noticeably similar to them. 
Again, recordings involve the process of converting 
transient sound events into relatively permanent physical 
objects; physical objects of the sort that subsequently may 
be used to make new sound events. With this fact in mind. I 
shall, for the sake of simplicity. use the term recording to 
refer to the sound-sequence-events produced through a proper 
use of the recorded tape or disc (or whatever). Thus. 
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recordings are sound-sequence-events that are causally 
related to some earlier occurring sound-sequence-event. 
Musical Elements 
Musical elements are the stuff of which all musical 
works are made. They are the media or materials of music. 
I say media rather than medium because musical elements 
exist as differing physical entities. Some are apprehended 
by hearing them because they are sounds; others are 
apprehended by seeing them because they are inscriptions. 
Some groups of musical elements are appreciated for 
themselves: musical sounds; others are appreciated for what 
they may refer to: notational symbols and spoken 
descriptions. Put another way, musical elements are all 
physical entities, i.e., they are concrete individuals 
located spatially and temporally. But they are not all of 
the same material. Some musical elements are sounds, 
especially musical sounds, some are written inscriptions of 
specialized musical notational symbols. and some are spoken 
words denoting either these notational symbols or musical 
sounds. An example of a musical sound element would be an 
actual sounding of a particualr pitch. This pitch can be 
described as a physical event consisting of air waves at say 
440 cycles. Phenomenally, this musical sound element may be 
described as hearing an 'A' pitched sound. 
An example of a musical symbol element would be the 
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inscription J This symbol is generally used to 
refer to an 'A' pitched sound, but this notational 
inscription has its own status as a physical entity, (it is 
an ink mark on this page of paper). Notational symbols such 
as the one above are not the only inscriptions that are 
musical elements. The written words MA sharp major• or u'A' 
pitch in key of C" are also musical symbol elements. 
An example of musical symbol element that is spoken 
wuuld be actually uttered words "A sharp major" or "'A' 
pitch in the key of c·. Their physical and phenomenal 
status is comparable to that of musical sounds, except that 
spoken words are not themselves musical sounds as such, 
rather they are sounded symbols denoting actual musical 
sounds. Spoken musical symbols should not be confused with 
musical sound elements which are sung words. Sung words are 
musical elements not because they are words, but because 
they are voiced musical sounds, i.e., musical sounds made 
with vocal cords. That these sounds are also words is not 
relevant to their status as musical sounds.5 
All musical works are made of some combination of 
musical elements. These musical elements are either sounds 
or symbols. These latter exist as either written 
inscriptions or as spoken words. As I shall eventually 
explain, musical works may consist of any combination of any 
musical elements. 
But this does not mean that just any or every 
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combination or occurrence of musical elements is a musical 
work. Two issues bear on this point. First, a work is a 
completed whole. Admittedly, it is not clear what 
constitutes a completed whole. Somehow it is something 
which involves a purported explicit beginning and a 
purported explicit ending. The sounds preceding a concert 
consisting of the tunings and practicings of the musicians 
are all musical sound elements, but the collection of these 
sounds is not a work nor are they considered any part of the 
work to be performed. This issue concerning the notion of a 
completed whole will be addressed further in the section on 
composing. 
A second issue related to the question as to when a 
group of musical elements is a work concerns certain 
evaluative notions of art status. To raise the question as 
to what makes any given collection of musical elements a 
work can be, in effect, to raise questions concerning the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a 
work of art, and some consider standards of aesthetic value 
to be at least somewhat relevant.6 I shall not address 
these questions and associated problems here. Rather, I 
will attempt to frame a theory that will be able to account 
for whatever is accepted as a genuine musical artwork by 
anyone. I shall begin with the assumptions that there are 
musical works and that compositions are distinguishable from 
performances and other musical objects. I will then proceed 
92 
from whatever is taken to be a musical artwork and address 
its ontological status. Mine is a theory about what musical 
artworks there are or might be, not about how something 
qualifies as a musical work of art. 
The reason for making this latter point is that there 
may be some disagreement about whet specific things are 
genuine musical elements. Just which sounds are musical 
sound-elements, just which inscriptions are musical symbol 
inscriptions, and just which verbal expressions are 
musical symbol expressions are somewhat controversial 
mitters. To a large extent what counts as a musical element 
is a matter of convention, that is, musical elements are 
whatever things musical composers intentionally combine in 
order to make their works. This seems to suggest that 
virtually any sound could be a musical element. As a matter 
of fact, this is the case. This can be argued on the 
grounds that virtually any sound has actually been used in 
music: from cannon roars to sounds of running water, from 
whale calls to glass breaking; (composers from Tchaichovsky 
to Cage have used such sounds in their works). What 
aesthetic merit or value these may or may not have is an 
important and interesting question, but one outside the 
issues to be addressed here. But I would at least suggest 
that thure seems to be little if any reason to exclude any 
sound as a possible musical element, (any attempt to do so 
will probably be met with an attempt by some composer or 
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performer to include it within a musical work). What is 
more controversial and less clear is the question, which 
collections or groupings of sound elements are musical 
artworks? If it is true that any sound could be a musical 
element, it would seem to follow that any collection of 
sounds could be a musical artwork. In the context of 
musical works the problems are amplified. But whatever or 
however we are to distinguish mere sounds from musical sound 
elements, (i.e., the way in which a mere sound comes to be 
regarded as a musical sound), should also, in similar 
fashion, indicate something about the distinction between 
mere collections of sounds and musical artworks. In other 
words, since any sound could be used and regarded as a 
musical sound, it would appear that any grouping of such 
musically used and regarded sounds thus would be a 
collection of musical sounds. All that is left to argue is 
whether just any collection of musical sounds is to be 
regarded a musical work. What settles this latter question 
will be determined by one's art theory in so far as it 
relates to the problem of defining art. 
As I have said, my concern at present is not to argue 
for a particular definition of art nor for a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for art status, as 
narrowly or widely as this may be done; rather, it should be 
made clear that what I am claiming here is that musical 
artworks consist of whatever are, as a matter of fact, taken 
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to be musical elements. The point is that certain things, 
certain sounds and/or notational symbols, are used as 
musical elements. I believe that these are or can be 
construed as concrete particulars, and so it follows that 
any combination of them are or can be construed as concrete 
particulars. 
Composing 
I have defined composing as the activity of selecting 
and arranging musical elements by some person (or persons) 
who intends to make what he/she (or they) believes to be an 
original musical work. As an activity, composing need not 
terminate or result in a completed composition, although 
this is the usual aim of such efforts. Composing is 
comparable to writing in this regard. Just as completing a 
book, a paragraph, or even a sentence is not a necessary 
condition for some activity counting as writing, neither 
does composing require any such completion. Composing is a 
way of acting which implies little if anything with respect 
to achievement. It follows then, that whereas the existence 
of compositions is dependent upon composing, composing is 
not dependent upon the existence of compositions. In other 
words, while all compositions are to be understood as 
produced by acts of composing, not all acts of composing 
produce compositions. 
There are two key parts to the proposed definition of 
95 
composing: (1) the selection and arrangement of musical 
elements; and, (2) an intention and belief about 
originality. Individually, neither of these is a sufficient 
condition for composing, but taken together, I do think they 
provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for an act 
counting as compositional. Since "being composed", (i.e., 
being the product of some act of composing), is not a 
sufficient condition for something to be a composition, it 
will later be argued that a further condition is required 
for a compositional act to produce a composition. I shall 
begin the present analysis of composing by addressing 
separately these two conditional aspects of composing. 
Selecting and Arranging 
Composing always involves selecting and arranging 
musical elements. (Of course, this is not to say that all 
selecting and arranging of musical elements is composing. 
There must also be intended novelty on the part of the 
person doing the composing, as we shall see.) As has been 
indicated earlier in this chapter, musical elements may be 
either sounds or symbols. Consequently, there are two 
principal ways of composing: (1) by selecting and arranging 
actual musical sounds; or (2) by selecting and arranging 
musical symbols. Regardless of which approach is taken, 
whether with sounds or with symbols, composing always 
involves making choices about which musical elements to use 
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and how they will be ordered with respect to one another. 
AnY composition produced as result of these selections and 
arrangements uf elements will consist just of those 
particular elements so selected and arranged. (But, again, 
not just any selecting and arranging of musical elements 
produces a composition.) 
One way in which a person may go about selecting and 
arranging musical elements and thereby composing is by 
making individual musical sounds with some musical 
instrument, (including one's own voice). An arrangement of 
these sounds in a particular way results in what I have 
called a musical sound-sequence-event. Some of these 
sound-sequence-events are compositions, (improvisations are 
the most notable examples), but it is not uncommon for 
composers to proceed in this way intending only to develop a 
new tune, theme, or mere part of a whole musical work. For 
example, this may happen while at a piano or by humming a 
series of notes in some desired way. While I do not propose 
to investigate very far at all into the nature of the 
creative process, it should be noted that such musical sound 
selecting and arranging may vary considerably to the extent 
that it might be deliberative and calculated or spontaneous 
and even haphazard. The important point here is not how 
composers actually decide which sounds to select and how 
they are to be arranged, but to claim quite simply first, 
that it is one of the conditions of genuine composing that 
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some selecting and arranging of musical elements be done, 
and second, that actual sounds are candidates or objects for 
such choices. Keep in mind that by actual sounds I mean 
concrete particulars, individual sounds that exist or 
existed in a specific time and place. These are what 
composers who compose with sounds are selecting and 
arranging. I am not referring to "kinds" of sounds. A 
composer is not "composing with sounds", in the sense I am 
explaining here, if she states her musical selections in 
terms such as "the first sound is a 'C', followed by an 'A' 
sound, followed by ... ,", and so on. Someone is not 
composing with sounds unless actual sounds are selected and 
made. 
But this first sort of composing, selecting and 
arranging actual musical sounds, is significantly limited by 
the fact that sounds are inherently short-lived, transient 
things. The objects produced by efforts to compose in this 
way cease to exist almost as fast as they come into 
existence. Memory, and the limits thereof, is thus sometimes 
an important consideration in those cases when someone 
chooses to compose with musical sounds. This is so because, 
as noted earlier, if some person's composing consists of 
working out various parts of a relatively complex 
composition and subsequently combining them together into a 
complete sounded whole, a significant exercise of memory is 
needed. As the whole work becomes more complex, the 
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required level of effective memory goes up. At some point 
it becomes impractical, if not impossible, to remember all 
the selected sounds and the desired arrangements of them. 
Memory is not the only such limitation on composing 
with sounds. If an individual person wishes to compose 
multi-instrumentally, he must know how to play each of the 
instruments. (Actually, every would-be composer who chooses 
to compose with sounds is limited by his or her instrumental 
skills. A person cannot very well compose on a flute if he 
cannot play one.) Also, if a composer wishes to select and 
arrange sounds in harmonies, then she must use a polyphonic 
instrument such as a piano or guitar, otherwise she must 
enlist the help of instrumentalists to make the desired 
musical sounds. It should be kept in mind at this point in 
the analysis that I am not discussing compositions made 
of sounds, rather I am presently describing the activity 
of composing with sounds. Compositions are understood 
as completed wholes, original musical works. Composing is 
just the act of making novel musical choices. Therefore, 
these limitations are not so great as they might be for 
making compositions, since, as wholes, compositions must be 
sounded out in their entirety, therefore all parts of the 
composition must be remembered and sounded. Mere composing 
does not require that all parts be sounded, only that 
whatever sounds are made are selected and arranged in what 
is believed to be an original way. As we shall see further, 
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the limitations on composing with sounds are magnified if 
the aim is to produce a composition made of musical sound 
elements. 
Musical notation provides a means of getting around 
some of these difficulties, and permits achieving a very 
high degree of compositional complexity. Again, the person 
wishing to compose in this manner is limited by knowing how 
to use an appropriate notational system. But using any such 
system is no longer composing with sounds. Sound recording, 
on the other hand, does permit composing with sounds in a 
way that allows virtually any degree of complexity,7 and yet 
does not place such heavy demands on the composer's memory 
or instrumental abilities. I shall return to both of these 
sorts of composing a bit later. 
Another important way that composing with actual 
sounds may be, and very often is, accomplished is by 
improvising. When composing with musical sound elements is 
done all at one time in a somewhat spontaneous fashion, then 
such composing may be called improvising. Improvising music 
consists of making selections of musical sound elements and 
arranging them into a sound-sequence-event. But it is 
something more than merely this. Improvising brings to 
light the other crucial constituent of composing, which is 
an intention to make these selections and arrangements in a 
more or less original way. I would argue that all 
improvising is composing. Before I address this intentional 
100 
component of the definition a few more points should be 
made.B 
Composing by improvising is not limited by memory in 
the ways described, because most improvising is done with no 
intention of repetition. That is, improvisations are 
usually not intended to have copies or derivations. 
Furthermore, any composition created through improvisation 
simply is the improvised sound-sequence-event, but this sort 
of composition does not exist beyond the time it is made. 
Improvised compositions are, in this way, no different from 
any other compositions made from transient sounds. The 
composition as such perishes as quickly as it is made. Any 
subsequent attempt to "repeat" the original 
sound-sequence-event does not result in bringing the 
composition back into existence. Rather, the new 
sound-event is what I have called a "copy" or "derivation" 
of the composition, which is not itself a composition. 
Composing by improvising may involve the efforts of an 
individual improvising alone or it may occur with either 
improvised or unimprovised accompaniment. If an individual 
improvises alone, her work counts as a compositional work, 
and she is the composer of that work. Any unimprovised 
accompaniment is not a part of her composition. The whole 
performed musical work is therefore only partly a 
composition; it is a heterogenous entity consisting of a 
composition combined with a musical work derived from some 
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other composition. If the accompaniment is also improvised, 
then the composition consists of all improvised sounds; and 
50 each of the improvising musical contributors is a 
co-composer of the work produced. 
Summarizing thus far, selecting and arranging actual 
sounds is one means of composing. Usually such composing 
takes the form of improvising, distinguished from other 
sorts of composing with sounds by the degree of spontaneity 
involved. Composing with sounds is limited by memory, 
instrumental skills, and the possible need for the 
cooperative efforts of other persons. These limitations 
probably account, in part, for the motivation to develop 
alternative techniques and materials for composing. 
The larger portion of composing is not composing with 
sounds, but composing with symbols. These symbols, by 
convention, refer to or denote musical sounds. The composer 
is, in effect, indicating what sounds, if made and put 
together in the specified way, might produce a 
sound-sequence-event as he might want to produce it. But 
this last point is somewhat irrelevant anyway. That is, 
composing by way of notation does not require that sounds 
ever be made based on this written manuscript nor that the 
composer have any particular interest in this regard. Most 
composers probably do wish to have their scores performed as 
sound-sequence-events, and many composers actually take part 
in doing so. But it is no less an instance of composing if 
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the person doing so has no interest in having her &elected 
musical symbols sounded out. By extention, a composi~ion is 
no less a composition, it is no more or less complete, if it 
is never sounded out, and even if the composer, for some 
reason or other, has no wish for it ever to be performed. 
Composing is not uncommonly referred to as "writing 
music". Such a comparison with writing that consists of 
linguistic symbols arranged into words and sentences is a 
sensible one because prose writing, for instance, also 
consists of selecting and arranging certain specifiable 
elements, but instead of musical symbols, words are the 
objects selected and arranged in the desired way. When used 
in this way the term "write• is synonymous with the term 
Hcompose", whether referring to writing prose or writing 
music. This somewhat metaphorical and colloquial sense of 
"writing" is used not only for the literal process of making 
inscriptions or marks on paper; instead, it m~ans that 
someone is arranging words or musical symbols in some way. 
Even further removed from the literal sense of writing, is 
the sense that such writing need not make use of written 
inscriptions at all. For example, a prose writer may dictate 
his work as spoken words into a tape machine; while, as we 
have seen, a musical writer may make her work by using 
sounds. 
Most Western musical composing with symbols makes use 
of a conventional, standardized notational systemi i.e., the 
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familiar five line staff with its various attendant symbols 
for pitch, duration, rhythm, meter, key, etc. But composing 
with symbols need not make use of this system. Alternative 
symbols, systems, and schemes can be and have been 
developed.9 I mentioned earlier in the chapter that included 
among musical symbols are words such as "B flat", "key of 
G", "4/4 meter", and so on. The important thing about 
musical composing with symbols is that the symbols used are 
musical symbols, i.e., they denote musical sounds. 
Composing with symbols is of course limited by the 
composer's knowledge of and facility with an appropriate 
symbol system. But such composing does not require that a 
composer be even a competant instrumentalist. A composer 
who uses symbols is freed from composing only for 
instruments he knows how to play well or play at all. What 
this means is that skill in musical composing may be 
regarded as independent of other sorts of musical skill, 
such as instrumental virtuosity. This fact is widely 
recognized. Many composers are not good instrumentalists, 
while many performers likewise do not compose nor possess 
skills in this area of musical activity. What is 
interesting about this is that a music composer who uses 
symbols could conceivably go about her business without ever 
making or hearing any musical sounds. A composer could be 
deaf and entirely unable to play any musical instrument and 
yet compose music, even what might be considered good music. 
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Thus, musical composition, under certain circumstances, can 
amount to nothing more than skillful symbol manipulation. 
Intending and Believing 
Compositions are not just any collection of selected 
and arranged musical elements. Strictly speaking, a 
performer working from a score is also selecting and 
arranging musical elements. Such a person °reads" the score 
and makes decisions about what notes to play on his 
instrument and what sequence they are to follow. But no one 
would consider playing music from a score, (or from memory 
for that matter), to be composing, though it does involve, 
in a sense, the selection and arrangement of musical 
elements. Nor is a person who transcribes a performance 
into notation properly considered to be composing. These 
are not acts of composing because it is generally believed 
that composing is, to a greater of lesser extent, a creative 
activity of a special sort. That is, composing is thought 
to include a notable degree of originality on the part of 
the composer. 
Originality sometimes refers to the extent to which 
something is itself new, different, unique, or novel. This 
is to define originality from the side of the thing created. 
I shall refer to this sense of originality as "objective 0 
originality. Objective originality refers to whatever is 
new about an object. In a most minimal sense, every object 
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that comes into existence is objectively original, since it 
is a "new" object in the world. So there are degrees of 
objective originality that are a function of the extent to 
which some object is unlike any already existing object. 
An alternative sense of originality, and one that I 
would like to emphasize, would approach originality from the 
side of the maker or creator. Looked at this way, 
originality refers to the extent to which the person 
involved is "coming up with something of her ownw, making 
something without direct dependence upon or conscious 
reference to something with which the person is aware. Such 
originality bears upon the experience, belief and intention 
of the creator, rather than upon the dependence of the 
character of the thing made on the existence or 
non-existence of something supposedly like it. I shall 
refer to this sense of originality as "subjective" 
originality. 
Given this latter, subjective sense of originality and 
under the view now being presented, the actual degree of 
originality on the part of the composition, (i.e., its 
"objective originalityw, or the novelty with respect to the 
work itself and the world within which it exists), is not 
relevant to that work's compositional status, nor to the 
sense in which the person who made it may be sai~ to hav,e 
composed it. Rather, what is decisive for compositional 
status is the originality believed and intended by the 
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composer, that is, its "subjective originality". 
Suppose two composers, unknown to one another, are 
working on what they believe to be original musical 
compositions. Each proceeds by selecting and arranging 
musical elements, (let us say in this case, they are both 
inscribing conventional notational symbols on paper). As 
improbable as it may be, they produce a sequence of symbols 
that is from all appearances indistinguishable one from the 
other. The two composers publish their manuscripts as new 
and original musical compositions. Do we now have two 
compositions or one? 
If we say there is only one composition, we are lead 
to the strange consequence that two separate people created 
the same thing. Now two people can create the same thing if 
they act jointly, but in the above scenario, the two people 
did not act together. 
To say instead that there are two separate 
compositions is not at all strange and leads to no peculiar 
consequences. After all, manuscripts are particular 
objects; there is no reason that two objects cannot be made 
that coincidently look alike. Two people could 
independently build two separate chairs that turn out to 
look alike in virtually every detail, would we want to say 
that there is anything other than two chairs. It might be 
argued to the contrary that the two chairs manifest the same 
design, and so, the makers of the two chairs have actually 
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created or discovered this design. Thus, manuscripts should 
be likewise understood as manifesting the same compositional 
design. Under such a view, the design is, in effect, a 
universal, something capable of having multiple examples. 
What would not be clear, given this appraisal of the 
situation, is whether the design existed before it was 
doubly realized through the efforts of the two makers, or 
whether the two makers simultaneously created the same 
universal. In the former case the makers might be said to 
have discovered the universal, in the latter they might be 
said to have created it. If it is thought that the 
composers created the universal, we return to the original 
oddity of saying that two persons created the same thing, 
that two people independently created the same universal. 
(A further question is raised here regarding whether or not 
universals are the sorts of things that can be created.) 
If, on the other hand, it is claimed that the design 
or composition was separately discovered by two different 
persons, much like two chemists independently discovering 
the molecular structure of some compound substance, this 
would seem to imply that all compositions, past, present, 
and future, always existed somehow waiting to be discovered. 
This way of describing the matter leads to the kind of talk 
that many nominalists object to, talk of so-called possible 
objects. It leads to the multiplication of entities so 
uncomfortable to nominalistic sensibilities. Not only is it 
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claimed that there exist as many compositions as have been 
composed, but there also exist all the compositions that 
will be composed and all the possible compositions that 
never happen to be composed (discovered). 
Clearly, the nominalist wants to avoid such a 
conception of the situation, and would prefer to acknowledge 
that there are, in the present example, two and only two 
separate, actual compositions each composed separately by 
each of two separate composers. There were two distinct 
acts of composing, two distinct individual composers, and 
two distinct manuscripts. Therefore, it is the belief on 
the part of the composer that distinguishes a compositional 
selection and arrangement from non-compositional selection 
and arrangement; more precisely, the belief that what is 
being constructed is generally original, that it is not an 
attempt to copy something else. 
Closely allied to this belief about other musical 
objects is an intention to create an original work. 
Intention on the part of composer is decisive within the 
present consideration of composing. I wish to maintain that 
the intention to compose is a necessary condition for a 
genuine act of composing, and since compositions are defined 
as the artifactual products of certain acts of composing, 
intentions are constitutive of compositions. 
Suppose an avant-garde composer well-known for her 
peculiar combinations of traditional musical sounds with 
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sounds not typically regarded as musical, (breaking glass, 
cat mews, closing books, etc.), along with poly-rhythmic and 
arhythmic or nonrhythmic structures. She is a tape 
composer, meaning that she records these various sounds onto 
multi-track sound equipment and later mixes the sounds into 
a completed recorded composition. 
One evening she is alone working in her studio. The 
tape machine happens to be running while she is setting up 
various musical instruments to be played and recorded. 
Before she has a chance to purposely make any sounds she 
wants to record, she is struck with a violent seizure that 
sends her thrashing about the room pressing keys on her 
electronic keyboards and piano, knocking into a drum set 
that crashes to the floor making all sorts of booming and 
pounding noises. This goes on for a few horrible minutes 
ending with her death. Most of the noises she made while in 
her death throes were recorded on tape. 
Later that evening a collegue discovers the gruesome 
scene. The collegue was aware of the composer's intention 
to do some work that evening and so several days later he 
reviews the tape in order to listen to what he thinks is the 
composer's last composition. Unknown to the collegue, none 
of the recorded sounds were selected and arranged for the 
purpose of composing a musical work. But the collegue 
believes that the recording is a composition, and with some 
very minor editing releases the tape as the famous 
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composer's last great work. 
Is this recording a composition? I do not believe so; 
at least it is not the work of the dead composer. The facts 
of its production would, if known, almost certainly 
undermine any belief that this recording is the composer's 
musical artwork. 
In this second example, the would-be composer's 
intentions determine whether or not a group of musical 
elements is a musical work generically and a composition 
specifically. The first example of the two composers 
reflects the role of belief in distinguishing between making 
a compositional work of music from making a 
non-compositional work of music. The intention to compose a 
work requires the belief that the selection and arrangement 
of musical elements is original, that these selections and 
arrangements are not significantly related to nor dependent 
upon some already exisiting musical work. 
In order to more fully understand the difference 
between original and non-original selection and arrangement 
of musical elements, it will be necessary to consider the 
nature of non-original selection and arrangement, what I 
shall call "copying" and "deriving". 
Copying and Deriving 
As noted in Chapter I, the chief difficulty for an 
ontology of music, (as well as for literature, printm~king, 
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drama and others), is characterizing the relationship that 
is presumed to hold between an original work of art and its 
purported examples. One way to characterize this difficulty 
is to ask, what allows for the same proper name to be 
assigned to a composition and to performances of it? How is 
it that an indefinite number of musical performances, 
scores, and recordings can each be identified as Beethoven's 
"Ninth SymphonyM? Why are some performances, (or scores or 
recordings), called nNinth Symphony" and others "Fifth 
Symphony", and still others McCartney's "VesterdayM? 
Uy objective throughout has been to develop a 
conception of this relationship which countenances the 
existence of individuals only. In keeping with the sorts of 
nominalistic presuppositions and hypothetical restrictions 
placed on the proposed theory, such a conception cannot 
construe the apparent relationship in a way that requires or 
permits the existence of something that composition and 
performance are said to share or have in common. To permit 
this is to admit universals or non-individuals into the 
theory. Nor should the relationship be described in a way 
that takes performances, (or scores, recordings, etc.), to 
be examples, occurrences, or instances of some composition. 
Again, such is the language of universals and abstract 
entities. But more importantly, I don't think that such 
characterizations correctly account for what is going on 
when we call a performance by the same name as some 
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composition anyway. It is the purpose of this section to 
describe what I take to be a nominalistic account of the 
presumed relationship that is thought to hold between a 
composition and other objects that are assigned its name. I 
shall do so in terms of what I have called copying and 
deriving. 
Since copying will be understood as a species of 
deriving, what I have to say initially about deriving will 
apply to both; so, for simplicity, I will describe what 
deriving means and it can be assumed that what is said about 
it also applies to copying. The differences between them 
will be discussed afterwards. 
Deriving may be defined provisionally in terms of 
three ~onditions: 
(1) temporal precedence; 
(2) acquaintance with an already existing work; 
(3) intention to make a work more or less like the 
already existing work; 
Thus, more precisely, "B is derived from A• means, 
(1) A is temporally precedent to B, (i.e., A exists 
before B); 
(2) the person (or persons) making B is acquainted with 
A, (i.e., the person is aware of A's existence and 
its temporal precedence); 
(3) the person (or persons) making B intends to make it 
more or less like A. 
Let us examine each of these items in turn. 
The first condition is quite straightforward and 
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probably not controversial. To say that something is 
derived from something else is to acknowledge that the 
derived thing came from, was caused by, or followed from 
something that preceded it. This first condition is 
virtually analytic with respect to the notion of "derive". 
The point here as it concerns compositions is that 
compositions, as noted already, are originals; and, as such, 
precede any of their so-called derivations, (e.g., 
performances, score-copies, recordings, etc.). Or, put 
another way, what I am calling derivations are 
distinguishable from compositions partly by the fact that 
they are not originals in the ways that compositions are. 
One of the ways in which compositions are originals is that 
they exist before any work that is derived from them; that 
is, any of a composition's derivations are works made 
subsequent to the making of the original composition with 
which the derived work is associated and with which it 
shares a name or title. This first condition of deriving 
accounts for the sense in which all compositions may be 
regarded as "~bjectively" original: the object which is the 
composition existed before any purported performance, score, 
recording, etc. of it. It is not being claimed that 
compositions are objectively original in the sense that they 
are the first objects to exist which possess a certain 
combination of characteristics or qualities. According to 
the theory under construction, compositions need only be 
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objectively original in the sense that they precede, (exist 
before), any of their derivations. 
It should be made clear though that derived works need 
not be derived directly from a composition in order to be 
named by the same name as that composition. Quite often it 
is the case that derived musical works are derived from 
other derived works. For example, a performance of 
Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony" is usually derived from a score 
of the "Ninth Symphony". It is highly unlikely that this 
score is Beethoven's manuscript, instead this score is 
probably itself a derivation. In point of fact, the scores 
used to derive performances of this symphony are just about 
always some of the more recently derived works in a series 
of derivations of derivations which eventually terminate in 
Beethoven's manuscript. 
The second condition follows upon what was claimed 
about those who make compositions, insofar as such persons 
who intend to make compositions believe that what they are 
doing is original, whereas those who make works derived from 
compositions do not have such a belief. Instead they are 
aware of the composition from which they are deriving their 
musical works. Obviously, if I derive B from A, I must be 
somehow acquainted with A; I must know of A's existence and 
something about what A is like. In addition, this condition 
compares favorably with what was stated earlier about a 
subjective sense of originality. This sense turns on 
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whether a person's efforts to make a work are in any way 
consciously influenced by some already existing work. 
Novelty (or originality) under this conception is thus a 
person-relative notion dependent upon the prior experience 
of the maker of a work. The relevant prior experience in 
this context is acquaintance with an already existing or 
formerly existent selection and arrangement of musical 
elements from which the present deriving is taking place. 
The third condition for deriving is also indirectly 
related to this subjective sense of originality. This 
condition is a particularly decisive criterion for 
distinguishing acts of composing from acts of deriving. 
Subjective originality, as described earlier, is a function 
of what a person believes about the work he is making. This 
belief amounts to someone thinking that the musical 
selections being made are not significantly influenced in 
any detailed way by some already existing work of which one 
is aware. It is the belief that the present selection and 
arrangement of musical elements is a novel selec~ion and 
arrangement of such elements. This sort of belief of 
subjective originality is largely constitutive for acts of 
composing. To derive a work, on the other hand, means not 
to have such a belief with respect to this sort of novelty. 
Deriving is thus selecting and arranging musical elements in 
a non-original way. But it is more than merely this. More 
precisely, it amounts to selecting and arranging musical 
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elements with the intention of basing these decisions on 
some already or formerly existing selection and arrangement. 
The act of deriving is a matter of purposely being 
influenced by some other musical work, (e.g., a score, a 
performance, or a recording). in the process of selecting 
and arranging musical elements. This condition thus 
reflects the intentional character of deriving and parallels 
a similar, yet opposite, condition for composing. 
Deriving a work from another work usually consists of 
selecting and arranging musical elements with the intention 
of naming the resulting work by the same name as the work 
from which it is derived. I say "usually" because such 
illicit work-making as plagiarism lacks this intention. 
Plagiarism, quite simply, is deriving a work without 
acknowledging publically the fact that the work is derived, 
and going so far as to intentionally deceive others into 
thinking that what one has made is original when, in fact, 
it is not. It is to claim subjective originality about a 
work that is not subjectively original. It is not 
plagiarism to create a work that turns out to be quite 
similar, if not apparently identical, to some other work. 
This point was made earlier in the example concerning two 
composers who, inadvertantly and entirely unknown to one 
another, make works that look or sound virtually identical. 
Such occurrences would be acts of genuine composing. The 
decisive element distinguishing composing from plagiarizing 
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is therefore subjective originality. (Forgery is the 
reverse of plagiarism. It consists rather of attributing 
someone else's composership to a work that one has made 
oneself. This is also a form of illicit work-making since 
it involves an intention to deceive, although it is genuine 
composing. Whereas, plagiarism is a form of deriving 
improperly called composing, forgery is a form of composing 
falsely called deriving.) 
Except under these illicit circumstances, deriving one 
work from another work involves the intention of being 
significantly, (most often maximally), influenced by the 
earlier work in the process of selecting and arranging 
musical elements; and then calling or naming the resulting 
work by the same name as the temporally precedent work that 
one is aware of and intends to derive the new work from. We 
shall see in further detail how names are attached to 
derived works in the next chapter. 
Admittedly, this third condition of deriving gives 
rise to possible difficulties for the theory. For example, 
let us imagine that I had heard a performance or read the 
score of a particular musical work some time in the past, 
yet I have consciously forgotten about it. Several months 
later, I begin working on a composition of my own and 
unintentionally make a work that is very much like the 
performance I had heard earlier, (the assumption here is 
that I have somehow been unconsciously or subconsciously 
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influenced by the previously experienced work). Are such 
efforts acts of deriving? As a consequence of the theory I 
am attempting to articulate and defend, I believe that such 
acts are genuine acts of composing and not deriving. Again, 
the decisive criterion distinguishing composing from 
deriving is to be understood in terms of the intentions and 
beliefs of the person making the work. To the extent that a 
person sincerely believes that her efforts are 
compositional, (i.e., among other things, purposely novel or 
minimally influenced by some other work), they are 
compositional. After the fact, it may be discovered that 
the activity did not produce the sort of objectively 
original work that is admired in aesthetic contexts, and 
that the composer was somewhat self-deceived about the 
novelty of her selection, but I think these efforts and the 
products of them remain compositional nonetheless. What is 
really at issue then bears upon certain evaluative rather 
than ontological considerations. Since actual, objective 
originality is particularly valued in the artworld, the 
less-than-original results of someone's activity of the sort 
described probably will not be as highly regarded as the 
original work that preceded them. But to say of some 
activity or $Ome object that it is compositional need not be 
taken as honorific nor need they be recognized as making an 
evaluative judgement; it need not be meant to say that it is 
"good' or "bad•. Recall that the issue at stake here 
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concerning the ontological status of co•positions involves a 
classificatory rather than evaluative sense of work of art. 
A second difficulty arises, which creates a deeper 
problem for the description of deriving as it now stands. 
suppose a person who intends to derive one work from 
another, "gets it wrong•. That is, suppose that some person 
believes that she is performing a work derived from a score 
of so•eone else's musical composition, but she overestimates 
her ability to read musical notation and plays the wrong 
notes for several or even all of the symbols contained in 
the score. In such a case, she is aware of the original work 
and she intends to base her performance on it. Such a 
scenario satisfies the stated criteria for derivation, yet 
the resulting performance does not sound anything like what 
we would expect; the score is for, let us say, Bach's 0 Art 
of the Fugue", but it sounds more like McCartney's 
·vesterday•. Is it proper then, since the perfor•ance is 
derived from the score, to name the perfor•ance by the 
original work's title? 
Ves and no. I shall describe how it is that works 
acquire their na•es or titles in the next chapter, but a 
question remains regarding the sense in which the resulting 
performance can be said to be derived fro• Bach's work. We 
could say of what has resulted that it is an exceedingly 
poor performance of Bach's original work, since, after all, 
a score of his work did provide the basis for the musical 
120 
selections made by the performer. Typically, poor 
performances have a noticeably significant number of 
mistakes, but in the present instance, virtually every note 
is a mistake. In the barest sense of derive, the 
performance in the present example is a derived work from 
Bach's fugue because the performer did not make genuinely 
original musical selections, (they were influenced and 
guided by some other work, albeit in a peculiar and 
distorted way), and the performer believed that what was 
being made was not original; that it was somehow derived 
from the Bach score. But although the performer has 
seriously misread or failed to "complyH with the score, it 
remains an act of deriving nonetheless, and it was derived 
from Bach's work. The question remains though whether this 
derived work should be called a performance of "Bach's 'Art 
of the Fugue'" or "McCartney's 'Yesterday'"? Though it does 
not seem improper to say of the performance that it was 
derived from Bach's work, it does seem quite awkward to 
claim that it was a performance of "The Art of the Fugue•, 
even to say that was an optimally bad or inaccurate 
performance of it. The purpose of analyzing the notion of 
deriving a work is to get clearer about the way compositions 
are related to their purported examples. We want to know 
what it is about some musical works that justifies 
associating them with already existing compositions. Why is 
it that it seems so inappropriate to consider the 
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performance described above a performance of Bach's •Art of 
the Fugue•? 
In order to address this sort of phenomenon, a fourth 
condition for deriving seems to be in order. I shall refer 
to it as 0 the compliance condition•. The third condition 
describes an intention on the part of the person doing the 
deriving to comply with the selections already made in the 
original work by the composer. This fourth condition 
requires that the derived work actually comply with the 
work from which it is derived. What is meant here by 
"comply•? Before I explain this notion of compliance and 
spell out its implications for deriving a work, I shall 
first describe the difference between copying and deriving. 
The basis of the difference between copying and 
deriving is this: in copying, the product of the process of 
copying exists in the same medium as the thing copied; 
whereas, in deriving, the product of the process of deriving 
exists in a medium different from the original object. In 
saying that copies are in the same medium as the thing they 
copy, I mean that they are each comprised of the same sorts 
of musical elements. For example, since a score consists of 
musical elements that are notational symbols, a copy of a 
score also consists of notational symbols.10 A copy of a 
performance, on the other hand, will consist of musical 
elements which are sounds because performances are comprised 
of musical sound elements. 
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Now the process of deriving one work from another, as 
distinguished from copying one, involves using musical 
elements of a different sort from the original. A scored 
transcription derived from a performance consists of 
notational symbols although the performance itself consisted 
of sound elements. A performance of a scored musical work 
is also a derived object because it consists of sounds 
rather than notations. 
Recordings create special difficulties for this 
distinction. As we have already observed, the ontology of 
musical recordings is particularly perplexing. As a musical 
object, a recording is significant for the sounds it can 
produce; nothing about its status as magnetic tape or a 
plastic disc is of any direct musical value. Somewhat 
like a score, which is also of value largely for what it can 
be used for, (i.e., to denote a sound-sequence-event that 
could be performed), a recording has no musical value other 
than its capacity for being used to make musical sounds. I 
shall consider recordings of performances to be copies on 
the grounds that they are musically significant for the 
musical sounds that they themselves are capable of producing 
and because the way they are apprehended is by being 
listened to. We typically say that we 0 listen• to 
recording, whereas we "read• a score. 
Copies and copying should not be understood solely in 
terms of similarity. Similarity is a problematic notion for 
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a nominalistic perspective, so such a relationship should be 
avoided in the present context. Admittedly, copies are 
often described as varying in degree of similarity with 
respect to the objects they copy, but similarity, under the 
view being considered, is not constitutive for "being a 
copy". Rather, "to copy a work" is, in addition to the 
stated conditions for deriving in general: (a) to make a 
work comprised of musical elements in the same medium as 
those comprising the work being copied, and (b) to attempt a 
certain degree of similarity, to intend that a certain 
desired degree of similarity be achieved, and to believe 
that a certain degree, although not necessarily the intended 
degree, has been achieved. Thus copying, like deriving, is 
fundamentally a matter of making musical selections and 
arrangements that are intentionally and maximally influenced 
by some other already existing work. But again, as with 
deriving, a question arises as to how we are to account for 
those occasions in which, inspite of the intentions by 
someone to make musical selections based on some other work, 
the resulting work is quite different from the original? We 
usually do talk about a comparison between a copy and an 
original in terms of some degree of similarity. How do we 
avoid calling what sounds like "Mary Had a Little Lamb" by 
the name "Row, Row, Row Your BoatN when the performer of the 
former intended the latter? 
As indicated earlier, a similar problem arose in cases 
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of derivations as well, although in a different sense. 
Instead of referring to a score's similarity to a 
performance of it, the term of comparison I suggested with 
respect to a derivation was •compliance•.11 Since 
derivations are, by definition, of a different medium than 
the thing they are derived from, any sense of similarity 
attached to notions of deriving are metaphorical at best and 
substantially different from what goes on with copying. 
Sounds cannot be similar to inscriptions and vice versa. 
But there is an interest in having some term for comparison, 
since people often do talk about the degree to which a 
performance, for example, compares with a score from which 
it was derived. The term that I shall use to characterize 
such positive comparisons is, as already stated, compliance. 
To comply with a score in deriving a performance is to make 
sounds that are within the range of the denotations of the 
musical symbol elements contained in the score. 
A performance of Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony• is 
almost always derived from a score. If the performers have 
Beethoven's manuscript, then the performance is derived from 
the composition. But in either case, the degree to which 
the performance is said to comply with Beethoven's work is 
the degree to which the performers base their selection and 
arrangement of musical sounds on the score associated with 
Beethoven's composition titled •Ninth Symphony". But there 
is considerable room for variation even under these 
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circumstances because Beethoven's work is nothing more than 
the inscriptions on the page. Compliance consists of making 
musical sound elements in a way consistent with the 
denotations of the musical symbol elements contained in the 
score. Making sounds as denoted by the symbols contained in 
the score can be done in numerous ways, and the results can 
vary greatly. What determines the degree of compliance is 
clearly not similarity, since sounds cannot be similar to 
inscriptions; nor is compliance a matter of actualizing the 
intentions of the composer or providing a sounding of 
musical ideas somehow •embodied• in the score. Compliance 
is a matter of basing selections and arrangements of musical 
sounds as directly as possible on the score. This "basing• 
amounts, in part, to the belief on the part of the 
performers that what musical choices they make are maximally 
influenced by the score, that they believe their selections 
minimally original and independent. In addition, and very 
importantly, compliance requires that the musicians actually 
produce musical sound elements that are within the accepted, 
(according to musical conventions), range of sounds denoted 
by the musical symbol elements. 
For example, a symbol within a score may denote a 
certain pitch, say 'A' flat, for a particular instrument, 
say a bassoon, and other symbols may denote something about 
the dynamics, say 'forte' (loud), but, even given these 
specifications, there is not only one way to comply with 
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these symbol elements. Conventional musical practice does 
prescribe certain limitations for how to play this note, but 
even this involves going outside of the score to some 
extent; i.e., to make a selection with respect to a musical 
element that is other than what is explicitly evident in the 
score. The point is that the performance of the note 
complies with the composition in the event that the 
performer does what is indicated, but there is not only one 
way to do this. It should be noted that it is just this 
fact which allows for what is called interpretation. 
We may now return to what I have called the 
"compliance condition•. This may be understood as the 
fourth condition for deriving a musical work. Thus, what 
it means to say that "B is derived from A• includes this 
final criterion: 
(4) the person deriving B from A makes B in such a 
way that it complies, for the most part, with the 
musical elements contained in A; (i.e., the 
musical elements which make up B are within the 
accepted range of denotation of the musical 
elements that make up A). 
But how might this condition be applied to copies? 
I believe this may be accomplished by recognizing that 
as denotation may function across media, (e.g., a symbol may 
denote certain sounds), so may denotation function within a 
single medium. That is, a sound may denote other sounds, or 
a symbol may denote other symbols. Therefore, the 
compliance condition may be said to apply to both deriving 
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and copying. It is the condition that specifies the extent 
to which copies and derivations of musical works may be 
compared with their originals. The degree of compliance is 
a function of the extent to which the derivation or copy 
consists of elements lying within the range of musical 
elements denoted by the musical elements that go together to 
make up the original work. 
Let me su111111arize what I think has been accomplished in 
this chapter. Musical works may be made in one of two 
fundamental ways: they may be composed or they may be 
derived. To compose a musical work a person must: 
(1) select and arrange musical elements, (either sounds 
or symboln); and 
(2) intend and believe that 
a. this selection and arrangement produces a 
musical work, and 
b. this work is original, i.e., not derived 
from an already existing work. 
To derive a musical work a person must: 
(1) select and arrange musical elements, (either 
sounds or symbols); and 
(2) intend and believe that 
a. this selection and arrangement produces a 
musical work, and 
b. this work 'B' is related to an already 
existing work 'A' according to the 
following conditions: 
i) 'A' is temporally precedent to 'B'; 
ii) the person making 'B' is acquainted 
with 'A'; 
iii) the person making 'B' intends to 
make it more or less like 'A'; and 
iv) the musical elements of 'B' comply 
with, (are denoted by), the musical 
elements of 'A'. 
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copying a musical work is one important way of deriving a 
work. It consists of deriving a work in the same medium, 
(i.e., the copy-work is made of the same sort of musical 
elements), as the original, copied work. If the work 
consists of musical elements in a medium other than the 
original work, it is said to be a derived work. 
Most acts of composing produce musical compositions, 
usually consisting of musical notations, (typically 
manuscript scores), or musical sounds-sequence-events, 
(typically improvisations or multi-track tape recordings). 
Derivations, (including copies), are usually either musical 
performances, scores, or recordings. Whereas composed works 
are usually given a name or title that is intended to 
uniquely identify and distinguish them from other composed 
works, derived works are usually given the same title as the 
compositonal work from which they were ultimately derived. 
That is, a composition's title sets off the composition 
from other compositions, and thereby functions as a proper 
name. On the other hand, a derivation's title associates 
the derivation with a specific composition; and as such is 
not a genuine name. The title, which is the name of the 
composition, attached to a derivation is thus 
non-designative; it is non-referential, or 
syncategoramatical, and serves only to indicate that from 
which it was derived.12 More about this latter point will 
be forthcoming in the next chapter. 
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In this chapter the focus has been on the constituent 
elements, the materials, of composing, and on the activity 
of composing as such. In the next chapter, I shall turn to 
a more explicit consideration of compositions, the musical 
artworks produced from these materials and by these 
activities. To accomplish this I shall describe my theory 
of compositions in terms of comparisons and contrasts with 
alternative views on the matter. 
CHAPTER IV 
MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS AS CONCRETE PARTICULARS CONTRASTED WITH 
THREE NOTABLE ALTERNATIVES 
Introduction 
As a way of further characterizing my theory of 
musical compositions as concrete particulars, I shall 
distinguish it from some notable alternatives. Of course it 
would be impossible to contrast my theory with all competing 
theories; there are simply too many. My approach instead 
will be to discuss three important theories chosen for the 
following reasons. First, they are each reasonable and 
important contributions in their own right to the 
ontological discussion of musical compositions. Second, 
each theory is described by its author in language and 
categories amenable to my own approach: we are all 
developing our theories from within an Anglo-American 
perspective. Third, each of the selected theories has the 
effect of highlighting significant contrasts with my 
construal of musical compositions. Whereas my theory 
emphasizes the physical and individual character of 
compositions, the others represent varying alternative 
combinations of physicality vs. non-physicality and 
individuality vs. non-individuality. 
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My intentions in the present chapter will be to 
describe each of these theories, to point out their key 
points of divergence from my theory, and to comment on their 
adequacy as descriptions of musical compositions. Following 
this, in Chapter V, I will summarize this discussion in 
terms of the categories of concrete, abstract, particular, 
and universal as a means of identifying a proposed range of 
possible ontological characterizations of musical 
compositions, of which my theory represents one extreme. 
Music, as was observed in previous chapters, is an 
artform that presents special problems for the ontologist. 
The usual practice of distinguishing compositions from 
performances encourages taking the composition as some sort 
of abstract entity or universal. This is often the case 
because it is customary to talk of multiple performances of 
music, sound sequences of a certain sort, as instances or 
occurrences of some composer's work. The performance is 
usually given the same name as the composition from which it 
was derived. Thus, the composition, understood as the sort 
of thing capable of multiple instances, is often readily 
construed as a universal, a type, a kind, or some such 
non-individual. 
Another tendency evident in discussions about the 
ontological nature of musical compositions is the 
description of compositions as essentially non-corporeal. 
This is the notion that the actual work of art, although 
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revealed through some sensory artifact, (usually a 
performance or score), is not essentially this corporeal 
artifact. Rather, the artwork is some sort of non-physical, 
abstract entity or phenomenon. Under such a view, the 
musical composition exists, in some sense, independently of 
any physical or sensory expression or occurrence. In clear 
contrast to these tendencies, my approach has been to cast 
the ontology of musical works entirely in terms of physical 
or sensory individuals, (i.e., concrete particulars). 
As we shall see shortly, R. G. Collingwood and 
Nicholas Wolterstorff describe musical works as essentially 
non-physical entities. Later, we shall see that although 
William Webster's theory requires that works be physically 
realized, he and Wolterstorff will construe works as 
non-individuals. Much more will be said about this in 
Chapter V. 
R. G. Collingwood: Compositions as 
Mental Entities 
Philosophers of art have devised various theories 
aimed at working out the relationship between the 
composition and performance that call upon the language of 
universals and/or abstract entities. One such approach is 
to consider the composition as essentially an entity of 
consciousness. That is, the musical composition is 
essentially an idea, a mental construction that is the 
product of and existent in the mind of a composer. The 
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composition is not a physical, corporeal, or concrete entity 
at all, rather it is an abstract entity of thought. 
R. G. Collingwood has delineated just such a 
conception of musical compositions that takes them as 
fundamentally and essentially non-corporeal mental 
creations. "The work of art proper is something not seen or 
heard, but something imagined."1 As he makes clear, 
compositions are created in the mind of a composer and are 
then communicated or expressed through some performance or 
score, and thus made available to the minds of other 
persons. The work remains an entity or phenomenon of human 
consciousness, the performance or score is merely a vehicle 
for communication of the musical ideas of the composer. 
To regard the musical composition as a concrete 
particular, as I do, is effectively to deny that it has 
genuine status as an artwork "in the mind of the composer". 
The genesis or creation of a composition may indeed involve 
mental activity, but my view is that the composition as 
artwork is essentially a corporeal artifact, and moreover, 
it is an individual. Compositions are in a certain sense 
something like prototypes. Prototypes may be understood, in 
this context, as individual objects that serve as things to 
be copied, or as models suggestive of others objects that 
could be made similar to the prototype. The point I wish to 
emphasize here is that prototypes are usually some original 
physical object serving as a model for making other 
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physical objects. 
Let us return to Collingwood's theory of artworks as 
presented in The Principles of Art. As I have said, his 
is an example of the sort of view that takes musical 
compositions to be some sort of mental entities, an object 
of thought that is not physical or sensory. Collingwood 
describes the work of art as an "imaginary object"2. The 
section of his book that deals explicitly with this claim 
conveniently uses the "making of a tune", or the composing 
of music, as his paradigm case for developing his broader 
theory of artistic ontology. 
He begins by reminding us that, under the view 
developed earlier in his book, the making of "art proper" is 
not the making of an artifact; it is not a process of 
"fabrication".3 Such activity is characteristic of what he 
regards as mere "craft", rather than genuine artmaking. 
(Whatever the merits and weaknesses of this distinction, I 
shall not address the basis for his view on this issue in 
any detail. Rather, my concern here is to describe how 
Collingwood understands compositions. I am interested 
primarily in the implications of his theory as they might 
bear upon my central thesis regarding the ontological 
conception of compositions.) 
What sort of "making• is involved in "art proper"? 
Strictly speaking, for Collingwood, artists do not "make" 
their artworks; instead, they create them. In order to 
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clarify this claim, he carefully lays out a distinction 
between making and creating. In so doing, he defines 
creating as the special sort of activity artists as artists 
perform. Creating, unlike mere making, does not aim at 
achieving a particular outcome or end, does not require any 
preconceived procedure, and does not impose 0 a new form upon 
a given matter•.• To do these is to "craft• or fabricate 
artifacts, not create artworks. Vet creating is, as 
Collingwood points out, conscious, voluntary, and 
deliberate, although the creator may not know quite what 
will come of his creating. 
Underlying these claims is Collingwood's expression 
theory of art. Collingwood believes that genuine artworks, 
(•art proper"), are expressions of an artist's imagination 
and emotions. But an artist's expression of emotions 
through aesthetic creation must not to be confused with any 
intention to arouse or evoke emotions in others. This later 
intention is goal directed; it aims at producing a certain 
kind of response in an audience. Expressing emotions is not 
directed toward any preconceived goal or response; rather 
works of art express emotions for their own sake. They give 
articulation and form to feelings that often arise 
subconsciously and inarticulately. Purported works of art 
that are intended to arouse or evoke certain emotional 
responses are, for Collingwood, not products of artmaking, 
but are instead products of craftmaking. 
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Collingwood goes so far as to say that an artist does 
not know at the beginning of her artistic endeavors just 
what character the artwork will take. 
No artist, therefore, so far as he is an artist proper, 
can set out to write a comedy, a tragedy, an elegy, or the 
like. So far as he is an arist proper, he is just as 
likely to write any one of these as any other .... s 
This is so because art as the expression of emotions is not 
essentially a matter of communicating these emotions to an 
audience or getting them to feel the same way. The artist's 
primary concern is the expression itself; the mode or form 
of the expressed feelings or imaginings is secondary. 
For this reason the artist's expression, the artwork, 
need not be externalized in a physical or public art object 
at all. Since artworks are intended neither for 
communicating to others nor for evoking responses in others, 
no publically accessible object is required. The essential 
work of art is therefore sufficiently actualized in the mind 
of the artist. More specifically, the composer's musical 
expression, the composition, is the musical idea created 
by the composer. It may or may not ever be sounded as a 
performance or written out as a manuscript score. 
In distinguishing it from mere making. Collingwood 
likens creating to a special sense of planning: a planning 
that does not require execution in the form of either 
something written down or any sort of fabricated obiect. 
Creating artworks is an activity of "imagination". That is. 
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it is a mental activity which does not require construction 
of real objects. Collingwood claims that "a work of art may 
be completely created when it has been created as a thing 
whose only place is in the artist's mind."5 He compares the 
creating of an artwork to an engineer's planning of a 
bridge. Before any drawings are made or specifications 
discussed with anyone, the plan for the bridge can be said 
to exist in the imagination of the engineer. Such a plan 
for a bridge thus could be referred to as an "imaginary 
bridge". If this plan were executed, then we could refer to 
a "real bridge". But the •real bridgeH and the "imaginary 
bridge" remain as distinct entities, the latter having no 
dependence upon the former in any significant way. 
Note how the conception of planning in this case has 
the marks of Collingwood's sense of creating, rather than 
mere making. First, an engineer can plan a bridge without 
any specific purpose or end product in mind. Such planning 
might be simply an engineering exercise, an example for a 
textbook, a proposal for a contract, and so on. No 
intention to actualize or build the bridge need occur in 
order to plan a bridge. 
Second, the planning need not follow any preconceived 
procedure or specifications. Again. the result of the 
planning may be merely an example or simple musings without 
guiding parameters or specifications. The engineer may 
simply •start from scratch" and let her ideas come as they 
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will. 
And finally, planning a bridge does not consist in 
imposing new form on given matter. As an act of 
imagination, no material is there to be formed. The 
execution of a plan for a bridge in the form of drawings or 
actual construction would count as an instance of "making•, 
not "creating". Collingwood acknowledges the use of the 
word ''plans" for actual drawings on paper; but he denies 
that these are the plan as such. They are only the means by 
which the engineer's ideas are communicated to others for 
practical purposes. The drawings are not the plan, rather 
they merely represent the "true" plan that exists in the 
mind of the engineer. 
As goes an engineer's planning of a bridge, so goes a 
composer's composing of a musical piece: 
When a man makes up a tune, he may and very often does 
at the same time hum it or sing it or play it on an 
instrument. He may do none of these things, but write 
it on paper. Or he may both hum it or the like. and 
also write it on paper at the same time or afterwards. 
Also he may do these things in public, so that the tune 
at its very birth becomes public property .... But all of 
these are accessories of the real work. though some of 
them are very likely useful accessories. The actual 
making of the tune is something that goes on in his 
head, and nowhere else.7 
It should now be fairly clear as to what Collingwood means 
by his claim that the genuine musical artwork, a 
composition, is an "imaginary obiect•. Composing is an act 
of "imaginative creationu. Making a tune is a mental act on 
the part of the composer, the product of which is a mental 
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entity. As such, according to Collingwood, the artwork is 
essentially complete. This creative act does not require the 
fabrication of any object, the writing of a score, nor any 
sounding of instruments in order to constitute an instance 
of composing a musical work. 
An important implication of this view is that the 
concrete public object, (score, performance, recording, 
etc.), is not only inessential to a composer's art-making, 
but such an object is not a genuine artwork at all. Rather, 
it is only a vehicle for communicating the musical ideas in 
the composer-as-artist's imagination. 
the music, the work of art, is not the collection of 
noises, it is the tune in the composer's head. The 
noises made by the performers, and heard by the audience 
are not the music at all; they are only means by which 
the audience, if they listen intelligently (not 
otherwise), can reconstruct for themselves the imaginary 
tune that existed in the composer's head.8 
This is a striking claim. Not only does it characterize the 
composition essentally as a mental entity. but CollinQwood 
goes further in denying the status of music to the actual 
sounds of a performance. Music is thus fundamentally 
imaginary. Listening to music. it appears. is merely a 
matter of getting a composer's musical ideas into your own 
imagination. (Collingwood makes parallel claims for other 
art forms as well). 
To defend his position, Collingwood compares listeninA 
to music to listening to a scientific lecture. The upshot 
of this argument by analogy is that no one confuses the 
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collection of noises uttered by the lecturer with the ideas 
or thoughts that are supposed to make up the actual content 
of the lecture. What we are supposed to "get out of" the 
lecture are the ideas not the lecturer's spoken sounds. We 
do not go to lectures to hear noises, but to "listen" to the 
lecturer's ideas. Likewise, according to Collingwood, we 
are not to get out of the performance of a musical work the 
sounds of music, but we are to "reconstruct in our own 
minds• the composer's imagined composition. 
This comparison seems flawed. Collingwood's point 
concerning the utterences of lecturers seems sensible 
enough. Generally speaking, the sounds of a speaker's voice 
are, for the most part, irrelevant to a lecture's content. 
The sounds are words that have meaning or reference. A 
lecture which did not consist of meaningful spoken words 
would hardly be counted as a genuine lecture. But musical 
performances are surely quite different from lectures on 
this very point. It is not at all clear that musical sounds 
refer to or mean anything in the ways that spoken words do. 
Moreover, one could plausibly argue that the 
relationship between imagined compositions and soundings of 
the compositions should be understood as quite the reverse 
of how Collingwood portrays it. That is, compositions exist 
for the purpose of aiding in the production of aesthetically 
valuable performances. It is not so much the ideas of the 
composer that interest us but the aesthetic satisfaction 
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that comes from hearing certain arrangements of musical 
sounds. Much composing is a deliberate effort to formalize 
an arrangement of musical sounds so that these sounds may be 
repeated in similar fashion over and over again. There is 
aesthetic satisfaction and interest in hearing actual 
musical sounds and sequences of these sound. In this way 
the composition is taken as the vehicle for making musical 
sounds, rather than the sounds as vehicle for communicating 
compositions. More on this point later. 
Collingwood recognizes that some listeners attend 
performances only for the "sensual pleasures"9 of sounds. 
He does not regard this as genuine "listening 0 • 
Furthermore, such attention to these sensual pleasures will 
impede the genuine appreciation of the musical artwork. 
Genuine appreciation requires educated listeners; those 
sorts of listeners capable of reconstructing and 
understanding the composer's musical ideas. 
Must the experience of music be dichotomized into 
either sensual pleasure or imagined ideas? It seems 
contrary to general musical practice and experience to deny 
that educated, experienced appreciators of music do not. and 
indeed ought not, attend closely to the actual sounds of 
music for their intrinsic aesthetic value. Much of the 
aesthetic interest in and qualities of the various rhythms. 
melodies, harmonies, dynamics, timbres. etc. evident in 
performances depend on actual soundings of musical 
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instruments. The aesthetic value and appreciation of 
performed musical works is vastly different from merely 
remembering or imagining such works. Why listen to 
different performances of a composer's work if only to 
acquaint oneself with his/her ideas? Once I have gotten the 
composer's ideas in my head, why not simply re-imagine the 
piece instead of bothering with the costs and other hassles 
of attending a performance? 
Is it only pure sensual delight that follows from 
carefully attending to the physical sounds of a performance? 
Or, as Collingwood argues, are these sounds only to be 
attended to for the purpose of imaginative reconstructions? 
Isn't the conscientious experience of musical performances 
richer than the former, yet not so rarified as the latter? 
Collingwood's dichotomy might be a false one. 
Performers often work very hard at Ngetting the right 
sound~. That is, they aim at aesthetically valuable actual 
soundings of their instruments. In addition. the various 
instruments presumably were developed and perfected for the 
purpose of creating interesting and diverse musical sounds. 
Why have such potential diversity, some of which are highly 
subtle, if only to aid listeners in thinking like the 
composer or becoming acquainted with his expressions? Part 
of Neducated- listening is an improved ability to recognize 
high quality musical sounds produced on fine instruments by 
skilled performers. 
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The wide ranging differences between individual 
instruments and performers certainly seem to be 
aesthetically relevant, and composers usually care a great 
deal about such aspects of music, but under Collingwood's 
view these aspects are not and cannot be significant. The 
only real issue with respect to quality of performance is to 
what extent and how clearly the composer's expressive ideas 
are conveyed. 
But composers, first of all, cannot convey with 
conventional notation the nuances of sound possible with 
different instruments and by different players of those 
instruments. Secondly, composers may not have any specific 
ideas or preferences in these regards anyway; they may and 
often do leave these sorts of decisions to performers' 
interpretations. Does Collingwood's position imply that 
such nuances are nothing but extraneous embellishments; or 
worse, distractions from the "true• composition? Is a high 
quality instrument played by a virtuoso described as such by 
Collingwood purely because it is better at aiding listeners 
in the reconstruction of the composer's ideas? Do 
performers ever count as artists? 
Performances seem to be aesthetically valuable in part 
because they allow the exercise and experience of the art of 
virtuosity. Part of virtuosity is interpretive ability: 
the expansion of a composer's musical work beyond what is 
explicitly contained in its original presentation, usually a 
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score. At least some, if not all, of this interpetation is 
expressible only in soundings of a particular instrument by 
a particular performer. The aesthetic qualities of such 
performances are not merely a matter of Hsensual pleasure", 
since not just any hearer of the sounds can detect their 
aesthetic value. 
My point here is that Collingwood not only 
misconstrues the nature of compositions, but that he 
misrepresents and "short-changes• the nature of performance 
both from the side of the performer and the side of the 
listener. Performances do depend upon compositions in 
crucial ways; but compositions depend upon performances in 
ways that are not solely practical. Collingwood's so-called 
educated listener may attend to the actual sounds not merely 
for their sensual satisfactions, but for unique aesthetic 
experiences unavailable any other way, and these are 
experiences often inaccessible to the "uneducated", 
inexperienced listener. 
Also the performer and her instrument do more than 
merely convey the composer's ideas to other listeners. The 
a1m of virtuosity is not simply the pursuit of a more 
effective communication of someone else's ideas or the 
exquisite presentation of a composer's work. It includes an 
aesthetically motivated desire to make aesthetically 
valuable musical sounds in their own right. A fine 
instrument in the hands of an accomplished musician is a 
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worthwhile and sought after aesthetic experience somewhat 
independent of the specific composition performed. 
Collingwood seems to miss this important part of musical 
experience. His theory fails to account for what is 
commonly taken to be a principal reason for public 
performances: listening to fine musical sounds. 
There is another problem with Collingwood's conception 
of musical compositions that does not involve its 
implications for performance. If the actual musical artwork 
is essentially mental, something that originates and is said 
to properly exist in the mind of the composer, then it would 
seem that no one else can have access to the genuine artwork 
except the composer. 
Mental phenomena as such are private and thus not 
available for public inspection. The representation, in 
whatever form provided by the composer (score, tape 
recording, etc.), will always be an approximation. This 
somewhat Platonic conception, the notion that the true and 
real existent is non-corporeal, the notion that what is 
physical and sensuous is inferior, creates certain problems 
when it comes to evaluative questions concerning the 
composition. It seems that we can never critique the actual 
musical artwork. One, because the work is, by Collingwood's 
definition, private and thereby fundamentally inaccessible. 
Two, unless the composer is at the performance to confirm 
the adequacy of the performance in representing his/her 
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ideas, we cannot know that we are hearing, and thus 
reconstructing in our minds, what the composer intended. 
Does such a view force us to commit the so-called 
"intentional fallacy"? How can a musical work be evaluated 
or appreciated at all without continuously attempting to get 
at the composer's intentions? In trying to reconstruct the 
artist's ideas in our own minds we are actively and 
deliberately doing what the intentionalist criticism warns 
against. Collingwood's view, in effect, seems to be just 
the view that the actual artwork consists of the artist's 
intentions. 
The intentional fallacy is purported to occur whenever 
someone takes the artist's intentions for an artwork as 
relevant, if not decisive, for an aesthetic interpretation 
and/or evaluation of that artwork. The critic of 
intentionalist approaches to works of art argues that 
intentions are "neither available nor desireable as a 
standard for judging the success of work .... "10 The bases 
for this view are first, the recognition that artist's 
intentions are essentially private and thus virtually 
inaccessible to others. The artist may be unavailable 
because of death or absence. The artist may choose not to 
reveal his/her intentions. The artist might not effectively 
or accurately communicate his/her intentions for all sorts 
of reasons. Or finally, the artist might not be a good 
interpreter of his/her own work. As the originators of the 
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intentional fallacy thesis, Wimsatt and Beardsley, point 
out, "judgement of poems is different from the art of 
producing them.u11 
A second basis for the intentionalist criticism is the 
claim that since intentions are external to the artwork 
itself, it follows that they are of no significance to any 
aesthetic interpretation of the work. Intentions are 
essentially private to the persons having them. As private 
they are external to the public artifact or public 
expression that makes up the artwork under this view. That 
which is external to the actual work of art should not 
intrude on an aesthetic interpretation of the work itself. 
The work should be evaluated only in term of what is 
internal to it; what constitutes the work itself. 
Although this critique of the role of the artist's 
intentions is aimed explicitly at interpretive and 
evaluative considerations, it carries with it some 
ontological implications. First, the view implies that a 
genuine artwork must be a public object and not a private 
entity of consciousness. To require examination of 
intentions on the part of the artist suggests that the 
public artwork is deficient in itself, that it is somehow 
incomplete. The position that disregards intentions takes 
the work of art to be an entirely independent object wholly 
or sufficiently accessible to a spectator or audience. Such 
an object must be a thoroughly public object; it cannot be a 
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mental entity in any way. 
A second implication of the intentionalist criticism 
is that since intentions are not relevant to the evaluation 
of an artwork, they cannot be constitutive of it either. If 
intentions comprised the "true" work of art, and if 
intentions are fundamentally irrelevant to interpreting such 
works, then there would be nothing left to interpret or 
evaluate. 
Collingwood's view not only makes the somewhat 
uncontroversial claim that artworks somehow originate in the 
artist's imagination, but he goes much further in arguing 
that the essential artwork is this imagining on the 
part of the artist. In this way, Collingwood's view 
implies that the artworks consist of the artist's 
intentions; the artist's intentions constitute the real work 
of art. As we have seen, experiencing a work of art 
actually amounts to attending to these intentions. 
In saying this I have not shown Collingwood's view to 
be false. Rather I have attempted to show its 
incompatibility with the intentionalist criticism. I have 
tried to show its fundamental incompatibility with any view 
that identifies artworks with a public, physical artifact. 
And, I have tried to show its incompatibility with any view 
that focuses aesthetic attention or interest on a sensory 
experience of this artifact. I shall return to Collingwood 
in Chapter V. 
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Nicholas Wolterstorff: Compositions as 
Norm-Kinds 
In Part Two of his Works and Worlds of Art, Nicholas 
Wolterstorff develops a theory of musical compositions that 
construes them as what he calls "norm-kinds•. A chief 
feature of such a conception of musical works of art is that 
they are to be regarded as a sort of universal, that is, as 
non-individuals capable of multiple instances. Compositions 
construed in this way may have any number, (including zero), 
of particular expressions, examples, instantiations, or as 
Wolterstorff puts it, occurrences. Such occurrences may 
take the form of scores, performances, or recordings, and as 
such may each be referred to by the same name as the 
composition. Thus, "performance of Schoenberg's 'Verklaerte 
Nacht 1 • is to be interpreted as "occurrence- or instance of 
Schoenberg's 'Verklaerte Nacht'".12 
From a nominalist's perspective such talk is 
unacceptable. In this section I shall attempt to show (1) 
that an alternative nominalistic mode of discourse referring 
to compositions and performances is possible and reasonable; 
and (2) that Wolterstorff's construal of musical works as 
norm-kinds leads to difficulties and misconceptions 
concerning the practices of composing and performing music. 
Wolterstorff claims that "performing some work of art 
consists of bringing about A performance of it .... "13 
Later he says, "a performance of a work of art is an 
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occurrence of it .... "14 He calls artworks such as these 
"occurrence-works", and then argues that "most if not all 
occurrence-works are universals."15 From these initial 
descriptions he will eventually develop his theory of 
compositions as norm-kinds. Before I comment on his notion 
of norm-kinds, I shall consider these initial descriptions. 
By describing performances of musical works in the 
ways that he does, Wolterstorff appears to have prejudiced 
the analysis in favor of a universalistic interpretation 
from the beginning. That is, the language he uses to 
characterize performances presupposes that they are 
instantiations of universals, and the universals that they 
instantiate are the compositions from which they are 
derived. Let me explain. 
Although I readily agree that performances are 
occurrences, I fail to see why such occurrences must be 
taken as occurrences of the work. To speak of 
performances as occurrences of the composer's work is to 
presuppose that compositions are universals or abstract 
entities of some kind. But we may wish to ask. is 
"occurrence of• a proper and necessary interpretation of 
"performance of"? Does "perforMance of A imply "occurrence 
of" in the context of music? I shall argue that it does 
not, and that an alternative interpretation is possible and 
preferable. 
If performances are admittedly occurrences, what then 
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are they occurrences of? When I attend a performance I 
listen to the occurrences of certain sounds made in a 
certain way, in a certain sequence, at a specifiable time 
and place. Performances are these actual occurrences of 
actual sounds. Therefore, musical performances are 
occurrences of musical sounds. What occurs during a 
performance is usually a performance of a musical work, 
not the musical work itself. (Although later I will argue 
that improvisations are compositions that are created as 
they are performed, thus improvisations would be 
performances that are the compositions themselves.) Simply, 
but somewhat awkwardly, put, performances are occurrences of 
performances. 
To speak of a musical performance as an occurrence of 
the musical work, rather than the musical sound-events 
that go together to comprise the performance, is to presume 
that in hearing the sounds occurring during the performance 
a listener is actually hearing the musical work itself, the 
musical composition. If this presumption is made, then the 
composition's ontological status will tend to be resolved in 
terms of abstract entities. This is so because the musical 
composition will have to be construed as the sort of entity 
capable of being present in different places at the same 
time. (No one denies that it is possible if not likely that 
there may be more than one performance of "Beethoven's 
'Ninth Symphony'" on any given date.) Thus a composition 
152 
will be construed as an universal, the sort of entity 
capable of such multiple occurrences. 
I would like to propose a different way of 
interpreting the two phrases •performance of" and 
•occurrence of• in the musical context. Consider this 
distinction: Beethoven's •Ninth Symphony• and 
"Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'". The work of art that was 
composed by Beethoven can be referred to as Beethoven's 
"Ninth Symphony•. The name Beethoven refers to the 
composer, identifying the maker/creator of the artwork 
"Ninth Symphony•. Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony• names a 
unique object: the original composition. 
Naming a performance is a somewhat different matter. 
To say, "Last night I listened to a performance of 
Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'", is to significantly 
under-represent the event; that is, it is an incomplete 
description of what actually happened. A performance is 
usually produced by some musician or musicians making 
musical sounds. (John Cage's "4'33°" notwithstanding. This 
is an extremely minimalistic piece comprised entirely of one 
musical element, namely, silence. See Chapter III on 
"musical elements•.) 
When an orchestra performs Beethoven's work, we are 
actually listening to the musical sounds intentionally 
produced by that group of persons. Thus, if The Chicago 
Symphony Orchestra, for example, performs the work mentioned 
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above, an appropriate description for this performance would 
be, The Chicago Symphony's •Beethoven's 'Ninth 
symphony'". That is, the performance, what occurred last 
night, was made by The Chicago Symphony. In this case, the 
name The Chicago Symphony identifies the maker/creator 
of the musical event attended and attended to last night. 
Strictly speaking, "Beethoven" here does not refer to the 
maker of the object of our attention; rather, his name 
identifies the maker of the composition from which the 
performance happens to be derived. In effect, "Beethoven" 
becomes a part of the name of the performance. Whereas 
"Ninth Symphony" names a composition,•Beethoven's 'Ninth 
Symphony'" names a performance. 
What occurs is not an occurrence of Beethoven's 
"Ninth Symphonyu, rather what occurs is a performance of 
The Chicago Symphony's "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'". 
Thus, we never hear Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony•, but only 
some musicians' performance of "Beethoven's 'Ninth 
Symphony••. We can only hear sounds, and the composition 
under consideration, (Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony•), is 
not itself made up of sounds, therefore this composition 
is not capable of being heard. 
Occurrences are events, happenings in space and time. 
Wh~t happens during a performance of Beethoven's work are 
sounds and actions, but Beethoven's work doesn't happen 
during a performance because his work is not sounds and 
154 
actions, at least not at this time. Therefore, it appears 
that saying we can listen to an occurrence of 
Beethoven's work of art is imprecise, since his work is not 
occurring at all; it is not the sort of thing that can occur 
during a performance. What we mean when we do speak of 
listening to an occurrence of this piece is that we listen 
to an occurrence of "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony••, not 
Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony•. 
Now there is a legitimate sense in which we may speak 
of the occurrence of Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony•. That 
would be when we refer to the occasion of Beethoven's 
composing, (the actual selecting and arranging of musical 
elements into an intended original). This is a dateable 
event or set of events, and resulted in a particular 
artifact: most likely a manuscript score. In other words, 
Beethoven's •Ninth Symphony• occurred when he made 
composed it; "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony••, on the other 
hand, occurs whenever a musical performance is created with 
the appropriate connections to the original compositional 
work 0 Ninth Symphony• by Beethoven. (These appropriate 
connections have been discussed earlier in Chapter III). 
Does "performance of x• imply •occurrence of x• as 
Wolterstorff seems to think? I have been trying to show 
that the performance of an already existng musical 
composition consists of making a different object, (or more 
precisely, an event), distinct from the composition itself. 
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To perform a work is not to make the work occur; to result 
in an occurrence of the work. The work itself already 
occurred at the time of its creation by the composer. It 
may be said to exist, if the manuscript, (or whatever sort 
of artifact the original composition is, e.g., tape 
composition), has not been destroyed. We may say that the 
"Mona Lisa" occurred at the time daVinci painted it, but 
now, instead of saying that it occurs in the Louvre, we say 
that it exists there. In like manner, under my approach to 
musical compositions, Beethoven's "Ninth Symphony• occurred 
when he composed it, but now exists whereever the manuscript 
resides. 
To perform a work is thus to bring about a 
sound-sequence-occurrence that is derived from an already 
existing musical work, i.e., a composition. 
(Improvisational compositions are modifications of this 
formula, as was described in the previous chapter, in the 
sense that, though they are performed musical works, they 
are not derived from some already existing work.) 
Performing a work consists, in part, of a cultural practice 
that amounts to admitting that the musical event being made, 
(occurring), is not fully original. The performance of a 
composition is not an occurrence of the composition, rather 
it is a unique entity, (i.e., an new individual 
ontologically distinct from the composition from which it 
was derived), resulting from using a composition as a basis 
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for making choices with respect to musical sounds. 
Again, a comparison with painting might be helpful. 
If a painter were to make a copy of the •Mona Lisa", we do 
not speak of it as an occurrence nor as an instance of the 
"Mona Lisa•. Instead it is called a copy, an imitation, or 
possibly a forgery, depending on the circumstances of its 
presentation. This painter may or may not intend to make an 
indistinguishable copy of the original. She may succeed in 
accomplishing these intentions to varying degrees. In any 
case, the result is a new artifact derived, to some greater 
or lesser extent, from an original work of art. This new 
artifact is not an instance nor an occurrence of the 
original, daVinci's work of art. 
Performing a musical work is somewhat similar. The 
performers are making a new artifact acknowledged to be 
derived from some other musical object, the composition. 
These performers may or may not intend to perform the work 
precisely as the composer is believed to have wanted it. 
They may succeed in accomplishing their intentions to 
varying degrees. In any case, their efforts result in a new 
artifact, (event/object), derived from and, to some greater 
or lesser extent, compliant with, an original composition. 
It so happens that, in music, most performers do aim at a 
high degree of compliance in doing what the composer wanted. 
This is largely a matter of cultural practice, or certain 
customary expectations in the musical artworld. 
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I do not wish to stretch the comparison between 
painting and music too far. The practices and products of 
these two arts are obviously quite different, and these 
differences are important. But I do think, as I have 
explained earlier, that they are ontologically more similar 
than is usually thought. Uy thesis continues to be that 
musical artworks, (compositions and performances), are 
concrete particulars. I take it that paintings are less 
controversially so. (Clearly, there are those who will 
dispute even this claim. I am not concerned here with 
defending the notion that all artworks are concrete 
particulars. I am maintaining that if the reader grants 
that paintings, or any artworks for that matter, can be 
understood as concrete particulars, then musical artworks 
may be interpreted in a similar manner.) Painting thus 
provides a useful paradigm art for comparison. 
An implication of Wolterstorff's view that 
performances are occurrences of the musical work of art, and 
that as such the work is a universal, is his claim that 
recordings of performances, although not themselves 
performances of the work, are nevertheless occurrences of 
the work.16 This is admittedly consistent with his 
"universalistic• interpretation of musical works. Once one 
has accepted that something other than the work itself can 
be an occurrence of it, (as Wolterstorff has done in the 
case of performances; he has not said that performances of a 
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work are the work, rather they are occurrences of it), then 
it seems evident that there may be various ways that works 
can occur. 
But if speaking of occurrences of the work in this way 
requires accepting the notion that works are universals, how 
might a nominalist reinterpret the situation? I agree with 
Wolterstorff that recordings of performances are not 
themselves performances. Performances are intentional acts 
in which a musician or musicians produce actual 
sound-sequence-occurrences. As I have explained in Chapter 
III, performances of a composition consist of performers 
selecting and arranging musical sounds with the intention of 
making these selections based upon the composition. 
(Wolterstorff requires that the performance, in addition, 
exemplify •the properties normative within the workM. I 
will discuss his notion of "normative within• when I 
consider his concept of "norm-kind• below). Recordings are 
not performances, and Wolterstorff would concur, because 
they are not themselves the results of this intentional 
selecting and arranging. 
But I do not follow Wolterstorff in his assertion that 
a recording of a performance of "Beethoven's 'Ninth 
Symphony•• is an occurrence of Beethoven's •Ninth 
Symphonyn, the composition. Indeed, in my view, it is not 
even an occurrence of The Chicago Symphony's 
"Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony••. A recording of a 
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performance is not an occurrence of the performance. To 
speak this way would be to construe the performance itself 
as an abstract entity, since it would permit multiple 
instances of this performance at the same time in 
different places. Also, since performances are events and 
thus transient, they no longer exist after they have 
occurred. What does not exist certainly cannot be said to 
occur. 
A number of things seem to be clear about recordings 
of performances. We should distinguish between three senses 
of the term "recording•: (1) the act of recording; (2) the 
physical product of that act; and (3) physical copies of 
this produced object. The first involves using certain 
sorts of electronic equipment at the time of the 
performance-event. As an action, or set of actions, a 
recording in this sense is an occurrence, an occurrence of 
recording a performance. 
The second sense refers to the object that is made as a 
result of using the equipment. It is thus a physical 
"record" of the sound-sequence-occurrence that made up the 
performance. Usually today this object consists of a length 
of magnetic tape that has been micro-physically altered so 
as to be capable of reproducing a sound-sequence-occurrence 
that sounds, to varying degrees, much like the original 
performance from which it was made. 
Finally, a recording may be a physical object that is 
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a copy or reproduction of the original product of the act of 
recording. In this sense, a recording may be another length 
of tape made by copying the original tape. Or this 
recording may be in a medium different from the original 
recording, (e.g., a grooved vinyl disc). In any case, this 
sense of recording refers to some object derived from the 
initial product of the act of recording which is also 
capable of reproducing a sound-sequence-occurrence that 
sounds, to varying degrees, much like the performance from 
which it was ultimately derived. 
The phrase "from which it was ultimately derived• 
should be interpreted in terms of historical and causal 
connections. That is, the act of recording is an event 
occurring simultaneously with the performance. The product 
of this act is, as such, caused by these events. The 
recorded copies of this product are themselves caused by 
this product. Thus, there is an historical and causal chain 
of events and objects linking the performance with 
subsequent recordings. 
The point here is that the relationships between 
performances and recording are not to be understood as any 
kind of instantiation of an exemplar. Something is a 
recording of a performance not because it is an instance of 
the performance, but rather because it is historically and 
causally traceable back to a performance. Furthermore, nor 
is the recording an instance of the compositional work, 
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since, as was explained in Chapter III, the relationships 
between performances and compositions are also historical 
and causal, the relationships between recordings and 
compositions are also describable in terms of an extended 
series of historical and causal connections. 
Consider this example. If someone is said to be 
listening to "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'" on a tape 
player, what is actually happening is that the person is 
listening to, for example, the playback of a copy of 
Philips' recording of •The Chicago Symphony•s• performance 
of "Beethoven's 'Ninth Symphony'" Philips has made an 
object, (a recording), that was derived from a performance 
that was derived from a composition. 
Describing the situation in this way does not require 
r~ference to any abstract entities. The copy of the 
recording, the recording, the performance, and the 
composition are each concrete particulars, (objects or 
events). They are each unique entities made by different 
peraons through various means or processes and in different 
media. The practice of referring to each of these items by 
the same name, "Beethoven's Ninth Symphony•, is a matter of 
customary shorthand. 
For now, the point I am attempting to make is that 
recordings in the musical context are not instances, 
examples, nor occurrences of the work from which they 
were derived. Rather, recordings can function in the audial 
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mode the way that photographs can function in the visual 
mode. A photograph of the "Mona Lisa" is never considered 
an instance of the "Mona Lisa". A photograph of the "John 
Hancock Building" is not considered an example of it. A 
photograph can •record• some visually perceptible object or 
event; whereas a sound recording can •record" some audially 
perceptible object or event. 
(It should be recalled that, under my view, some 
recordings, often on magnetic tape, are themselves 
compositions. Some composers produce "tape compositions•; 
that is, they compose their works by means of recording 
musical sounds directly onto tape. Their compositions are 
thus not comprised of notational manuscripts. If a score of 
this tape composition is made later, it does not constitute 
a composition, rather it would have a similar status as that 
of any scored ~ of a manuscript--it would not be a 
composi~ion. A tape composition as a concrete artifact is 
the composer's artwork.) 
So far I have presented a possible nominalistic 
interpretation of discourse about musical compositions, 
performances, and recordings. Unlike Wolterstorff, I do not 
see a need to regard performances and recordings as 
occurrences or examples of the composition. I have not 
argued that one way of speaking, nominalistically or 
"universalistically•, is inherently superior; only that a 
nominalistic interpretation of the sort of language 
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Wolterstorff uses is plausible and not problemmatic. 
Next I shall address Wolterstorff's characterization 
of compositions as norm-kinds. My primary objective will be 
to show how this conception leads to some strange, if not 
undesirable, implications, and that this suggests that an 
alternative conception may be preferable. My own theory of 
compositions as concrete particulars is offered as just such 
a preferable alternative. 
Wolterstorff believes that musical works are 
"norm-kinds". Not all kinds are norm-kinds. Norm-kinds are 
those sorts of kinds that permit the possibility of 
malformed examples of that kind. For example, the norm-kind 
'Dog' allows for a meaningful distinction between 
properly-formed dogs and improperly-formed dogs, (a dog 
missing a tail is still a dog, and thus an example of the 
kind 'Dog', albeit a moderately malformed one). On the 
other hand, the kind 'Red Thing' is not a norm-kind, since 
it is nonsense to speak of an improperly red thing. It is 
not possible to assess a red thing in terms of the degree to 
which it is properly red.17 
Another way to get at Wolterstorff 's conception of a 
norm-kind is through an understanding of his distinction 
between properties that are •essential within• and those 
that are "normative withinM a given kind. A norm-kind will 
be a kind that has among its constituent properties at least 
one property that is normative within it. 
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A property normative within a kind is a property 
that a properly-formed example of that kind must have. 
Wolterstorff 's formal definition is as follows: 
The property P is normative within the norm-kind K = 
df K is a norm-kind, and it is impossible that there be 
something which is a properly-formed example of K and 
lacks P.18 
By contrast, a property essential within a kind is 
formally defined this way: 
(Having) the property P essential within K = df P 
and K are such that necessarily if something is an 
example of Kit has P.19 
The central feature of this distinction is represented by 
the qualifying phrase nproperly-formed". In effect, a 
property essential within a kind is one that contributes 
to determining whether or not some entity is an example of 
the kind. Without this property a thing cannot be an 
example of the kind. But a property normative within a 
kind does not play any role in determining whether or not 
something is an example of the kind in question. It 
determines rather the degree to which it is 
"properly-formed•. It has something to do with how "correct• 
an example it is. 
Therefore, in the case of the norm-kind 'Dog', the 
property of "being an animal• is a property essential 
within it. Something cannot be an example of 'Dog' unless 
it possesses the property of "being an animal•. The 
property "having four legs•, on the other hand, is a 
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property normative within this kind. Lacking this 
property does not undermine a thing's status as an example 
of 'Dog', but the lack of this property does indicate that 
the example is less than properly formed, that it is 
deficient with respect to four-leggedness. 
In other words, possessing the property "being an 
animal" is a necessary condition for something being counted 
an example of the kind 'Dog'; possessing the property 
"having four legs• is a necessary condition for something 
being counted a properly-formed example of the kind 'Dog'. 
It follows then that, "any property essential within a 
norm-kind will also be normative within it; but not so vice 
versa."20 After all, another property necessary for being 
counted a properly-formed dog is "being an animal"; but as 
should be quite clear, it is not necessary that all dogs 
possess the property of 0 having four legs• in order to 
qualify as examples of 'Dog'. 
What of so-called •accidental properties•? 
Wolterstorff does not discuss any properties accidental 
within, and with good reason. The sorts of properties he 
has described are those that go toward characterizing kinds 
themselves. Any given kind will be determined only by 
properties necessary to its character. 0 Normative" and 
"essential" properties are properties within the kind; 
they are somehow constitutive of the kind. "Accidental• 
properties, on the other hand, are not the sort of 
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properties that are within the kind. Such properties 
would attach to exa•ples of a kind, but not to the kind 
itself. It would appear then that kinds as kinds do not 
have properties accidental within. Therefore, 
norm-kinds have two sorts of properties: those essential 
within and those nor•ative within. Exa•ples of norm-kinds 
can have three sorts of properties: essential, normative, 
and accidental. 
The norm-kind 'Dog' possesses the properties of "being 
an animal" and "having four legs". A dog must be an animal 
in order to be considered an example of 'Dog'; it must have 
four legs to be considered a properly-formed example of 
'Dog'; but it may be virtually any color whatsoever, 
(essential, normative, and accidental properties 
respectively). 
This theory of norm-kinds has application to music in 
the following manner. Musical works, or compositions, are 
norm-kinds, according to Wolterstorff. As such they possess 
properties essential within them and properties normative 
within the•. Performances, which are examples, or 
occurrences, of musical norm-kinds, must possess all the 
properties essential within the work in order to count as 
performances of the work. Furthermore, they must possess 
the properties normative within the work in order to count 
as "correct" performances of the work. This last feature of 
the work/occurrence relationship is particularly important 
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to Wolterstorff. He takes it that an adequate theory of 
musical works and performances must be able to account for 
the generally accepted view that works may have incorrect 
performances. (His criticism of Nelson Goodman's theory 
centers on just this issue.21) 
An incorrect performance, on Wolterstorff's theory of 
norm-kinds, would be any performance that lacks some 
property normative within its associated work, the 
composition. It should be clear by now that, unless some 
property normative within a work is also essential within 
it, some performance's failure to possess a normative 
property and thereby be an incorrect performance is not 
decisive against a performance's status as a performance of 
that work. An incorrect performance of a work is usually 
still a performance of it. 
At what point divergence from the properties normative 
within a work a performance ceases to be an example of the 
work at all Wolterstorff does not specify. This seems 
sensible since it is not clear how it could be otherwise. 
Properties normative within a kind simply do not play a role 
in determining that a thing is an example of the kind. He 
does say that performing of a work consists, in part, of 
bringing about •a sound-sequence-occurrence ... which comes 
fairly close to exemplifying the acoustic and 
instrumental properties normative within that work .... "22 
(emphasis mine). 
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To summarize Wolterstorff's position thus far: 
Musical works are norm-kinds, and as such possess properties 
normative within them that establish criteria for evaluating 
the correctness of examples of the work. Any example of the 
work may be more or less correct according to the degree to 
which the example manifests the properties normative within 
the musical work from which it is derived. 
Let us now examine what Wolterstorff has to say about 
composing and performing. This will provide us with a 
fuller understanding of the implications of his theory. 
Some of these implications will provide points for criticism 
later on. Since musical works consist largely of properties 
normative within them, composing consists most simply of 
selecting such properties. More specifically, 
in selecting a set of properties as criteria for 
correctness of occurrence the composer composes a work. 
And the work composed •.• is that one which has exactly 
those properties and their prerequisites as normative 
within it.23 
In this way, a composer uniquely determines a musical 
norm-kind that may serve as a guide for making musical 
sound-sequence-occurrences, (variously described as examples 
of the kind or as occurrences of the work). 
A few observations are in order here. Since musical 
works are norm-kinds and composers are those persons who 
select the properties normative within the work, 
Wolterstorff argues that composing consists of 
intentionally selecting properties for the purpose 
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of determining correctness of occurrence. What this implies 
then is that improvising is not composing. Improvisation, 
as was discussed in Chapters I and III, is the musical 
practice of performing musical sounds, to varying degrees, 
extemporaneously. That is, the performing musician makes 
sound selections at the moment of performance somewhat 
spontaneously and somewhat independently of the composition. 
She may go outside the specified elements of the composition 
by adding embellishments; she may alter, in large measure, 
various components of the piece, or she may even create 
completely new passages of music on the spot. 
Improvising does indeed involve selecting musical 
properties, but it does not involve doing so for the 
purpose of determining correctness of occurrence for some 
subsequent sound-sequence-occurrence. Wolterstorff 
emphasizes this aspect of improvisation in his denial of its 
status as genuine composing. In his terminology, the 
improvising musician is not selecting properties normative 
within a kind, therefore she is not producing a norm-kind, 
and so she is not composing a work. Improvisations are thus 
never themselves compositions. I will have more to say about 
this conclusion later. 
Another point to be noted is that performances are not 
the only sort of examples that a musical composition can 
have. Sound recordings may be examples of a work in so far 
as they come "fairly closeu to exemplifying the prope~ties 
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normative within the work. Thus recordings are evaluated 
for correctness o~ occurrence in the same way as 
performances. If a composer were to specify that "being 
performedN is normative within the work, does this mean, 
under Wolterstorff's view, that a recording of such a 
performance is not an occurrence of the work? Not at all; 
it would only follow that the recording was a less than 
correct occurrence. But what if a composer claims that the 
property "being a performanceN is essential within the work? 
According to Wolterstorff 's conception of composing, a 
composer cannot do this. Composing is essentially the 
selecting of properties which determine correctness of 
occurrence, i.e., properties normative within, not selecting 
properties essential within. Wolterstorff does not explain 
why composing should be limited only to selecting normative 
properties; it appears that he merely stipulates this. 
(Actually, he seems somewhat unclear on this point.) 
Could a composer compose a work that is unperformable? 
An interesting and important feature of norm-kinds, as 
construed by Wolterstorff, is their complete independence 
from any examples. That is, a norm-kind does not need to 
have any examples in order to exist.24 Therefore, a 
compositional work need never be performed, recorded, or 
otherwise instantiated to be counted as a genuine work. 
Such a claim is justified by Wolterstorff first, on 
theoretical grounds, that as a sort of universal, norm-kinds 
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have the crucial characteristics of universals. One such key 
characteristic of universals, as traditionally understood, 
is their capacity for existence independent of 
instantiation. Wolterstorff argues that just as the 
universal or idea of 'Dog' could be said to exist even if no 
actual dogs existed, or just as the kind 'Unicorn' exists 
uninstantiated, so a norm-kind such as 'Beethoven's Ninth 
Symphony' could be said to exist even if it were never 
performed. 
A second justification he offers is the common sense 
recognition of the fact that composers sometimes have 
trouble getting their works performed, especially if these 
works are highly unconventional or the composer is little 
known. Our ability to meaningfully talk about and identify 
such unperformed works is evidence to their status as 
genuine works. The point is that composers can produce 
works of compositional music that yet go unperformed or 
unsounded. This is not an uncommon occurrence in the real 
world of musical practice. Therefore, we can acknowledge 
the existence of unperformed or even unperformable musical 
works. 
We now arrive at a somewhat strange element in 
Wol ter·storff' s theory. He says on page 67, "we must not 
overlook the fact that there are musical works which were 
probably never composed." He gives as an example what he 
calls "works of indigenous folk music", which he claims, 
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"just emerged from performances.u25 In other words, the 
work is not the product of any identifiable person's act of 
selecting normative properties, instead the properties are 
recognized and used to determine correctness of performance 
or occurrence. Thus, he suggests distinguishing ~wo sorts 
of originators of musical works: composers and 
practitioners. Further, he adds, "a work is always a work 
of somebody. Nothing is ever a work of music without, in 
one or the other of these two ways, being the work of some 
person or persons."2ti 
The first peculiarity here is Wolterstorff's claim 
that some works are uncomposed. It may be that some of the 
works he is referring to are not so much uncomposed, as they 
are the product of some unknown composer, forgotten or 
unidentified. Alternatively, folk music of the sort he 
describes may have resulted from the combined efforts of 
many individuals, again with lost identities. Such works 
could still be described as composed but again by unknown 
composers. Surely the inability to identify composers 
should not count against a work's status as composed. 
Wolterstorff does not clearly explain the alleged process by 
which practitioners generate musical works, so it is 
difficult to evaluate the plausibility of his suggestions on 
this matter. But if we grant that there actually are works 
that have simply "emerged• from the practice of making music 
without any explicit intention of selecting normative 
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properties, why must we regard these as uncomposed? 
As with his objection to regarding improvising as a 
form of composing, it seems that Wolterstorff is determined 
to confine composing to the intentional selection of 
normative properties. That is, composers must have as part 
of their intention, as they go about the selection 
process, that the choices they make be taken as normative 
for subsequent occurrences. Improvisors and practitioners 
are not composers because they do not explicitly propose 
that their musical selections be used as instructions for 
future musical products. 
Nevertheless, so-called practitioners apparently do 
produce musical works, describable as uncomposed norm-kinds; 
whereas, improvisors apparently do not produce works, rather 
they produce what might be referred to as uncomposed 
non-kinds. Although he does not say so, it would seem that 
if an improvisation were recorded or rememebered and then 
imitated to some degree and repeatedly so, that such an 
improvisation may eventually become the sort of work that 
Wolterstorff regards as the product of practitioners rather 
than composers. Thus, in this way an improvisation may 
evolve into or become a work 
Since, "for Wolterstorff, works are kinds, and since 
kinds are the sorts of things that are capable of having 
examples, and since improvisations are unique individual 
events which lack the capacity for multiple instantiation, 
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(although we may wonder whether Wolterstorff would consider 
recordings of an improvisation occurrences of the 
improvisation and thus examples of it?); therefore, 
improvisations cannot be regarded as any sort of kind, and, 
as such, cannot be regarded as works. Thus, not only are 
improvisations not compositions, but they are not musical 
works. 
Wolterstorff acknowledges that improvisations may 
become compositional works if the performer later goes about 
making a score based upon the performed improvisation. He 
says, 
Suppose that someone has improvised on the organ. And 
suppose that he then goes home and scores a work of such 
a sort that his improvisation, judged by the 
requirements for correctness specified in the score, is 
at all points correct. In spite of that, the composer 
did not compose his work in performing his 
improvisation. In all likelihood, he did not even 
compose it while improvising. For in all likelihood 
he did not, during his improvising, finish selecting 
that particular set of requirements for correctness of 
occurrence to be found in his score.27 
This description of improvisation seems consistent with 
Wolterstorff's theory of musical works as norm-kinds. But 
it leads to a perplexing dilemnta. 
Suppose that some performer, or group of performers, 
improvises an extended musical passage with a clear 
beginning and ending. Someone else, by virtue of an 
excellent memory or a sound recording of the event, produces 
a detailed score of this musical performance. Clearly, 
under Wolterstorff's view, we have a musical work. The 
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score allows for the production of examples of 
sound-sequence-occurrences that can be judged for 
correctness according to the indicated normative properties 
contained within the score. 
Who is the composer of this work? According to 
Wolterstorff's characterization, neither improvisor nor 
score-writer can qualify as composer. The improvisor cannot 
be the composer because he never intended that his musical 
selections be taken as normative for future performances. 
He may never consent to this scoring, (the scoring is 
unknown to him, he may die soon afterward, he may even 
refuse to authorize the scoring), and so never confirm the 
properties of his performance as normative. 
The score-writer cannot be the composer, under 
Wolterstorff's view, because, although she may intend that 
the score be taken as describing normative properties for 
subsequent musical occurrences, she did not select these 
properties herself. (Besides, if Wolterstorff's theory did 
lead to the conclusion that the score-writer is the 
composer, so much the worse for the theory. Such a 
conclusion would be quite counter-intuitive and inconsistent 
with general musical custom.) 
Not only is such a situation as described possible, 
but it is quite probable, especially within musical idioms 
that often emphasize improvisation, such as jazz, blues, and 
rock. It is not uncommon for performers in these styles to 
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be: ("1) unable to score their own music, since they do not 
know or use musical notation; and/or (2) uninterested in 
setting their music down as compositional works. 
Wolterstorff may simply argue that these works 
resulting from improvisational performances are uncomposed 
works. The notion of uncomposed works may be troubling in 
itself to some of us, but in this case what makes the claim 
seem particularly odd is that we can clearly identify the 
person or persons directly responsible for the existence of 
the work. Vet, because of certain criteria established by 
Wolterstorff, namely, the intention to make a work and the 
selection of normative properties, such persons are denied 
the status of composers. 
I would now like to consider another peculiar 
consequence of Wolterstorff's theory of musical works as 
norm-kinds. On page 88, he says, "if the ontological 
principles in accord with which we have been conducting our 
investigation are correct, then no kinds come into or go out 
of existence.• He then adds that since musical works are 
kinds, " a composer does not bring that which is his work 
into existence. Musical works exist everlastingly."28 (We 
may note that by 'modus tollens', any suspicions concerning 
the consequent of the above stated conditional, i.e., "no 
kinds come into or go out of existence•, would have direct 
bearing on the soundness of Wolterstorff's "ontological 
principles". In other words, if it is spurious that.kinds 
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exist everlastingly, then the ontological theory upon which 
such a claim is dependent is also spurious.) 
Instead of assessing the whole of his theory of kinds, 
I shall examine its specific application to music. Is it 
reasonable to accept the conclusion that •musical works 
exist everlastingly"? First of all, Wolterstorff seems to 
contradict himself on this point. As we may recall, he said 
that •a work is always a work of somebody.•29 How can 
something be the product of some person's efforts if it has 
always existed? If musical works exist everlastingly, then 
they predated the existence of the composer. Wolterstorff 
says, 
What the composer does must be understood as consisting 
in bringing it about that a preexistent kind becomes ~ 
work--specifically, a work of his. To compose 
is not to bring into existence what one composes. It is 
to bring it about that something becomes a work .... The 
only thing a composer normally brings into existence is 
a copy, a token, of his score.30 
I think this passage is somewhat confused. If musical works 
exist everlastingly, then how is it that a composer brings 
it about "that a preexistent kind beco111es ~ work• if the 
work already exists? Something cannot become what it 
already is. If musical works exist everlastingly, then in 
what sense does a composer select normative properties? or 
is it really a matter of discovering them? 
Additional strange implications of the claim that 
works exist everlastingly seem to follow: 
(1) All works past, present, and future have aiways 
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existed and will always exist; and a large number of these 
are uncomposed. 
(2) There are an infinite number of existing 
musical works, the vast majority of which will never be 
composed, (i.e., no person intentionally selects properties 
normative within the work), nor heard. Since there would 
seem to be an infinite variety of possible combinations of 
musical properties, and it is possible that any of these 
combinations could be selected and arranged by some composer 
at some time, then each of these infinite combinations must 
be considered a work, and furthermore, as a work, each must 
be everlastingly existent. 
(3) Since improvisations are not compositions and not 
works, and since compositions are not created by their 
composers31, does this mean that improvisations might 
qualify as genuinely created by their improvisors? Since an 
improvisation is not a kind, but instead an individual, 
ther~ is nothing to preclude it from being regarded as a new 
and original created object. This does not imply that 
improvisations are created, only that it appears they 
might be. Could it be then that improvisors are creators, 
whereas composers are not? An odd consequence indeed. 
As we have seen with Collingwood earlier and with 
Wolterstorff now, it is quite apparent that the ways in 
which musical compositions are construed ontologically can 
lead to interesting yet problematic implications. 
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Ontological commitments in musical contexts are not without 
aesthetically significant consequences. A principal purpose 
for my examina~ion of the preceding views and the one to 
follow is not so much to show the views talse, (although I 
am inclined to think they are less than adequate), nor 
merely provide theoretical contrasts with my own view. 
Rather, I hope to reveal the sorts of implications 
ontological commitments in music have, and leave the 
suggestion that theoretical accuracy in this context is 
partly a function of a theory's ability to fit musical 
experience and practice. So far, I think I have raised at 
least some important inadequacies in this regard with 
respect to the presented theories. Let us examine one more 
proposal. 
William Webster: Compositions as 
Abstract Particulars 
One additional ontological characterization of musical 
compositions that I should like to consider is a theory 
developed by William Webster. His view consists in 
regarding musical works as •abstract particulars•. Whereas 
Wolterstorff has described compositions as "norm-kinds•, a 
sort of universal; and I have described them as •concrete 
particulars•, a sort of individual; Webster prefers to 
describe musical works as "abstract particulars•, an 
ontological category lying somewhere between individuals and 
universals. For Webster, compositions are not properly 
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understood as either individuals or universals. 
To begin with, Webster distinguishes universals from 
individuals in terms of what I shall construe as four key 
features: 
(1) physical uniqueness and temporal specificity. 
(2) spatial and temporal continuity, (or contiguity). 
(3) capacity for multiple instantiations. 
(4) independence from individual realization. 
Individuals are identifiable as manifesting features (1) and 
(2); universals manifest features (3) and (4); and as we 
shall see, abstract particulars manifest, in a sense, 
features (1) and (3). Note that for each of the three 
ontological categories, (universal, individual, abstract 
particular), two features are affirmed for that category, 
while the remaining two features are denied. For example, 
an individual may be defined positively as an entity 
physically unique, temporally specific, and spatially and 
temporally continuous. Or it may be defined negatively as 
the sort of entity that is not capable of multiple 
instantiations and is entirely dependent upon individual 
realization for its existence. Similarly, universals may be 
understood negatively as the sorts of purported entities 
that do not exist in any physical, temporal, or 
continuous, (i.e., contiguous), way. 
The characterization of the distinction between 
universals and particulars in the above manner is 
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sufficiently consistent with what has preceded it in this 
paper that little more need be said about it. But what of 
Webster's notion of abstract particulars? Let us now 
examine how they differ from both universals and individuals 
within the context of the four features mentioned above. 
As stated earlier, abstract particular may be 
understood as referring to the ontological category 
manifesting features (1) and (3). At first gloss it seems 
quite strange to say of a thing both that it is physically 
unique and temporally specific and that it is capable of 
multiple instantiations. What Webster means by such claims 
shall now be spelled out. 
Under Webster's view, abstract particulars, like 
universals, are themselves neither spatially nor temporally 
continuous entities. That is to say, they may be understood 
as capable of existing in more than one place at more than 
one time. For example, the universal 'Dog' is supposed to 
be present, in some manner or other, in each of any number 
of spatially and temporally separate individual dogs. The 
abstract particular 'Beethoven's Ninth Symphony' is likewise 
existent somehow, according to Webster, in each of any 
number of spatially and temporally separate musical 
realizations that warrant the title "Beethoven's Ninth 
(What permits such warranting of a title for 
Webster will be discussed below). How then is the notion of 
abstract particulars to be distinguished from that of 
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universals? 
Unlike universals, abstract particulars, as described 
by Webster, do not exist independently of their 
realizations. Whereas the universal 'Dog' requires no 
instantiations in order to exist as a universal, 
'Beethoven's Ninth Symphony' must be realized in some medium 
or other in order to properly say of it that it exists. As 
Webster puts it, 
The distinguishing feature of an abstract particular is 
that it does not exist at all unless it exists at some 
place at some time, but its identity is independent of 
the continuity of times and places at which it exists. 
An abstract particular exists wherever and whenever it 
is realized, and unrealized does not exist at all.32 
Thus, abstract particulars manifest feature (1) in the sense 
that they must ~e physically and temporally realized in some 
medium or other. Webster mentions that in the case of music 
such realizations are usually either scores or performances; 
but other media are availible: "topological makeup of the 
grooves on a record, radio waves traveling in space, 
magnetic patterns on tape, ... ,"31 and so on. 
In these latter terms, Webster's and my views are 
somewhat compatible. It would seem safe to say that in 
certain respects Webster's theory of compositional works 
appears to be a physicalist theory, as is mine. When he 
says that, "there is no work independent of a realization 
and no realization without a medium,"32 and the examples he 
gives of the various media are all physical, it seems 
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justifiable to conclude that all musical works, under 
Webster's view, are physical entities. Actually, Webster is 
a bit unclear about this. He says that all works must be 
realized in some medium, and that each realization is an 
individual. He has already defined individuals, in part, as 
essentially "physically unique•. Vet later on, in the 
context of his discussion of authoritative realizations, 
(which I will address shortly), he says, "the authoritative 
realization may be in the composer's mind."34 It is not 
clear how such a mental realization could be regarded as 
"physically unique and temporally specific". Webster does 
not explain this. 
But Webster and I diverge more significantly with 
respect to his claim that musical works manifest what I have 
called feature (3). That is, Webster believes that musical 
works, as abstract particulars, are capable of multiple 
instantiations, or as he puts it, "discontinuous existence". 
Discontinuous existence is essentially a denial of feature 
(2), a definitive characteristic of individuals. For 
Webster, whatever is an abstract particular is not an 
individual just because it can be said to exist in more than 
one place at more than one time. 
An abstract particular may exist in realizations (which 
are individuals) which are discontinuous spatially and 
temporally with one another. All of its realizations 
are individuals, but the abstract particular is not 
identical with any of its realizations, and yet is 
identical in all of its realizations.33 
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In this way, insofar as Webster and I might agree that 
musical works must be physically actualized, we disagree 
over his claims that, (a) a musical work is not identical 
with any single individual, and (b) a work may exist 
equally in multiple realizations. 
It is on just these points that Webster's theory is 
not nominalistic, and thus distinct from my theory. As such 
this fact alone certainly does not count against its 
adequacy, unless of course one is a nominalist. My 
intention at this point is merely to clarify the essential 
distinctions between my approach and others; and to indicate 
that what we have in Webster's theory is an approach that 
appears to be physicalistic, like mine, (but unlike either 
Collingwood's or Wolterstorff 's), yet at the same time, 
unlike mine, (but similar to Wolterstorff 's), is not 
particularistic. (Although Webster calls musical works 
abstract particulars, I do not believe that his conception 
of works is actually particularistic, and so "abstract 
particular" may not be, in my view, an accurate name for the 
ontological category he develops. I shall examine this 
question of terminology in the next chapter.) 
In order to more fully understand Webster's theory, it 
is necessary to examine some other aspects of his proposed 
conception of musical works. 
Two elements of Webster's theory are specifically 
relevant and important to the context of my thesis. First, 
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his description of compositions as •two dimensionalu 
abstract particulars. Second, his notion of "authoritative 
realization". 
Webster states that "a work of musical composition is 
an abstract particular in two dimensions. The work exists 
whenever, and only whenever these dimensions are realized in 
some medium."37 These two dimensions consist of relations 
organized tonally (or vertically) and rhythmically (or 
linearly). The relata of these dimensional relations may be 
virtually anything as long as "they are elements of a 
potential medium for work realization".38 For example, a 
composition realized 1n the medium of sound as a performance 
would consist of sounds related to one another in terms of 
tonal intervals, (changes in pitch), and rhythmic intervals, 
(changes in duration and accents of sounds over time). A 
score, on the other hand, is a realization in the medium of 
notation in which various symbols, ("notational phenomena•), 
are related to one another in such a way that some symbols 
describe tonal intervals and others describe rhythmic 
intervals. 
Webster wishes to emphasize, at this point, that 
musical elements, (the relata of dimensional organization), 
in whatever medium, are, by themselves, minimally 
significant. What is most significant are the relations or 
intervals between the elements. More simply, the identity 
of a composition is a matter primarily of the way in which 
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musical elements are arranged. A performance of a 
composition, for instance, is not merely the collection of 
certain musical tones and rhythms, but the proper sequence 
and arrangements of these certain tones and rhythms. 
Now the identity of most any compound individual is to 
some extent a function of the arrangement and relations of 
its constituent parts. The relational arrangement of my 
body parts has much to do with my individual identity; not 
just any arrangement will do. Clearly, Webster is saying 
more than that the way the relata are related is crucial to 
some work's identity. He is indicating something about how 
these relations are decisive for identifying realizations of 
some given musical work, i.e., how each of several 
realizations are realizations of a single work. 
In attempting to clarify just how this is so, he says, 
"every correct and complete realization of a work is 
isomorphic with some authoritative realization of the work 
with respect to the ordered sets of relations in each 
dimension."39 Thus, a genuine realization is something that 
manifests a set of relations specific to that work. What 
are most important are the relations, not the relata. 
Webster has now introduced his notion of 
"authoritative realization•. Such a realization is defined 
as that realization which serves to identify "violations of, 
deviation from, and alternative work realizations."40 
Authoritative realizations function similarly to 
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Wolterstorff's norm-kinds: they help us distinguish correct 
from incorrect performances, scores, recordings, etc. As 
was partially described above, Webster's view is that 
whatever realization is taken as authoritative, any other 
realization which is isomorphic with it counts as a correct 
and complete realization of the work. It should be noted 
that Webster is not identifying the composition with its 
authoritative realization; rather, it serves only a 
practical function for identifying more or less accurate 
realizations of a work. 
The following characteristics of authoritative 
realizations (henceforth AR) may help clarify Webster's 
notion further: 
(1) ARs need not be temporally prior to any other 
realization. An AR is not necessarily the original or first 
realization of a work. Rather, the AR is whatever 
realization is given or taken to have the proper authority. 
Webster does not specify how this occurs; partly because 
there are any number of ways that it could. He does say 
that, "The justification for considering a particular 
realization to be authoritative is pragmatic, not 
logical."41 In other words, there are no specifiable rules 
or criteria for determining which realizations are ARs, such 
as temporal priority. 
(2) The compositional work is not identified with the 
AR. The AR only provides the means for comparing and 
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contrasting various realizations of the work, but the AR is 
itself not the work. 
(3) Any given composition may or may not have an AR. 
Or there may be more than one competing ARs. This may be so 
for various reasons. The composer may not have indicated 
what would count as the AR. The composer's AR may be lost 
or unknown. There may be conflicting views over which of 
two or more competing ARs is the true AR. And so on. 
Earlier I mentioned that Webster claims that an AR 
could exist in the composer's mind. I suspect that a 
justification he might offer for this claim would be that 
such an occurrence qualifies as a realization in a medium to 
the extent that it is spatially unique and temporally 
specific insofar as it is a mental phenomenon in the mind of 
the composer. 
I shall leave further commentary on Webster's theory 
for the next chapter, in which the issues and the 
perspective he presents will be discussed directly and in 
the context of the other two theories discussed in the 
present chapter. I shall set my proposed theory in 
opposition to these three by means of a typology using a 
specified conception of the terms of concrete, abstract, 
particular, and universal. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
I have characterized my proposal for a nominalistic 
theory of compositions in terms of what I have called 
"concrete particulars". I have done so not because I 
believe a nominalistic theory must consider them in such 
terms; rather, (1) since they are artifacts, I think musical 
compositions are best understood as concrete pariculars; 
and (2) if compositions can be construed as concrete 
particulars, a nominalism with respect to musical entities 
is clearly attainable. After all, concrete particulars are 
necessarily and noncontroversially individuals; and a 
nominalism is just that ontological perspective that 
countenances only individuals. 
If this first objective can be accomplished, an 
additional task, which would aim toward developing a fuller 
nominalistic treatment of music as a whole, would be to show 
how, in terms of individuality alone, these 
compositions-as-individuals are related to what are referred 
to as their performances and other so-called "examples", 
(scores, recordings, etc.). But the notion of musical 
compositions as individuals is the toughest nut to crack, so 
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to speak, on the way to a nominalistic ontology of music. 
The sense in which this is the case was discussed at length 
in Chapter I. Simply put, the apparent problem is that 
compositions have seemed to some to be related to their 
so-called examples in a way that suggests they are best 
construed as some sort of universals or other abstract 
entities, i.e., non-physical entities capable of multiple 
realizations or instantiations. Typically, performances or 
other occurrences of a composition appear as associated in 
such a way that it is presumed that the composition itself 
is somehow evident or present in its realizations. 
Therefore, it may seem that compositions just cannot be 
individuals in the way that, say paintings or sculptures 
seem to be. I have attempted to show otherwise. 
I think I have provided, in what has preceded, a 
plausible account of musical compositions, (and music 
generally), that construes them as concrete particulars. If 
this is true, then I believe I have gone some distance in 
accomplishing a goal I set out for myself from the beginning 
of this dissertation. I have aimed at producing an 
alternative limiting theory, cast in nominalistic terms, 
that fits within an array of theories that has been produced 
by others. My hypothetical adventure consisted of 
developing a theory within certain parameters; that is, all 
musical entities were to be described as individuals. 
The three theories of musical compositions discussed 
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in Chapter IV are also, I believe, limiting theories of 
sorts. In the present chapter, I shall attempt to show more 
explicitly how these four theories, (mine and the others), 
indicate four distinct directions a musical ontology may 
take. I shall do so by combining the specified uses of a 
set of four terms into four main positions that may then be 
applied to the sorts of ontological considerations I have 
been investigating. More specifically, these four positions 
will serve to identify or demarcate what I think are four 
principal ontological conceptions of musical compositions. 
Four Ontological Categories 
The four terms that shall provide the language for 
characterizing the four ontological categories under 
consideration are: 'concrete', 'abstract', 'particular', and 
'universal'. As I shall attempt to indicate, these terms 
may be understood as fitting together in four important 
ways. Since 'concrete' and 'abstract' will be shown to be 
contrast terms, as will 'particular' and 'universal', the 
following, in no significant order, may be regarded as the 
possible alternative conceptions of the ontological status 
of something: 
( 1 ) concrete particular; 
(2) abstract particular; 
(3) abstract universal; 
(4) concrete universal. 
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Let me begin by briefly summarizing points I have made 
earlier and throughout this dissertation about the four 
elementary terms from which these categories are derived. 
But before I go any further, I should make clear that 
although I will be describing certain ontological 
categories, such descriptions are to be understood as 
entirely theoretical. That is, I will be making no claims 
as to whether or not anything exists within any given 
category as described. Part of my purpose in presenting 
these categories is that I think an ontology is largely 
describable in terms of which categories are taken as 
identifying genuine existents. 
Under the use I propose for the term 'concrete', 
something is said to be concrete if it is describable as 
physical or capable of intersubjective perception. It is 
identifiable as something composed of matter, (however 
matter is to be understood); and/or it is perceivable with 
the senses. As I explained before, I am simply assuming for 
the purposes of this dissertation that material objects 
exist and that there are sensory perceptions. My intention 
is not to solve or even address any of the well-known 
controversies over such matters as matter and perception. 
Nothing I say turns on any conclusions about such claims 
anyway. Rather, all that is required in the present context 
is the acknowledgement that we can and do at least talk 
about physical objects and intersubjective sensory 
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experience. My point here is that we can distinguish 
descriptions of physical objects and sensory experiences 
from other sorts of descriptions, and that such physical and 
phenomenal descriptions are descriptions are of what I shall 
call concrete entities. Therefore, anything that can be 
described as physical (material) or capable of 
intersubjective sensory apprehension can be referred to, 
under the proposed terminology, as concrete. 
Traditionally, the term concrete has had a use 
indicating some sense of being composite, compound, coming 
together, and so on. Thus, concrete has been used, for 
example, to refer to the way in which an abstract quality is 
united, combined, or embodied in substance or matter. Thus, 
a thing was said to be concrete, whereas a quality or 
attribute was said to be abstract. In order to avoid the 
complex metaphysics implied by such a characterization of 
the meaning of this notion, I am suggesting that the term 
has a genuine use referring simply to something just being 
material or sensory. Again, to describe something as 
physical or perceptual is to describe it as concrete. 
One proviso with respect to what I am calling sensory 
or perceptual should be kept in mind. I wish to distinguish 
such notions from what have sometimes been referred to as 
"internal sensations". That is, I take dreams, 
hallucinations, mental images, and any other sort of 
experiences that are not purported to originate outside the 
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perceiver and to be accessible through the sensory organs, 
to be included among those things which I shall eventually 
describe as abstract rather than concrete. This is why I 
have said that sensory experience which is concrete is 
"intersubjective". That is to say, such experience is in 
some sense objective or publically accessible by means of 
the senses. But this is not to say that all concrete 
things are directly and publically accessible with the 
senses. For example, atoms would seem to be appropriately 
described as concrete, yet they are not sensory, strictly 
speaking. Thus, it would seem that anything that is 
physical may be said to be concrete, and anything that is 
intersubjectively perceptual may also be said to be 
concrete; but not everything that is said to be concrete is 
perceptual. 
In contrast to 'concrete', the term 'abstract' will be 
used to refer to what is not describable as physical or 
intersubjectively perceptual. What we usually refer to 
generically as 'ideas' are prime examples of what I have in 
mind for the term abstract. I shall use the term abstract in 
such a way that it may serve to identify or describe such 
various things, (or purported things), as ideas, mental 
conceptions, forms, structure, spirits, souls, and so on. 
To the extent that such things are apprehended, it is not by 
means of the sensory organs; and to the extent they may be 
said to exist, they are not properly conceived as being 
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material. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, 
'particular' shall be understood as synonymous with the term 
'individual'. Something is particular when it is singular 
and not general or universal. A key feature of a particular 
is that it can be located in a specifiable place and at an 
identifiable time. A particular does not exist in more than 
one place at one time; it has a definite spatial and 
temporal identity. 
It should be pointed out that a particular is not 
necessarily concrete. Given what was said about the notion 
of abstract, and if there are such things, it could be that 
something can be both particular and abstract. For example, 
my memory of some event is an idea and so it is abstract, 
under my view; but the occasion of having that idea is 
identifiable with the time I have the memory, and with the 
place where I am when I have it; thus, it is a particular 
idea. The idea is occurring here and now with me, not 
nowhere at no time, nor elsewhere at many times. We do 
speak of different persons having the same idea, or the one 
person having the same idea twice. Whether such talk should 
be taken literally or not as implying multiple existence of 
the same thing is an important question. (As we shall see, 
such descriptions of ideas would class them as universals). 
But my only point here is that we can regard or describe 
certain ideas as abstract and particular. They would be 
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non-concrete things that are, in a sense, spatially and 
temporally locatable; thus they are particulars. Another 
example of an abstract entity which is also a particular 
might be a Cartesian human soul. Such a conception of a 
person's soul would claim that a soul exists during a period 
of time that is identifiable, and this soul can exist with a 
body at some identifiable place. I wiil say more about 
'abstract particulars' shortly. 
Finally, the term 'universal' shall be understood to 
refer to entities which are not identifiable with a specific 
time or place; rather, a universal is said to be capable of 
multiple existence or realization. A universal is purported 
to be the sort of thing that may exist in more than one 
place at one time. 'Universal' is thus the contrast term to 
'particular'. It should be made clear that it is not 
necessarily the case that a universal as such, (or what is 
purported to be a universal), must actually be instantiated 
or realized in order to exist, only that it can so exist. 
Particulars cannot exist in this way at all. 
We are now in a position to combine the elementary 
terms into the four basic ontological categories mentioned 
above. The four categories are again (1) concrete 
particular; (2) abstract particular; (3) abstract universal; 
and (4) concrete universal. These are the four meaningful 
combinations of the four terms thus far described. Given 
the ways that the terms were defined, such combinations as 
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'particular universal' or 'concrete abstract' are not 
possible, much like 'odd even'. Besides, the way that I am 
using the terms, 'particular' and 'universal' are generally 
used as nouns, whereas 'abstract' and 'concrete' usually 
function as adjectives. 
A concrete particular is something which is a 
physical, singular individual, and it exists and is 
locatable in space and time. Often, but not always, 
concrete particulars are publically observable through an 
exercise of the senses. Some examples are such things as 
rocks, trees, chairs, animals, and atoms. 
As I described above, an abstract particular, like a 
concrete particular, is also spatially and temporally 
locatable, but it is not a physical or publically observable 
entity. It exists independent of being itself material. 
Examples would be mental conceptions and images, as well as 
minds or souls. 
An abstract universal is the sort of thing that would 
be, first, neither physical nor perceptual; and secondly, 
neither is it identifiable as spatial or temporal. It is 
capable of multiple occurrence, and can be attributed to 
many different individuals. Plato's Forms are the 
preeminent examples of abstract universals. Kinds, natures, 
essences, etc., are often conceived as abstract universals. 
Finally, a concrete universal would be the sort of 
entity that exists physically, in some sense, yet is not 
198 
limited to individual spatial or temporal location. This 
appears to be a very peculiar notion. But it would seem 
that something akin to Aristotle's essences may be likely 
candidates for examples within this category. The reason I 
think this, is that a concrete universal would amount to a 
universal that depends on physical instantiation for its 
existence. For example, it might be argued that nwhite" 
should be regarded as a concrete universal because while 
many things many be white at the same time in different 
places and in the same respect, and so may count as a 
genuine universal; "white" must exist in some physical 
realization in order to exist at all. "White• has no 
meaning independent of white things, things capable of being 
perceived as white; though there may be an indefinte number 
of them. Therefore, so-called physical qualities may, under 
some views, be considered concrete universals rather than 
abstract universals. The latter may exist independent of 
any realization or instantiation, whereas the former must 
exist as physically realized in order to exist at all. 
The four theories of musical compositions presented in 
this dissertation appear to correspond, more or less, with 
the four ontological categories just described. In the case 
of my own theory, I have purposely tried to develop a 
conception of compositions which construes them explicitly 
as concrete particulars. Musical artworks are thus original 
physical artifacts consisting of collections of either 
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actual musical sounds or inscriptions of musical notations, 
which are themselves concrete particulars. They are 
intended originals made by some person from some selection 
and arrangemnet of musical elements. If these elements are 
sounds, the composition itself is exceedingly short-lived; 
it ceases to exist after its sounding. Any future awareness 
of the composition is dependent upon the existence of 
musical works derived from it. Subsequent attempts to make 
scores or performances of a composition made of sounds 
result not in instances, examples, occurrences, or 
realizations of the composition. Rather, performances, 
scores, recordings, or any other entity comprised of the 
appropriate musical elements, are distinct and unique 
individual works that, owing to their status as genuinely 
derived from the composition are entitled to the title of 
the original artwork. 
Compositions made from musical elements that are not 
sounds have whatever durability these constitutive elements 
possess. That is, a composition which is a manuscript score 
consisting of inscriptions on paper will survive as long as 
the manuscript score remains in existence. If it is 
destroyed, so is the composition. This is no different than 
if daVinci's "Mona Lisa" were destroyed by fire, and we 
would quite accurately say that the "Mona Lisa" no longer 
exists. Copies and derivations afford us some sense of the 
nature of the original composition, maybe even to a very 
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high degree of compliance, but the composition ceases to 
exist when its constituents musical elements, (which are 
themselves concrete particulars), cease to exist. 
In sharp contrast to this proposed ontological 
characterization of compositions is Nicholas Wolterstorff 's 
theory of musical artworks as "norm-kinds". As we have 
observed in the previous chapter, Wolterstorff's proposal 
consists in defining musical compositions as a kind of 
universal. More precisely, they are norm-kinds, an abstract 
entity capable of an indefinite number of occurrences in 
many different media. This norm-kind is distinguished from 
other kinds of kinds by its status as a standard for 
determining the correctness of any occurrence derived from 
it. The composition as norm-kind need never be 
instantiated; it exists independent of any actual 
occurrences. For example, any given musical composition 
need never be performed. According to the description 
developed by Wolterstorff, it seems appropriate to 
categorize compositions as abstract universals. They are 
abstract, rather than concrete, because they are not and 
need never be physically or perceptually existent; they 
exist independently of the material world. Compositions are 
universals, rather than particulars, simply because they are 
defined as the sort of thing which may have examples or 
multiple occurrences. A composition is neither to be 
identified with any given example nor is it dependent upon 
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these examples for its own existence. 
William Webster has articulated a theory of musical 
compositions in which he refers to them as abstract 
particulars. It should be apparent by now that I find this 
category misapplied within hi.s theory. I would argue that, 
from what he says about musical compositions, it would be 
more accurate to categorize them as concrete universals. 
For Webster, a composition does not exist independent of 
being realized in some medium. That is, a composition 
always exists as one or other of the following: a score, a 
sounded performance, grooves on a vinyl disc, radio waves, 
magnetic patterns on plastic tape, and so on. These are all 
physical media, so it seems evident that Webster takes 
compositions to be necessarily dependent upon physical 
existence. Therefore, compositions, as described by 
Webster, would seem to be concrete, rather than abstract 
entities. 
Furthermore, and I think more significantly, he does 
not describe compositions in terms that I think justify 
categorization as particulars. Webster holds that the 
distinguishing mark between individuals as such and what he 
calls abstract particulars is that the former cannot have 
"discontinuous existence•, whereas the latter can. But what 
he means by discontinuous existence has much to do with why 
I think his view is not about particulars, but instead about 
a kind of universal. 
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I have indicated that, under my view, to be a 
particular is to be, in some sense, spatially and temporally 
locatable. With this, Webster would agree. But I do not 
think this precludes at least one sort of discontinuous 
existence; one that Nelson Goodman suggests is consistent 
with certain individuals. As noted in Chapter II, Goodman 
argues that certain individuals may be construed as 
discontinuous wholes; i.e., individual parts spatially and 
temporally separated with each part going together to form a 
compound whole individual. (Though nothing about this 
description of individuals is at odds with my my own views, 
it should be noted that neither Goodman nor I claim that 
compositions are this sort of individual.) 
Now Webster's view is not that compositions consist of 
realizations as parts of some one whole composition. 
Rather, each realization is itself an instance of the 
composition, but the composition cannot exist independent of 
any realization. In this way, Goodman's sense of 
discontinuous existence and Webster's sense of the same are 
quite different. What makes Webster's sense of 
discontinuous existence significant for his theory is that 
it allows multiple occurrences of the composition at the 
same time. Therefore, even under Goodman's characterization 
of this sort of individuality, Webster's view fails to count 
as properly individualistic. 
Admittedly, Webster does not want to construe 
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compositions as individuals anyway; rather, they are to be 
considered, according to Webster, abstract particulars. 
Though Webster may choose to stipulate a specific use for 
his terms, I think to do so as he does is misleading. The 
importance he gives to setting so-called abstract 
particulars off from individuals is not so much because he 
thinks they have discontinuous existence, but because he 
thinks they may have multiple realizations. The only sense 
in which compositions as nabstract particulars 0 have 
udiscontinuous existence•, according to Webster, is in the 
sense of that the individual realizations of the composition 
exist literally unconnected to one another; yet each, by 
itself is a realization of the composition. It seems to me, 
that such a characterization is much more accurately 
understood as referring to a kind of universal; namely, a 
concrete universal, because they must exist concretely in 
order to exist at all. 
Though I do think Webster is mistaken in how he 
chooses to name his view, my primary purpose for criticizing 
his terminology is to set it in context, by means of a 
reasonably consistent use of language, with the rest of the 
theories I am examining, including my own. Furthermore, 
though he describes his theory in terms of what he calls 
"abstract particulars", I want to anticipate and blunt any 
temptation to regard his theory as a candidate for a 
nominalistic theory. Even if every realization of a 
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composition is understood as an individual, which few would 
dispute, it still would have to be to shown that the 
composition itself is an individual. As far as I know, 
Webster has no interest in considering his theory a 
nominalistic one; but this is somewhat beside the point. My 
purpose here is to provide examples of contrasting limiting 
theories about musical compositions. Insofar as Wolterstoff 
has provided a worthy example of a theory in which 
compositions are conceived as abstract universals, it seems 
to me that Webster's is a good example of a theory that 
construes compositions as concrete universals, regardless of 
how he chooses to name his view. It only remains for me to 
provide a theoretical example which is cast in terms of what 
I have defined as abstract particulars. 
What might such a theory be like? As abstract, 
compositions would have to be described as essentially 
non-physical and non-perceptual entities. As particular, 
they would have to be regarded as identifiable with a 
specific location and time. I mentioned before that a given 
person's conscious ideas occurring at a given moment may be 
the sorts of things that would count as abstract 
particulars. Assuming that there are such things, they may 
be referred to as mental entities or the contents of mind or 
particular ideas. Thus, a theory of compositions that 
identified the essential musical work with certain ideas in 
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someone's mind could be regarded a theory that construed 
them as abstract particulars. Although I do not think it 
fits the bill perfectly, R. G. Collingwood's description of 
musical compositions seems reasonably close to one which 
effectively treats them as abstract particulars. 
Artworks, for Collingwood, are not to be identified 
with any physical or sensory artifact; rather, the artwork 
is essentially an "imaginary object" existing in the mind of 
the person attending to it. He says that artworks are made 
in the mind of the artist and nowhere else. Musical 
compositions, as artworks, are thus created ideas composed 
in the mind of the composer. If these musical ideas are 
expressed by way of a written score or •ounded on an 
instrument, it is not the composition that is being seen or 
heard. The composition-as-idea is not directly accessible 
to anyone other than the person whose idea it is. What is 
required to have any access whatsoever to the musical ideas 
of the composer is that the reader of the score or the 
listener of the performance re-construct from what is seen 
or heard an imaginary musical object of one's own. This set 
of musical ideas in the mind of the spectator is not the 
same set as those of the composer's--that is impossible. 
What is seen or heard are not themselves ideas, but 
occasions for recreating musical ideas in one's own mind. 
According to Collingwood, the composition as it 
originates and exists in the mind of the composer is fully 
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actualized in this state. In other words, the composition 
lacks for nothing, and is in no way deficient in its status 
as a "mere" idea. It does not depend on being physically or 
perceptually realized at all. If anything it is the 
artifactual expression, (e.g., a score or performance), of 
the compositional ideas that is extraneous, and somewhat 
superfluous. There is little question then that 
Collingwood's notion of compositions is one that virtually 
defines them as abstract entities. 
But is his view properly represented as being 
particularistic; that is, are his compositions essentially 
individuals? On this point Collingwood is not so clear, and 
I may be forcing my case a bit by attempting to characterize 
his position in terms of particulars. On the other hand, I 
would suggest that it is at least plausible to interpret 
what he says about compositions--that they are mental 
entities of a sort--as implying that they are abstract 
particulars. At least it is the theory of musical works 
that comes as close to such a conception as any of which I 
am aware. The reason that I think this is because no other 
theory so closely identifies the actual artwork with the 
actual ideas in the mind of the creator of the work; and 
then goes on to argue further that any given spectator's 
experience with a work is also essentially a matter of 
having certain ideas in his or her mind. When he makes this 
latter point he does not imply at all that spectators are 
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having the same ideas as those that go to make up the 
composition, i.e., the ideas in the composer's mind. 
Therefore, it would seem inappropriate, under his view, to 
regard compositions as any kind of universal. He does not 
describe the compositional work of art as consisting of 
whatever these ideas within various minds have in common. 
Rather, the ideas that he is describing are the sort that 
occur in some specific person's mind at some specific time. 
As such they would appear to be particulars. It is these 
particular ideas, these abstract particulars, that are 
constitutive of the musical composition. 
Summarizing, according to the four ontological 
categories proposed at the outset of this chapter, musical 
compositions may be construed as 
(1) concrete particulars: compositions are physical 
or perceptual artifacts; they are singular individuals 
identifiable with a specific spatial location and 
temporal duration. This dissertation is an attempt to 
articulate the details and implications of just such a 
description. 
(2) abstract particulars: composition are 
essentially mental entities originating and existing in 
the mind of the composer, and subsequently as 
reconstructed, but different, ideas in the minds of 
spectators. Any physical or sensory artifact associated 
with the composition is inessential to the existence and 
nature of the musical artwork. I have offered R. G. 
Collingwood's theory of artworks as an example of this 
sort of conception. 
(3) abstract universals: compositions exist 
independently of any actual occurrences--they need never 
be performed or scored; yet a composition may exist in 
and be attributed to multiple examples. The composition 
itself is not spatially or temporally located. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff's theory of compositions as norm-kinds is 
provided as a noteworthy example of this approach. 
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(4) concrete universals: compositions must be 
spatially and temporally realized in order to exist at 
all; yet the composition is not to be identified with 
any one of these realizations. Thus, compositions may 
have multiple existence insofar as the composition is 
what is common to its many realizations. William 
Webster has articulated just such a view. 
According to Collingwood and Wolterstorff, the existence of 
compositions does not depend upon their artifactual 
realization; whereas for Webster and me, compositions do not 
exist if their physical or perceptual realizations do not 
exist. Webster and Wolterstorff attempt to show how 
compositions may have multiple instantiations, how they may 
exist in different places at the same and different times. 
But Collingwood and I emphasize the uniqueness of a 
composition's existence, its identifiable place and its 
individuality at the time of its creation. Clearly, 
Wolterstorff's views and my own have little in common. They 
are limiting theories at opposite poles. On the other hand, 
they do share an interest in an explicit analysis of certain 
ontological issues in music. 
I offer these four theories as what I hope are 
creditable alternatives demarcating the ontological 
landscape with respect to certain aesthetic entities. 
Undoubtedly, other, and maybe better, theoretical versions 
of each categorical type are possible; though I do take 
these to be excellent theories. I have let my preferences 
be known in a way I hope is clear and somewhat convincing. 
But I leave it to readers to judge between these 
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alternatives as suits their own preferences and 
philosophical lights. 
I shall end this dissertation by commenting on its 
origins. It must be said that this dissertation was 
initially motivated by a desire to come to terms with 
Nicholas Wolterstorff 's theory of musical works. I am 
indebted to his fine work in this area of inquiry, though 
his conclusions are ones with which I am temperamentally and 
philosophically at odds. My first encounter with his 
impressive theoretical considerations on these matters found 
them, on the one hand, attractive, insofar as he sought to 
address issues about artworks that are of great interest to 
me; namely, what sort of things are artworks. On the other 
hand, my own philosophical intuitions and commitments 
discouraged me from accepting his characterizations and 
conclusions. Thus, I sought to develop a theoretical 
approach that started with similar objectives as 
Wolterstorff 's, but instead were worked out in terms more 
amenable to an ontology that I found preferable. It may be 
said then that without Nicholas Wolterstorff 's work, this 
dissertation would not have been written. I only hope I 
have provided an alternative that comes close to a level 
comparable to its inspiration. 
ENDNOTES 
Chapter I 
1. As will be explained further in Chapter II, many 
nominalisms acknowledge that terms or words can be used in a 
general fashion. The name "nominalism" itself expresses 
etymologically, (the Latin 'nominalis': belonging to a 
name), the nominalistic view that all generality or 
universality can be accounted for in terms of language 
alone. 
2. The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1971), entry #5 under 'concrete'. 
3. For a valuable discussion of a similar point, see 
Eddy M. Zemach, "The Ontological Status of Art Objects 0 in 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XXV, 
(1966), pp. 147-148. Here the author describes a 
distinction between "displayed qualities" and "represented 
qualities". Very simply, the point is that the former 
elements in artworks refer somehow to the latter. He 
develops this distinction in a way he believes to be 
acceptable even to formalists. 
4. Musical compositions may exist in other media, 
e.g., magnetic tape; these shall be discussed in Chapter 
III. 
5. George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 21-27. 
6. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic, p. 26. 
7. These three alternatives are considered briefly by 
Manuel Bilsky in his article "The Significance of Locating 
the Art Object," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
13, (1953). p. 531. He attempts to show how such differing 
conceptions of the art object's "location" can and do affect 
art theory. His point is that questions about the 
ontological status of artworks are important for 
aesthetics. 
8. Two points about what follows: 1) I shall assume 
that physical objects exist; that is, I shall not be 
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concern•d here with defending the notion that there are 
physical objects; and more importantly, 2) to the purposes 
of this dissertation I shall collapse the notions of 
physical objects and phenomenal objects together. Most 
simply, I understand by physical object something which is 
materially objective; by 11 phenomenal object" I mean 
something which is sensorially objective. Thus, it is 
possible to take these terms as referring to different 
aspects of the same thing. But the important point is that 
my use of the term 'concrete' throughout this paper is 
intended to encompass both notions without preference for 
either. 
9. Proposals along similar lines have been offered 
by such philosophers as Haig Khatchadorian, Margaret 
Macdonald, Joseph Margolis, Ruby Meager, C.I. Stevenson, and 
Richard Wollheim. Critics of this approach include Jay 
Bachrach, Richard Rudner, and R.A. Sharpe. 
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212 
Metaphysics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle, (Grinnell, 
Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1979), p. 129. 
11. William of Ockham, "Summa totius logicae" in 
Philosophical Writings: Ockham, trans. Philotheus Boehner, 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979), p. 36. 
12. Ockham, "Summa totius logiae, 11 p.38. 
13. Richard I. Aaron, The Theory of Universals, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 223. 
14. Aaron, Theory of Universals, p. 223. 
15. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 414. 
16. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge, edited by Colin M. 
Turbayne, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 10. 
17. Berkeley, Treatise Concerning the Principles of 
Human Knowledge, p. 11-12. 
18. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited 
by L. A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 
24. 
19. Rolf Eberle, Nominalistic Systems, (Dordrecht, 
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1970), p. 7. 
20. D. F. Pears, "Universals" in Logic and 
Language, ed. A.N. Flew, (Garden City, N.V.: Anchor Books, 
1965), pp. 267-281. 
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24. Much of what is discussed here with respect to the 
recurrence of qualities is derived in part from Panayot 
Butchvarov, Resemblance and Identity, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1966), and H. H. Price, Thinking 
and Experience, (London: Hutchinson University Library, 
1969). 
25. Butchvarov, Resemblance and Identity, p. 7. 
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{Dordrecht- Holland, O. Reidel Publishing Co., 1977), p. 
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39. Butchvarov, Resemblance and Identity, p. 49. 
40. Price, Thinking and Experience, pp. 19-20. 
41. Price, Thinking and Experience, pp. 19ff. 
42. Butchvarov, Resemblance and Identity, pp. 33ff. 
Chapter III 
1. This distinction between uses of "artwork" and 
"work" has been adapted somewhat from comparable 
applications of these terms by Nicholas Woterstorff in his 
Works and Worlds of Art, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), p. 41. As shall be indicated in Chapter IV, 
Woterstorff 's theory of compositions is considerably 
different from the one presented here, and so, his 
description of the different uses of "artworkM and "work of 
art" is significantly different from mine, although there 
are some important parallels. He uses "work of art" .to 
refer to artworks and their "examples•, while "artwork• 
refers to compositional works only, those works that can 
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have examples or occurrences. Such a way of describing 
things is consistent with his ontology which takes 
compositions to be a kind of universal, whereas performances 
and the like are examples or instantiations of them. The 
similarity of our usages is evident in the way that work of 
art is the broader term applicable to compositions, 
performances, etc., whereas artwork applies only to 
compositions. 
2. This is not much different from what a painter 
does in creating her artwork. A painting may takes days or 
even years to complete; and may involve all manner of 
starting, restarting, working on parts of the canvas while 
other parts are considered done. Musical composers do 
something like this although their materials are highly 
transient as so rely on memory to a greater extent. 
3. This does not preclude using recorded sounds as 
parts of performances, (e.g., a singer using recorded 
orchestral arrangements as accompaniment or a recording of 
cannon roars instead of real cannons in the "1812 
Overture"), or possibly even using nothing but recordings to 
produce a performance: imagine some avant-garde performer 
switching various recording/playback machines on and off in 
a certain way and calling the resulting sound-sequence-event 
a musical performance. I am not uncomfortable with 
accepting this as a genuine performance. My description of 
it using my terminology would be that it was a whole 
performance comprised of recordings as parts, but that none 
of the individual recordings as such were the performance. 
I am not sure how to solve the puzzle which might be created 
by a "performer" who simply stands in front of an audience, 
t~rns on a single machine which plays back some recorded 
music and then at a certain point turns off the machine and 
regards the whole event to be a musical performance. One 
solution may be to regard genuinely musical performances 
to be those which include at least one performer who is 
actually and directly making musical sounds. 
4. It may be desirable to distinguish 0 mere 
practicing" from rehearsing, with the former not being a 
case of performing whereas the latter is. Mere practicing 
also involves making musical sounds but with no intentional 
reference to a compositional work. Rehearsals are 
performances to the extent that they are "deriveda from a 
compositional work of music. What I mean by "derived• will 
be discussed a little later in this chapter. 
5. Admittedly, the words, lyrics, or libretto 
associated with much music is often regarded as part of a 
musical work. Many music composers "compose• these-words 
for their works. I do not consider this to be musical 
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composition though. Writing words for musical works is 
actually a kind of literary writing, although, the tonal 
aspects of the words often have musical significance. 
6. See Chapter I on the distinction between 
evaluative and classificatory senses of art. 
7. For an interesting examination of the status of 
composition by way of recording techniques, see Linda 
Ferguson, "Tape Composition: An Art Form in Search of Its 
Metaphysics," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
Vol. XLII, No. 1 (1983), pp. 17-27. 
8. Philip Alperson has provided a valuable 
contribution to discussions about musical improvisation in 
his article "On Musical Improvisation, 0 in The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XLIII, No. 1 (1984), pp. 
17-29. While his general view of music is not nominalistic, 
his analysis of improvisation is not at great odds with my 
own. 
9. For example, John Cage and George Crumb have 
composed works by adapting additional symbols and 
arrangements of symbols to traditional notation, or by 
creating entirely new symbols and schemes. 
10. Nelson Goodman makes a similar point with his 
well-known notion of "sameness of spelling•. See Languages 
of Art, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
1976), pp. 115-117, 131-132. 
11. Again, Nelson Goodman has contirbuted much to my 
thinking on this. See Languages of Art, pp. 143-148, 
233-234. 
12. See Richard Rudner, "The Ontological Status of 
the Aesthetic Object• in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 10, (1950), pp. 380-388. 
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